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chapter investigates the impact of home Internet usage on women’s labor supply. From
shopping to telecommuting, home high speed Internet has affected where, when and how
individuals conduct numerous activities, and many of these changes could plausibly alter
labor supply decisions. Utilizing exogenous variation in Internet usage induced by supply-
side constraints to residential broadband Internet access, I find that married women who use
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I explore the potential mechanisms explaining this increase in labor supply by examining
data on Internet usage, telework and time use. I find that telework, job search and time
saved in home production are all plausible mechanisms through which Internet usage affects
female labor supply, and the ability to engage in part-time telework through an employer is
the greatest contributor to the estimated effects.
In the fourth chapter, coauthored with Melissa Kearney, we examine the effect of the
recent housing boom and bust cycle on fertility decisions. Recognizing that housing is a
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fertility. This applies to both potential first-time homeowners and current homeowners who
might upgrade to a bigger house with the addition of a child. On the other hand, for current
homeowners, an increase in house prices will increase home equity, leading to a positive effect
on birth rates. Employing data on Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-level house prices,
MSA-group level fertility rates, and MSA-group level home ownership rates, we find that
indeed, short-term increases in house prices lead to a decline in births among non-owners
and a net increase among owners.
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, WORK AND FAMILY
by
Lisa Jeanne Dettling
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Melissa S. Kearney, Chair/Advisor








To Jake Grover, whose support and encouragement made this possible.
ii
Acknowledgments
I would especially like to thank my mentor, coauthor and friend Melissa Kearney, who
provided countless hours of advice and support throughout this process and provided me
with excellent opportunities to learn. I am also grateful for the excellent comments and
suggestions I received from Judy Hellerstein and Sergio Urzua throughout my Ph.D, and
especially while working on my job market paper. There are many others who provided
advice and support throughout this process, including Jessica Goldberg, Lesley Turner, Belen
Sbrancia, Soohyung Lee, Tim Moore, John Ham, Ethan Kaplan, and John Shea. I’d also
like to thank participants from various seminars, particularly at the University of Maryland,
for helpful comments and suggestions. Thank you also to Jessica Goldberg and Joan Kahn
for serving on my dissertation committee. I thank the Economic Club of Washington and
the training program at the Maryland Population Research Center for financial support.
Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their help and encouragement.
iii
Table of Contents
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Opting Back In: Home Internet Use and Female Labor Supply 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.1 Data and Baseline Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.2 Preliminary Linear Probability Model Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.3 Proposed Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.4 Instrumental Variables Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.1 First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.2 Labor Force Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.3 Different Demographic Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.4 Alternative Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.5 Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.6 Falsification Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.7 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 Interpreting the Results as LATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.1 Characterizing the Compliant Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.2 Marginal Treatment Effects and Linear IV Weights . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Interpreting the Results in the Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.9.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.9.2 History of Broadband Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.9.3 Local IV Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.9.4 Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Home Internet and the Labor Market: Decomposing the Effects of Internet Usage
on Labor Supply 73
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Background on Internet Usage Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4 Telework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4.1 Summary Statistics on Telework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4.2 Self Employment and Full Time Telework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Job Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
iv
3.6 Home Production and Leisure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.6.1 Evidence from Time Use Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.6.2 Evidence from the Current Population Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.7 Decomposing the Net Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4 House Prices and Birth Rates: The Impact of the Real Estate Market on the
Decision to Have a Baby 108
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.2 Conceptual Framework and Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3 Data and Empirical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.3.3 Empirical Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.4 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.4.2 Instrumental Variables (IV) specifications: Exploiting local housing
supply elasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.4.3 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.4.4 Different Demographic Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.4.5 Individual level estimation – using Current Population Survey (CPS)
1996-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4.6 Housing Bust Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.5 Interpreting the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.5.1 Interpreting the Magnitudes of the Estimated Effects: Simulation Ex-
ercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.5.2 The Home Equity Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.7.1 Metropolitan Statistical Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144




2.1 High-Speed Internet Installation Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 State MDU Rates and State Residential High-Speed Internet Access Rates . 56
2.3 Reduced Form Relationship between MDU Rates and Labor Force Participa-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4 Aggregate Trends in Labor Force Participation 2000-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5 Decomposition of Instrumental Variables Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.6 Group Mean Predicted Change in Participation and Rates of Internet Use for
Different Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.7 Appendix - Marginal Treatment Effects for z = MDU ∗ t . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1 Internet Usage Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.2 Occupation Mean Internet Usage and Work at Home Rates . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.3 Trends in Telework 2002-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.1 Housing Price Index (FHFA and Case-Shiller) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.2 Fertility Rates and Macro Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.3 Predicted Percentage Change in Births for a $10,000 Increase in MSA Housing
Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Summary Statistics on Married Women 2000-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2 Summary of State-Level Variables 2000-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 LPM Home Internet Use and Married Women’s Labor Force Participation . 63
2.4 First Stage Relationship between Percent of State Residing in MDU and Home
High-Speed Internet Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 IV Home High-Speed Internet Use and Married Women’s Labor Force Partic-
ipation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.6 Additional IV Estimates of Home High-Speed Internet Use and Participation 69
2.7 Decomposing the Instrumental Variables Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.8 Appendix - Extensions and Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1 Activities Conducted Online: CPS 2000-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2 Summary Statistics on Telework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3 Home Internet and Telework Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.4 Internet Usage for Job Search and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.5 Means and Differences Between Users and Non-Users In Hours Spent per Week
Spent In Different Time Use Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.6 Internet Usage for Home Production or Leisure and Participation . . . . . . 107
4.1 Aggregate Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.3 Housing Prices and Fertility Rates: 1997-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.4 Housing Prices and Fertility Rates by MSA Supply Elasticity: 1997-2006 . . 155
4.5 Alternative House Price Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.6 Alternative Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.7 Different Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.8 Individual Level Analysis Using CPS: 1997-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.9 Real Estate Bust Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
vii
4.10 House Prices and Home Equity Withdrawal Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162




The past century witnessed dramatic changes in the role of women in society, as women
increasingly entered the labor market and birth rates plummeted. In 1910, the average 40
year old woman had 4 children and a 21 percent chance of working. In 1990, the average
woman had 2 children and a 78 percent chance of working (Gibson, 2013). In the 1990s,
however, a divergence in the long run trend began to emerge for certain groups of women:
college educated women began having more children and their labor force participation rates
began to decline (Shang and Weinberg, 2009; Macunovich, 2010). This change popularized
the term “opting out,” which referred to the hypothesis that highly skilled women were
increasingly opting out of the labor force to be stay-at-home mothers.1 While anecdotal
evidence abounded, more rigorous empirical investigations into the veracity of this hypothesis
found mixed results (Boushey, 2005; Herr and Wolfram, 2009; Macunovich, 2010). And in
the early 2000s, participation rates for highly educated women with children began to rise
again.2
This dissertation will explore two possible explanations for recent trends in labor supply
and family formation: the diffusion of home Internet technology and the recent housing
boom and bust cycle. Between 2000 and 2009, home high speed Internet usage increased
from 5 percent to 74 percent. Moreover, home Internet is increasingly used on a regular basis
for more numerous aspects of daily life, from working from home to saving time in home
production tasks like shopping and paying bills. In chapters 2 and 3, I explore the impact
of this technology on women’s labor supply. I find that high speed Internet has led to an
increase in labor supply among highly educated women with children, which can primarily
be explained by use of home Internet to telework. The final chapter of this dissertation,
co-authored with Melissa Kearney, investigates the impact of this recent housing cycle on
1See, for example Belkin (2003); Wallis (2004); Story (2005).
2Figure 2.4 displays trends in participation among college educated women with children since 2000.
1
fertility rates. Between 1997 and 2006, home prices rose 70 percent, and between 2006 and
2010, they fell 40 percent.3 We show that the recent housing boom led to a sizable increase
in aggregate birth rates –driven by home owners who presumably felt “richer”– while the
subsequent decline led to a net decrease.
The second chapter of this dissertation investigates the impact of home Internet usage
on female labor supply. From telework to socializing, home Internet technology has changed
how, when and where individuals conduct a diverse range of activities, each of which can
affect labor supply decisions in different ways. On the one hand, home Internet can reduce
the costs of working by allowing individuals to work from home and engage in flexible
scheduling. It can also reduce search frictions if the Internet is used to search for jobs, and
save time in tasks like shopping and paying bills. These uses of Internet technology could
lead to increases in labor supply. On the other hand, home Internet provides numerous new
leisure and entertainment options, which may lead to reductions in labor supply. The net
effect of Internet usage therefore depends on the extent to which individuals use Internet for
each of those activities and the responsiveness of female labor supply along each margin.
The goal of the second chapter is to estimate the net effect of Internet usage on women’s
labor supply. To do so, I employ individual level data on home high speed Internet usage
and labor market outcomes, which can be found in the Current Population Survey (CPS)
between the years 2000 and 2009. The obvious obstacle in conducting such an exercise is
that home high speed Internet usage is likely to be endogenous to work patterns, and the
direction of the bias is not ex ante clear. On the one hand, monthly subscription fees may
be cost prohibitive for individuals who do not work, leading a naive estimate to overstate
the true impact of Internet use on labor supply. On the other hand, individuals who work
may spend less time in the home and therefore place less value on a technology that is only
used within the home. In this case, a naive estimate will understate the true impact of home
3Author’s calculation from the Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index, based on a weighted
average over the 154 metropolitan areas that comprise the sample used in the fourth chapter of this disser-
tation.
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Internet use on labor supply.
To estimate the causal effect of Internet usage on labor supply I employ an instrumental
variables (IV) strategy that isolates exogenous variation in high speed Internet usage induced
by cross-sectional variation in supply side constraints to high speed Internet access. Namely,
I exploit the fact that aspects of the underlying housing infrastructure –the fraction of the
population residing in multiple family dwellings– affected the costs of provision for Internet
service providers. This difference in costs meant that, all else equal, states with a greater
concentration of the population residing in these types of dwellings received Internet access
earlier. My identification strategy exploits these differences in trends, and the identifying
assumption is that the fraction of the state population residing in multiple family dwelling
would not have been correlated with trends in labor supply in the absence of broadband
Internet diffusion.
The results of this analysis indicate that home high speed Internet usage has led to
large and statistically significant changes in the labor supply of married women, both on the
extensive and intensive margin. The results indicate the home high speed Internet usage leads
to a 4.1 percentage point increase in participation. The aggregate effects, however, mask
significant heterogeneity across groups and the effects are only found for highly educated
women with children. Effects among childless women, less educated women, and men are
found to be small and insignificant, and a falsification test indicates that there is no reduced
form impact of the instrument on labor supply prior to the diffusion of high-speed Internet.
In the third chapter, I explore the mechanisms underlying the increase in labor supply
induced by home use of high speed Internet. I begin the analysis by investigating summary
data on the ways in which individuals use the Internet, both across groups and over time.
I find that Internet users use the Internet for a wide range of tasks, including work-related
activities, leisure activities and home production tasks. Then, I propose a theoretical model
which incorporates all of the different ways individuals use the Internet into a labor supply
decision-making framework. The model considers four broad categories of Internet usage:
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telework, home production, job search and leisure, and creates predictions for the effects of
Internet usage for each activity on labor supply decisions.
I empirically examine the role of Internet usage for telework, home production, job search
and leisure in explaining the increases in participation and hours found in the second chapter
by employing data on Internet usage, telework, employment histories and time use. Using
those data, I conduct various additional analyses, including examining the relationship be-
tween telework patterns and Internet usage, studying the effect of Internet job search on
durations of transitions from non-participation to participation, and comparing the amount
of time Internet users and non-users spend in home production tasks. I conclude that tele-
work, job search and time saved in home production are all plausible mechanisms explaining
the results, and the ability to engage in part-time telework through an employer appears to
be the greatest contributor to the estimated effects.
The fourth chapter of the dissertation, coauthored with Melissa Kearney, investigates how
changes in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-level house prices impact household fertility
decisions. The conceptual approach is based on an economic model of fertility that recognizes
that changes in house prices potentially have offsetting effects on fertility. Recognizing that
housing is a major cost associated with child rearing, and assuming that children are normal
goods, we hypothesize that an increase in real estate prices will have a negative price effect
on current period fertility. This applies to both potential first-time homeowners and current
homeowners who might upgrade to a bigger house with the addition of a child. On the other
hand, for current homeowners, an increase in MSA-level house prices will increase home
equity, leading to a positive effect on birth rates. The net effect of house prices on aggregate
birth rates will depend on individual’s responsiveness along these margins and rates of home
ownership.
We estimate the effect of movements in aggregate house prices on aggregate birth rates
by employing data on MSA-level median home prices, MSA-group level fertility rates and
MSA-group level home ownership rates. Our main analyses consists of a set of ordinary
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least squares (OLS) regressions of MSA-group fertility rates on MSA-level house prices.
Importantly, we interact our measure of house prices with the measure of MSA-group level
home ownership rates so that we are able to separately identify the hypothesized price and
wealth effects which are expected to effect owners and renters differently. Controlling for
MSA fixed effects, trends, and time-varying conditions, our analysis finds that short-term
increases in house prices lead to a decline in births among groups with low levels of ownership
and an increase among groups with high level of ownership.
The key to our empirical approach is to separately identify effects for owners and non-
owners. Therefore, any alternative explanation (other than a causal effect of house prices) for
these observed relationships must differentially impact owners and non-owners. To address
the possibility that other local factors that drive both local area house prices and affect
the fertility behavior of owners and renters differently are biasing our OLS estimates, we
additionally implement an instrumental variables (IV) strategy that exploits exogenous vari-
ation in house price movements induced by variation across MSAs in their housing supply
elasticity. Results using the instrumental variables strategy are qualitatively similar to the
OLS results.
The main results of our analysis are statistically significant and economically meaningful.
Employing our regression estimates in a straightforward simulation exercise, we find that a
$10,000 increase in home prices is associated with a 5 percent increase in fertility rates in MSA
cells with 100 percent ownership rates. For MSA cells with zero percent home ownership
rates, we estimate a corresponding decrease in fertility rates of 2.4 percent. Under the
assumption of linear effects, these estimates suggest that all else held constant, the roughly
$108,000 average increase in house prices during the housing boom of 1997 to 2006 would
have led to a 9 percent increase in births over that time.
The results of this dissertation have important demographic and policy implications.
In the second chapter, I find that Internet technology is important for the labor supply
decisions of women with families. This suggests that by freeing up time spent in home
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production and permitting flexible scheduling, Internet usage facilitates work-family balance.
It also contributes to a literature on the impact of technological progress in the home on
labor market outcomes. In the third chapter, I find that Internet technology has allowed
women to increase their labor supply primarily via work from home opportunities. This
speaks to the potential role of telework and flexible scheduling as policy levers to encourage
participation. To date, there is limited evidence on the impact of telework and flexible
scheduling policies in the workplace, and take-up is still low. This is despite the potential
for these policies to benefit both employers and employees, and even increase aggregate
productivity if individuals are more productive at home or these policies encourage the
participation of productive workers.4 The second and third chapters shed new light on the
possible benefits of those policies by showing that the diffusion of high speed Internet (via
enabling telework participation) has increased the participation of a group of highly skilled
individuals.
In the fourth chapter, I find that the recent housing boom and bust cycle had a sizable
impact on aggregate fertility rates. As an issue of economic demography, understanding the
impact real estate cycles have on birth rates is interesting and informative. Moreover, our
finding that house prices exert a larger influence on fertility rates than unemployment rates
can inform future work on the demographic impact of expansions and contractions of the
economy, and suggests that economic models of fertility should consider movements in the
housing market separately from the labor market. Our work is also related to a literature on
the nature of the demand for children, and provides that literature with a useful test of wealth
effects on fertility decisions. Finally, our work speaks to a body of work on the propensity
to consume out of housing wealth, and provides insight into another way individuals may
“consume” out their home equity.
This dissertation has provided new insight into recent trends in fertility and labor supply
for American women. In the second chapter, I find that the diffusion of home high speed
4For a discussion of current research on telework and flexible scheduling policies, see the report on Work
Life Balance and Flexibility, published by the Council of Economic Advisers (2010)
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Internet has increased labor supply for highly educated women with children. This finding
is of particular interest given that much of the attention focused on this group in the early
2000s concerned the “opt out revolution” (Belkin, 2003; Wallis, 2004; Story, 2005). Yet,
after a decline in participation in the 1990s, participation among highly educated women
with children began to rise in the 2000s. I find that home Internet leads to significant
increases in labor force participation for this group of women, and a back of the envelope
calculation suggests that high speed Internet can explain 90 percent of the increase in female
labor force participation between 2000 and 2010. The third chapter finds that Internet usage
for telework and time saved in home production can explain the increase in participation that
occurred due to the diffusion of home high speed Internet. This suggests that by allowing
for workplace flexibility and lowering the costs of combining work and family, home Internet
permitted mothers to “opt back in” to the labor force.
At the same time this change in labor market participation occurred, fertility rates among
highly educated women climbed (Shang and Weinberg, 2009). This trend is potentially
consistent with the “opt out revolution” hypothesis, or a reduction in the costs of combining
work and family, but I leave it to future research to investigate those mechanisms. The late
1990s and early 2000s, however, was period in which there was a major change in economic
conditions which could have differentially affected highly educated women: the dramatic
rise in home prices. In the last chapter of this dissertation, I find that the recent housing
boom led home owners to significantly increase their fertility. Since college educated women
have relatively high rates of home ownership, this finding is a plausible explanation for the
differential rise in fertility among this group.5
This dissertation has found that two major changes which occurred in recent decades
–the introduction of high speed Internet and the housing boom and bust– have affected
women’s work and family formation decisions. These findings have important implications
5In the sample used in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, 53 percent of college graduates are home
owners, as compared to 29 percent of high school dropouts. At these rates of ownership, our simulation
results (presented in figure 4.3) imply that the net impact of a rise in house prices would be an increase in
fertility rates for college graduates and a decrease in fertility rates for high school dropouts.
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for understanding recent demographic trends and the possible impacts of policies that reduce
the costs of combining work and family. They also open up several important avenues for
future research. In the second and third chapters, I provide evidence that the introduction
of high speed Internet increased the labor force participation of married women by enabling
telework through an employer. Future research could uncover whether or not the effects
of Internet usage are concentrated on this particular group because telework opportunities
were already most readily available for that group, and whether extending telework oppor-
tunities to less educated women could have a similar effect on those groups of women in the
future. More generally, research into the potential costs and benefits of telework –both for
employees, employers, and society as a whole– will make a valuable contribution to policy
discussion in those areas. In the fourth chapter, we find that the recent housing boom and
bust had a sizable impact on fertility decisions. Future work could uncover whether fluctu-
ations in real estate markets affect other aspects of family formation, including household
formation, marriage, and divorce. These issues will be of particular interest in the future as
the implications of the recent housing cycle are fully realized.
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Chapter 2
Opting Back In: Home Internet Use and Female Labor Supply
2.1 Introduction
From shopping to telecommuting, the Internet has changed how, when, and where indi-
viduals do myriad activities. From 2000 to 2009, home high-speed Internet usage rose from
5 percent to 74 percent, a change that is remarkable for both its speed and depth of pene-
tration.6 Yet, scant evidence has been brought to bear upon the question of whether or not
this technological revolution has had a labor market impact.7 In this chapter, I investigate
whether home Internet use has altered married women’s labor supply, a group for whom
technological progress in the home has been shown to affect labor supply in the past.8 The
conceptual approach is based on an economic model of time allocation which incorporates
the diverse range of tasks for which the Internet is an input and indicates that Internet usage
can have offsetting effects on labor supply. On the one hand, home Internet can reduce the
time and monetary costs of working by allowing individuals to work from home. It can
also reduce search frictions in the labor market and save time in home production tasks like
shopping and paying bills, freeing up time to engage in market work. On the other hand,
the Internet offers a wide range of entertainment options, which may lead to reductions in
labor supply. The net effect of home Internet use on labor supply will depend on the extent
to which individuals use Internet for each of these tasks and the responsiveness of individual
labor supply along each margin.
6Author’s calculation from the CPS. High-speed Internet diffused more quickly than most other tech-
nologies. See for example Faulhaber (2002, figure 10-1) comparing broadband diffusion to VCR and wireless
phone diffusion, or Greenwood et al. (2005, figure 1) for appliance diffusion. Of these technologies, only
microwave ovens diffused at close to a similar pace (3 percent to 60 percent from 1975 to 1986)
7The exception is a more focused literature on Internet job search (e.g., Kuhn and Skuterad, 2004;
Stevenson, 2009; Kroft and Pope, 2010; Kuhn and Mansour, 2011; Brencic, 2012)
8Greenwood et al. (2005) show that the diffusion of home appliances such as washing machines and
microwaves can account for a large portion of the dramatic increase in female labor supply in the twentieth
Century. Follow up work by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008); Coen-Pirani et al. (2008) and Cardia (2010)
provides empirical evidence.
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The goal of this chapter is to identify the causal impact of home Internet use on labor
market outcomes. The main empirical strategy is to employ micro-level current population
survey (CPS) data on self-reported home Internet usage and labor market outcomes. A
central concern when attempting to identify the causal impact of home Internet use on labor
supply is the endogeneity of Internet take up to work patterns, as reverse causality could
lead ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates to either overstate or understate the causal
relationship. If monthly subscription fees are cost prohibitive for individuals who do not
work, OLS estimates will overstate the true impact of Internet use on labor supply. On the
other hand, if individuals who work spend less time in the home and place less value on a
technology that is only used within the home, OLS estimates will understate the true impact
of home Internet use on labor supply.
To overcome the endogeneity of home Internet use to work patterns, I employ an instru-
mental variables (IV) strategy that exploits cross-state variation in supply-side constraints to
high-speed Internet access. Unlike dial-up Internet, high-speed Internet installation required
substantial investments by Internet service providers and access was neither immediate nor
uniformly distributed across locations. From an Internet service provider’s perspective, mul-
tiple family dwellings were easier and more profitable for installation. Motivated by this
differential investment incentive, I show that geographic variation in the housing infrastruc-
ture –namely, the percent of the state population residing in a multiple family dwelling– can
predict trends in Internet access and usage. Conditional on state and year fixed effects, a host
of time-variant state-level labor and housing market indicators, and various individual-level
demographic controls, the identification assumption is that the fraction of a state residing
in multiple family dwellings would not have been correlated with subsequent trends in labor
supply in the absence of broadband Internet diffusion.
Ordinary least squares estimates indicate a positive correlation between home Internet
use and married women’s labor supply and the instrumental variables estimates confirm this
relationship is causal. The instrumental variables results indicate that a married women
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who uses the Internet at home is 18.6 percentage points more likely to be in the labor force,
however, this estimate is best interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE). The
magnitude of the IV estimate is indicative that the OLS estimate is biased downwards, which
is consistent with non-working women being more likely to adopt the Internet. There is also
substantial heterogeneity across sub-groups of women, and increases in participation are only
found for more educated women and women with school-aged children. The impact on less
educated women, childless women, and men is small and statistically insignificant. Moreover,
a falsification test indicates that there is no reduced form impact of the instrument on labor
supply prior to the diffusion of high-speed Internet. Finally, increases in hours and the
propensity to work full time suggest home Internet increases labor supply on the intensive
margin as well.
Aggregate trends in labor supply indicate participation rose among married women over
the period studied, but the magnitude of those aggregate increases are much smaller than
the effects that I estimate using linear IV. I reconcile this apparent disparity by conducting
several exercises intended to gauge the external validity of the linear IV estimate. It is
well known that linear IV can only identify a local average treatment effect (LATE) which
applies to the population whose treatment status is affected by the instrument (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994). In practice, membership in this subgroup (the “compliers”) is unobservable
and it is not possible extrapolate the estimated effects outside this unknown population
without assuming homogeneous treatment effects. Therefore, I begin by estimating the size
and characteristics of the compliant sub-population. I find that this group is both small
and observably different from the overall population. Then, I decompose the LATE using
a non-parametric local IV estimator to estimate marginal treatment effects (MTEs) across
the population and calculate the weights that the linear IV estimand places on those MTEs
(Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001, 2005; Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006). This exercise
indicates there is significant heterogeneity in the treatment effect of Internet use and that
individuals sort into Internet usage based on their expected gains from treatment. I find that
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the linear IV estimate applies to a minority of individuals with large expected and realized
treatment effects of home Internet usage, and while the LATE estimate is 18.6 percentage
points, the overall unweighted average effect is 4.1 percentage points. An analysis of the
observable characteristics of individuals with the largest treatment effects indicates those
individuals are primarily college educated women with children.
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide an empirical examination of how
home Internet technology has affected labor market outcomes. The diverse range of tasks
for which the Internet is an input suggests a plausible labor market impact, and to the
best of my knowledge, this is the first work to consider the net effect of individual home
Internet use on labor supply. This adds to a more focused literature that has considered the
use of Internet technology as a tool for job search (Kuhn and Skuterad, 2004; Stevenson,
2009; Kuhn and Mansour, 2011; Kroft and Pope, 2010; Brencic, 2012). Further, this work
contributes to the development of a broad understanding of how technological progress in the
home affects economic outcomes. Similar to work by Greenwood et al. (2005), who study the
diffusion of washing machines, microwaves, and other home technologies, I find a substantial
impact of a home-based technology on female labor force participation.
The findings of this chapter also have important demographic and policy implications.
Recent work has proposed that highly skilled women may be increasingly “opting out” of
the labor force to be stay-at-home mothers (Boushey, 2005; Herr and Wolfram, 2009). Yet,
between 2000 and 2010 labor force participation rose among married women (particularly
among highly educated women with children) and remained constant for other groups.9 The
demonstrated heterogeneity in the effects of Internet usage reconcile well with this divergence
in labor supply trends, and a back of the envelope calculation indicates that the diffusion
of high speed Internet can explain 90 percent of the observed increase in participation for
married women during this time period. The result that Internet technology is important
for the labor supply decisions of women with families suggests Internet usage facilitates
9Note that labor force participation rose during this period, however, employment did not. Employment




This work is related to three separate literatures in economics. First, this chapter is
related to the literature examining the diffusion of household technologies in the twentieth
century and their impact on female supply. The literature is motivated by the hypothesis
that the introduction of modern appliances freed up women’s time to engage in market
work and can therefore explain the dramatic rise in female labor force participation in the
twentieth century. Greenwood et al. (2005) investigate the theoretical relationship between
appliance diffusion and female labor supply using a Becker (1965) time allocation model
within a dynamic general equilibrium framework. In their simulation exercises, they find that
the diffusion of time-saving appliances can explain 28 percentage points of the 51 percentage
point increase in female labor force participation generated in the model. Coen-Pirani, Leon,
and Lugauer (2008) and Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) provide empirical evidence in favor
of this mechanism at the individual and cross-country level, respectively. Cardia (2010), on
the other hand, finds only modest evidence in favor of the theory using county-level data.10
This chapter contributes to that literature because home Internet is a modern, time-saving
household technology. Home Internet contrasts with the previously technologies studied
because it is not only an input in home production tasks such as shopping and paying bills,
but also leisure and market work.
This work is also closely related to a literature that examines various determinants of
the joint labor supply and family formation decisions of women. Balancing the competing
demands of work and family is thought to be partially responsible for the gender wage gap
(e.g., Black et al., 2008; Bertrand et al., 2009; Sasser, 2005) and the relative lack of women
in leadership positions (e.g., Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). Research suggests that family
10Cardia (2010) finds evidence that the diffusion of plumbing increased participation in some occupations.
He does not find an impact of refrigerator diffusion.
13
friendly work policies and subsidized child care can improve the labor market outcomes of
mothers (e.g., Ruhm, 2004; Baker and Milligan, 2008; Herr and Wolfram, 2009). Similarly,
there is evidence that maternal labor supply is sensitive to the price of child care (e.g.,
Anderson and Levine, 2000; Gelbach, 2002; Baker et al., 2008; Cortes and Tessada, 2008).
I find evidence that home Internet use, which can potentially permit more family-friendly
flexible work schedules and decrease necessary child-care expenditures leads to increased
female labor force participation. The finding that working from home could be important
for women is also related to recent work by Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2008), who find
that long commute times discourage labor force participation by married women.
Finally, this chapter is related to work that analyzes the impact of technological change
in the workplace. Conceptually and empirically, I provide evidence that part of the net
effect of home Internet use on labor supply can be attributed to an increased ability to tele-
work. By changing where and when work is conducted, the introduction of home Internet
is therefore related to the introduction of other technologies which changed the nature of
market work, most notably the literature on workplace computerization.11 Weinberg (2000)
provides evidence that by decreasing the physicality of market work, computers in the work-
place increased the relative demand for female workers. Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) find
that much of the narrowing of the gender wage gap can be attributed to computerization
and technological change in the workplace. This chapter adds to that literature because it
also finds that technology can be particularly beneficial for women.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
I analyze the theoretical impact of home Internet use on labor supply in a Becker (1965)
model of time allocation, which will permit an examination of the effect of Internet use as
11To be clear, I do not presume to speak directly as to how Internet use in the workplace may have altered
productivity (although it certainly may have). Therefore, this work is not directly related to the literature
on skill biased technical change, which is reviewed by Violante (2008).
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an input in leisure, home production, telework, and job search. In what follows, I briefly
summarize the theoretical predictions of that model, which is described in detail in the
third chapter of this dissertation. In the standard formulation of Becker’s model, an agent
derives utility from a set of commodities that are produced in home using a combination of
inputs purchased in the market and the agent’s own time. These commodities include home
production goods like meals or a clean home, as well as leisure goods like watching television.
As an example, purchased inputs may include raw ingredients and cooking utensils, which
produce a meal in combination with time spent cooking and eating. The agent’s time can
be allocated between home and market work. Time in the market earns a wage, and this
income can be used to purchase inputs for production. The agent’s labor market participation
decision reduces to a comparison of the value of his/her time spent working in the market
(e.g., the market wage (w)), to the value of his/her time spent at home (e.g., the reservation
wage (w∗)).
The introduction of home Internet technology can change the calculus of labor supply
decisions in two fundamental ways: it can alter the market wage (w) and/or it can alter
the reservation wage (w*). Changes in the reservation wage occur because home Internet
represents a new, more cost effective input in the production of home goods. The effect this
will have on the reservation wage depends on whether the good in question is better classified
as a home production good or a leisure good. For a home production good, a technological
improvement in inputs will tend to reduce the time agents need to spend in those tasks,
reducing the reservation wage. This is because the elasticity of substitution between time
and inputs in production tends to be relatively high for home production goods (Aguiar
and Hurst, 2007). Thus, a technological improvement in inputs used in the production of
home production goods like shopping or paying bills will decrease time spent in those tasks,
reducing the reservation wage, and encouraging market entry for those on the margin. The
opposite will be true for leisure goods, where the elasticity of substitution between time
and inputs tends to be smaller. In this case, Internet technology will tend to increase the
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time individuals spend in leisure, increasing the reservation wage, and reducing labor market
participation.12
Home Internet can also affect the market wage (w). Suppose that in addition to the
standard assumptions of the model there is a time cost to working, so that the net wage (w)
is some fraction (1− ρ) of the market wage w, where ρ represents the fraction of work hours
the agent must spend commuting to work. This can represent time spent in daily commute
or in transit when an emergency or family obligation requires the agent to leave work (say,
to meet a repairman). If home Internet technology permits individuals to work at home
some or all hours, this will be captured by a reduction in ρ , and hence, an increase in w.13
Suppose also that the market wage is imperfectly observed by job searchers due to search
frictions in the labor market. If the Internet improves search technology, it may increase the
propensity the agent observes a high market wage. In each case, an increase in the observed
market wage will tend to increase participation for those on the margin.14
In sum, this framework provides an ambiguous prediction for the net effect of home
Internet on labor supply which depends upon the extent to which individuals use Internet
for work, job search, home production and leisure and the responsiveness of individual labor
supply along each margin. Ultimately, the size and magnitude of the net effect of Internet
usage on labor supply will be an empirical question. However, in conjunction with several
stylized facts it is possible to speculate about the relative impact of home Internet use across
different groups. It is a well established fact that, within married couples, the majority
of home production tasks and child rearing is done by women, even conditional on both
partner’s employment (e.g., Bianchi et al., 2000). This suggests that the ability to save time
in home production tasks should have a relatively larger impact on married women than men.
Research has also shown that commute time negatively impacts the participation decisions
12The model has similar predictions for the effect of a change in the reservation wage on hours worked.
13Home Internet could also affect w by increasing productivity if telework reduces absenteeism and/or
workplace distractions. Bloom et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that telework can improve produc-
tivity.
14The model has more ambiguous predictions for the effect of a change in the net wage on hours worked.
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of married women, which suggests a relatively larger impact of telework opportunities for
this group (Black et al., 2008). If work from home reduces the costs of paid child care,
then women with children, whose labor supply is known to be sensitive to the price of child
care, will be particularly affected (Anderson and Levine, 2000; Gelbach, 2002; Cortes and
Tessada, 2008). Telework is much more common among more educated individuals, thus,
enhanced telework opportunities should have a relatively larger impact on more educated
men and women.15 Finally, female labor supply has historically been more elastic than
male labor supply (especially on the extensive margin), suggesting women should exhibit a
greater response to new technology than men (e.g., Heckman, 1993). Combining these facts
suggests that the Internet should have the largest effect on married women, with the impact
potentially differing by education and the presence of children.
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
The main empirical strategy used in this chapter is to relate individual home Internet
usage to individual labor force participation, controlling for relevant demographic factors,
state and year fixed effects, and time-varying state-level controls. To overcome the endo-
geneity of individual home Internet use to labor supply, I propose an instrumental variables
strategy that exploits cross-state variation in supply-side constraints to high-speed Internet
access which was induced by differences in state’s housing infrastructure. In this section, I
describe the main empirical approach and data sources.
2.4.1 Data and Baseline Specification
The primary data source for this chapter is the August 2000 and September 2001 Current
Population Survey Computer and Internet Use Supplement, and the October 2003, 2007,
15In 2009, 65 percent of teleworkers held a college or post-graduate degree (WorldatWork, 2009).
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and 2009 Current Population Survey School Enrollment supplements.16 The main regressor
of interest is home high-speed Internet use, which is a combination of an individual-level
indicator for whether or not the individual is reported to use the Internet at home and
a household level indicator for whether or not the household has a high-speed broadband
Internet subscription. I focus on high-speed Internet, versus dial-up, for both conceptual and
empirical reasons. First, high-speed Internet is expected to be a more effective replacement
for earlier technologies in the production of many of the activities which are expected to
affect labor supply decisions. For example, it has been argued that both telework and
shopping online were simply not feasible using slower dial-up connections (Hausman et al.,
2001; Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, 2002). Second, unlike dial-up Internet, the diffusion of
broadband Internet was hampered by supply-side constraints, which is essential for the
identification strategy.
The main empirical approach used in this study is to relate home Internet use to labor
force participation for married women using a linear probability model (LPM) of the following
form:
yist = HSIistβ1 +Xiβ2 + Sstβ3 + θt + ηs + εist (2.1)
Where yist is the labor force participation of individual i in state s in year t. HSIist is an
indicator for whether or not the individual uses high-speed Internet in the home. The main
outcome of interest is labor force participation, although I provide alternate specifications
using employment status, family income and intensive measures of labor supply (full time
status and usual hours worked per week) in section 2.5.4. All labor supply outcome variables
refer to current labor supply and are asked the month of the CPS supplement. The sample
is initially limited to married women aged 18-59 whose husband is present. The specification
includes a vector of individual controls Xi, which absorb demographic differences in rates of
16I do not use the 1997 and 1998 Internet Supplements because it is not possible to separately identify
high-speed from dial-up internet users in those survey years.
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home Internet use and labor force participation. The demographic controls used are dummy
variables for race, age category, education, spouse’s education, categories for number and
ages of children under 18, metropolitan area status, and central-city status. Education
is determined by highest degree of schooling obtained and split into four categories: high
school dropouts; high school graduate or GEDs; college dropouts and associates degrees; and
Bachelors, masters, professional and Ph.D’s. Age and number of children are in categories
based on both the number of children (zero, one, two, or three or more) and given the number
of children, whether children are under or over age 6 (or both). This flexibly controls for the
number of children which need to be looked after, as well as whether any or all children are
expected to be in school. Metropolitan area and central-city status are included to control for
rural/urban differences in high-speed Internet access and labor supply. Central-city status
is included separately from metropolitan area status because suburban and urban residents
may have differential rates of participation and access. Spouse’s education is included to
proxy for non-labor income, as well as spouse’s Internet take-up rates. Table 2.1 summarizes
the CPS data.
The analysis also includes a full set of year and state fixed effects, as well a set of time-
variant state-level controls. State fixed effect ηs and year fixed effects θt are included to ensure
the estimated coefficient on HSIist is net of any time-invariant differences across states and
national trends in Internet access and participation. Various state-level control variables
were also selected to mitigate concerns that various aspects of the labor and housing market
may be correlated with home Internet use and labor supply. Table 2.2 describes these
variables and their sources. They include income per capita, housing prices, population
density, unemployment rates, and average wages.17 Unemployment, income per capita, and
average wages control for differences across state and time in the labor market, while housing
prices and population density control for differences across state and time in the housing and
real estate market that may be correlated with work patterns and home Internet use.
17Wages are constructed for all employed workers. I alternatively include female-only and male-only wages
as controls in table 2.8.
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Although businesses adopted the Internet much earlier than households, one could still be
concerned that Internet use at work might be correlated with local Internet access and work
patterns. For example, job creation in “high tech” industries might increase the participation
of individuals with Internet skills, who are also likely to have a high demand for home high-
speed Internet access. Thus, I include two measures designed to control for local rates of
Internet usage at work: “adoption” and “enhancement”, which measure the share of the
population in each year employed in industries which use the Internet for each of these
purposes. These are constructed from the industry specific measures estimated by Forman,
Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2003). Adoption refers to the percent of firms in an industry
that use the Internet for any purpose, while enhancement refers to using Internet to enhance
business, such as through commercial sales online. These measures are interacted with state-
year-industry level employment rates to create a measure of state-year Internet adoption and
enhancement rates at work. Finally, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state-
year level.
2.4.2 Preliminary Linear Probability Model Estimates
Table 2.3 displays the results of estimating equation 2.1 under a variety of specifica-
tions. Column (1) presents the parsimonious specification with no demographic or state
level control variables, and column (2) adds the state and year fixed effects. Columns (3)-(5)
add the individual-level control variables. Column (3) adds the controls for age category,
race/ethnicity, education and MSA/Central City status. Column (4) adds the controls for
spouse’s education, which is intended to proxy for non-labor income. Column (5) adds the
controls for the presence and age of children, which were initially omitted since these may be
endogenous to the labor supply decision. Finally, column (6) adds the state level controls.
This is the preferred and most conservative specification. The results indicate that being a
home Internet user is associated with an approximately five percentage point increase in the
probability of participating in the labor force. After column (3), the addition of spouse’s
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education, presence/age of children, and the state level controls do not fundamentally alter
the point estimate. The sign of the control variables are generally as expected. Relative
to a college educated individual, less educated individuals are less likely to participate in
the labor force, and relative to having a college educated husband, a woman whose husband
has less education is more likely to participate. This is consistent with spousal education
proxying for non-labor income.
The LPM estimate suggests a positive correlation between home Internet use and labor
supply. This estimate, however, should not be interpreted as causal evidence of the impact
of home Internet use on participation because Internet users are not randomly selected and
estimates are likely to be biased by reverse causality. The direction of the bias in the LPM
estimate, however, is unclear. Individuals who work may be able to afford the monthly
subscription costs of Internet access, leading LPM estimates to overstate the true causal
impact of home Internet use. On the other hand, individuals who do not work and spend
more time in the home may place a higher value on home Internet access and the stream
of services it provides, leading OLS estimates to understate the true causal impact of home
Internet use. I propose an instrumental variable strategy to overcome these possible sources
of bias.
2.4.3 Proposed Instrument
The proposed instrument for this study exploits supply-side constraints to the availabil-
ity of residential high-speed broadband Internet induced by differences across states in the
housing infrastructure. The alternative to high-speed broadband Internet is dial-up Internet
service, which was first offered to residential customers in 1995 after the privatization of the
Internet. Dial-up services use existing phone lines and do not require any installation from
the Internet service provider (ISP), so access is essentially universal and adoption is driven
purely by consumer demand. Although most businesses invested in high-speed broadband
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Internet in the early 1990s, the service was not offered to residential customers until the end
of the decade. The term “broadband” refers to “advanced communications systems capable
of providing high-speed transmission of services such as data, voice, and video over the In-
ternet and other networks” (F.C.C., 2010). Transmission can be provided by a wide range of
technologies, including digital subscriber lines (DSL), fiber optic cable, coaxial cable, wire-
less technology, and satellite (F.C.C., 2010). For the majority of the population, the ISP
was an existing cable company transmitting through a cable modem or an existing phone
company transmitting through DSL.
Broadband access was (and still is) not universal. Cable and phone companies had
to retrofit existing lines to enable high-speed two-way traffic. For cable companies, this
included laying new fiber-optic lines and installing expensive operating switches and servers
(Faulhaber, 2002; Greenstein and Prince, 2007). DSL from phone companies used existing
phone lines, but in some areas existing wiring was not of sufficient quality and needed to
be upgraded and the phone companies were not generally aware of which areas would need
upgraded until they arrived for installation (Grubesic and Murray, 2002; Faulhaber, 2002).
Moreover, initial cable and DSL installations required a visit from a service representative
(Faulhaber, 2002). There is a general consensus that these costs slowed availability and access
did not keep up with consumer demand (Greenstein and Prince, 2007; Faulhaber, 2002).
In fact, there is some evidence that availability was not driven by consumer demand for
home high-speed Internet connections at all. Faulhaber (2002) argues that cable companies
upgraded lines under pressure to keep up with satellite TV competition and the phone
companies simply followed suit. News media reports suggest that potential subscribers often
faced long wait times for installation.18
The fact that residential broadband deployment lagged consumer demand provides a
potential source of exogenous variation in home Internet adoption. Information on access,
however, would be problematic as an instrumental variable because ISPs may have partially
18See, for example, “Broadband: What Happened?” Businessweek 6/11/01 (Rosenbush et al., 2001)
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responded to consumer demand for home Internet services in determining where to provide
access. If trends in latent consumer demand for Internet services are systematically correlated
with trends in labor supply, access itself would not satisfy the exclusion restriction. Instead,
I take advantage of aspects of the existing local infrastructure which made it easier and more
profitable to install high-speed Internet in some areas first, so that even given similar levels
of consumer demand for Internet services, those areas received access earlier than others.
When installing residential high-speed Internet, existing wiring within a home or building
does not generally need to be upgraded for either cable-based or DSL Internet. What needs
to be upgraded is the wiring that connects the home or building’s existing indoor lines
to the ISP.19 From the ISP’s perspective, this made certain types of residences easier and
more profitable for installation than others. In particular, apartment buildings and other
multiple family properties, collectively referred to here as “multiple dwelling units” (MDUs),
were preferable to single family homes. Figure 2.1 illustrates the difference between the two
types of connections. For an MDU, each length of upgraded wiring that is installed will
service multiple customers, allowing for economies of scale and making it easier and more
cost effective to provide each potential customer with access. Moreover, since the ISP or
MDU owner usually held the property rights to the “home run” wiring within the building,
the ISP usually obtained (de facto) monopoly rights to service all families after installation,
a further boost to the relative profitability of connecting MDUs.20 With these differences
19Both cable-based and DSL broadband Internet service requires the installation of fiber-optic wiring,
which provides high-speed Internet service up to a certain point, from which the signal travels over traditional
coaxial cable or copper telephone wiring the rest of the way. These fiber-optic lines may reach the ISPs central
office, some remote terminal in the neighborhood, the “curb”, or the “demarcation point” (see figure 2.1).
The main issue that prevented timely roll-out for the cable companies was capacity. Cable companies had
installed some fiber lines in the 1980s to provide better cable service, but each additional customer on a single
fiber line reduces the “downstream” capacity, meaning that multiple simultaneous users reduces speeds and
could exhaust the system. Thus, in order to provide reliable, high-speed Internet service cable companies
needed to add more fiber lines which came closer to residential consumer’s homes. For DSL Internet from
the phone companies, roll-out was prevented by the need to upgrade the existing telephone wiring, much of
which was old and had been split too often to be capable of carrying high-speed two-way traffic. The key
insight is that in either case, existing wiring within the home was of sufficient quality to provide individuals
with access, while much of the wiring outside the home was not. More technical details on the history of the
provision of residential high-speed Internet are available in the appendix to this chapter (section 2.9.2).
20When the MDU owner held the property rights on wiring, the ISP would often offer him a discounted
personal connection or incentives to recruit tenants. Until 2007, if the ISP held the rights to the wiring
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in mind, I propose that areas with more MDUs should have received Internet access earlier
than areas with less MDUs.21
Data on MDU rates was constructed using data from the 2000 Decennial Census, which
records population totals in different types of housing units based on the number of units
in the structure. A recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruling defines an
MDU as “... a multiple dwelling unit building (such as an apartment building, condominium
building or cooperative) and any other centrally managed residential real estate development
(such as a gated community, mobile home park, or garden apartment); provided however,
that MDU shall not include time share units, academic campuses and dormitories, military
bases, hotels, rooming houses, prisons, jails, halfway houses, hospitals, nursing homes or
other assisted living facilities.” (47 C.F.R. § 76.2000, 2008). Unfortunately, it is not possible
to perfectly map the Census data to this definition, since its not clear if a structure like a
townhouse or duplex is part of a centrally managed development. Therefore, I looked at
several reasonable definitions and chose the one with the most predictive power in the first
stage, which was to define an MDU as any unit in a structure with 3 or more units and
mobile homes.22 Results using various alternative definitions are similar and available in
appendix table 2.8. In practice, defining an MDU in this way means that MDUs constitute
about 25 percent of privately occupied residences.
There are conceptual reasons to believe that places with a higher concentration of MDUs
should have received Internet access earlier than other areas and this geographical variation
in the diffusion pattern of Internet access motivates the instrumental variable strategy. A
he had a monopoly. In 2007, the FCC issued a ruling aimed at encouraging competition within MDUs by
forcing ISPs who owned wiring to share with competing firms. In practice, there is some skepticism about
whether this policy has been effective and there is anecdotal evidence that ISPs simply shifted property
rights to the MDU owners (F.C.C., 2007).
21I am not the first to suggest this type of adoption pattern may exist. It has been noted that one reason
for South Korea and Hong Kong’s relatively high adoption rates is the propensity for the population to live
in apartments (Hausman (2002), Stross (2011)). To the best of my knowledge, however, I am the first to
formally propose use of this variation as an empirical strategy for isolating a causal effect of home Internet
usage.
22Miscellaneous housing units (recreational vehicles, vans, boats, etc) as well as dormitories, jails, prisons,
and hotels were excluded in the construction of this measure.
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strong first stage relationship will confirm that MDU rates are indeed predictive of individual
usage, but it is useful to first consider the relationship between MDU rates and Internet
access, since that is the assumption underlying the proposed link between MDU rates and
Internet usage. Figure 2.2 examines this link empirically by comparing state MDU rates to
Internet access rates. Data on local high-speed Internet access rates can be obtained from
the FCC form 477 filing data, which has information reported by Internet services providers
on zip codes in which they have at least one high-speed Internet customer. This information
was aggregated to the state-level and used to estimate the unconditional correlation between
the share of a state living in an MDU in 2000 and the share of households in a state with
high-speed Internet access, separately by year.23 The data confirms the intuition behind
the instrumental variables strategy: a 10 percentage point increase in the share of the state
residing in an MDU is correlated with an increase in the state’s high-speed Internet access
rate of 3.2 percentage points in 2000. The magnitude of the correlation declines each year
there after to a precisely estimated zero by 2006. This provides support for the hypothesis
that state MDU rates predict the early arrival of Internet access and in the next section, I
will show that the first stage diagnostics are indicative of a strong relationship between state
MDU rates and trends in individual usage of the Internet over time.
The key identifying assumption for this instrumental variable strategy is that baseline
state MDU rates would not have been systematically correlated with subsequent trends in
labor supply in the absence of residential broadband Internet diffusion. Certainly, women
with preferences for being stay-at-home mothers might choose to live in states with more
single family homes. It is therefore imperative that the empirical specification include state
fixed effects, so that the estimated relationship between MDU rates, home Internet use,
and labor supply will be net of time-invariant differences across states in preferences for
housing and work. Importantly, I also condition on individual-level metropolitan area status
and central city status, so that the estimated effect will be net of differences in preferences
23State-level aggregation was used because finer levels of geographic detail is not available for all individuals
in the CPS.
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between urban, suburban and rural residents.
Any threat to the identification strategy must come from unobserved variation over time
in sorting patterns across states which are related to MDU rates.24 To capture possible
sources of variation over time in the housing and labor market which might be correlated
with MDU rates and labor supply, I include a host of time-variant state-level controls. These
include population density, housing prices, unemployment rates, per capita personal income,
average wages, and employment in Internet intensive industries. Net of population density,
prices, and local labor market conditions, left-over variation in housing stocks across states
can be expected to be a function of factors such as historical zoning ordinances, weather, and
elevation, and the intuition behind the identification strategy is rooted in how these factors
led to differential rates of Internet access over time.25
Other empirical work on the impact of Internet usage has also had to address the en-
dogeneity of Internet take up to labor market outcomes. Kuhn and Skuterad (2004) and
Kuhn and Mansour (2011) study the impact of Internet on unemployment durations. They
control for Internet use for all activities to control for self-selection into Internet job search.
Since I am interested in estimating the net impact of Internet use, this strategy is not fea-
sible. Stevenson (2009) also studies the impact of Internet on job search. The author uses
state take-up rates of telephones and automatic washing machines in 1960 to instrument
for current state Internet usage patterns. The fundamental motivation for this strategy is
correlation over time in state-level latent demand for technology (Skinner and Staiger, 2007).
Unfortunately, if there is a contemporaneous technology diffusing alongside the Internet or
24For the instrument to valid, I must also assume that residential Internet diffusion does not have spillover
effects on other aspects of the local market. For example, if the Internet led to large increases in telework
and reductions in traffic, non-users labor supply might be altered by the decrease in traffic. This seems
unlikely given the fact that full-time telework take-up is still quite low (2.3 percent) and has not increases
substantially over the period in question. Similarly, telework take up has not been shown to be correlated
with local commute times (Lister and Harnish, 2011).
25For example, consider two observably similar cities (similar population, income, average age, and cost
of living): Washington, DC and Boston, MA. In Washington, the 1910 building height act does not permit
residential buildings above 90 feet (roughly a height so that the capital building can be viewed throughout
the city). Because of this law, there are fewer tall buildings in Washington DC. All else equal, this would be
predicted to have a relative negative impact on subsequent trends in high-speed Internet diffusion.
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if this latent demand is systematically correlated with trends in labor supply, the instrument
will violate the exclusion restriction.26
2.4.4 Instrumental Variables Specification
The impact of home high-speed Internet use on labor supply is estimated using two stage
least squares. The first stage is a linear probability model of the impact of the percent of
the state residing in an MDU on HSI use:
HSIist = MDUsθtγ1 +Xiγ2 + Sstγ3 + θt + ηs + νist (2.2)
HSIist is a dummy variable for whether or not individual i reports using the Internet in
a household with broadband in state s and year t. MDUs is the percent of the state’s 2000
population which resides in a housing unit that is classified as an MDU.MDUs is expected to
affect home Internet use via the timing of Internet access, since places with a higher MDUs
are expected to receive Internet access earlier. Therefore, it is interacted with the vector of
year fixed effects θt to allow the impact to vary separately by year. The instrument is the
vector MDUsθt.27 The main effect of MDUs only varies at the state level and is perfectly
correlated with the state fixed effects, thus, it cannot be included in the model. The second
26Several recent working papers using non-U.S. data have also proposed identification strategies that
exploit supply-side constraints to access, although their strategies would not be applicable in the U.S..
Bhuller et al. (2011) study the impact of the Internet on sex crimes. They use cross-sectional variation in a
publicly funded broadband roll-out program in Norway. Falck, Gold, and Heblich (2012) study the impact
of the Internet in German elections. They exploit a technological limitation of DSL provision which creates
a kink in accessibility at a precise distance from the central office of the telephone company. While this
technological feature of DSL provision is also apparent in the U.S., DSL has a considerably lower market
share in the U.S. (around 30 percent, as opposed to over 95 percent in Germany). Since this kink is not
present in cable-based broadband technology, it would be expected to have little predictive power for overall
access rates in the U.S..
27In the appendix robustness checks (table 2.8), I also display the results of interactingMDUs with a time
trend. This is less flexible than the current specification and is therefore not used for the main empirical
strategy. Results, however, are nearly identical to those presented below and the first stage is strong. I also
show that a binary instrument which interacts an indicator for whether the state’s MDU rate is above the
median with an indicator for years prior 2003 is also highly predictive of Internet usage and produces nearly
identical results.
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stage is a linear probability model of HSI use on labor force participation:
yist = ĤSI istβ1 +Xiβ2 + Sstβ3 + θt + ηs + εist (2.3)
Where yist is initially labor labor force participation of individual i in state s and year t.
The coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the impact of HSIist on labor supply. Xi is
a vector of individual controls and Sst is a vector of state-level controls, both of which are
the same as described in section 2.4.1. θt are year fixed effects , ηs are state fixed effects and
εist is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 First Stage
Table 2.4 displays the first stage relationship estimated using equation 2.2, which indi-
cates the sign and magnitude of the relationship between the MDU rates and home Internet
usage follow the expected pattern over time. The year 2009 is used as the base year, which
means all coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of state MDU rates on home Internet
use relative to 2009. When coefficients are scaled by the mean of the dependent variable in
each year (shown in italics below the coefficients and standard errors), there is a clear pat-
tern of a positive and statistically significant, but declining, impact of MDU rates on home
Internet use over time. In the most conservative, preferred specification with all control
variables (column (5)), this implies that a one percent increase in the proportion of the state
residing in a multiple dwelling unit increases home high-speed Internet use by 13.7 percent
in 2000 relative to 2009. This magnitude falls each year thereafter and in 2007, a one percent
increase in state MDU rates leads to only a 0.4 percent increase in usage relative to 2009.
In addition to displaying the predicted relationship between the instrument and Internet
usage, tests for weak identification also indicate that the first stage relationship is strong.
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To test for weak identification in the first stage, I cannot use the conventional F-Statistic
because I have employed cluster-robust standard errors and the conventional F-Statistic
will tend to over-reject the null of under-identification in the presence of non-i.i.d standard
errors. Therefore, I alternatively employ a “robust” version of the F-Statistic which employs
the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic, as suggested by Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman
(2007).28 Henceforth, I will refer to this as simply the F-Statistic. Since no critical values
have been developed for that statistic, Baum et al. (2007) suggest using either the Staiger
and Stock (1997) “rule of thumb” of 10 or the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values.29 I
will consider both. In the preferred specification, the F-Statistic is 27.55, which is above
each of the aforementioned benchmarks and indicates the instrument is indeed powerful and
relevant.
2.5.2 Labor Force Participation
Table 2.5 panel (b) shows the baseline instrumental variables results of estimating equa-
tions 2.2 and 2.3 for the impact of home Internet use on the labor force participation of
married women. Column (1) displays the parsimonious specification, which includes only
the state and year fixed effects. Columns (2)-(4) add the demographic control variables, with
column (3) adds spouse’s education and column (4) adds the controls for presence/age of chil-
dren. As in the LPM specification, the model is initially estimated without presence/age of
children since those variables may be endogenous to labor supply decisions. Their inclusion,
however, does not fundamentally alter the result. Column (5) is the preferred specification
28The conventional Wald F-Statistic uses theCragg and Donald (1993) statistic for the rank of a matrix.
This F-statistic instead uses the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic, the robust analog of the theCragg
and Donald (1993) statistic.
29Stock and Yogo (2005) provide two methods for evaluating the presence of weak instruments. The first
considers the relative bias of IV as compared to OLS, where an instrument is considered weak at x percent
if IV has a relative bias of more than x percent. Those critical values are as follows: 5% 16.85 10% 10.27
20% 6.71 30% 5.34. The second considers the Wald test, which rejects too often with weak instruments. An
instrument is considered weak at x percent if the Wald Test has a rejection rate of x percent when it should
have a rejection rate of 5%. Those critical values for my case are 10% 24.58 15% 13.96 20% 10.26 25% 8.31.
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with a full set of state and demographic controls. The point estimates for the coefficient
on HSI is 0.186 in the preferred specification, which is statistically significant at the one
percent level. This indicates that being a home high-speed Internet user leads to a 18.6
percentage point increase in the probability of participating in the labor force for married
women. Evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable, this corresponds to a 25 percent
increase in the probability of participating.
Instrumental variable estimates are considerably larger than the LPM estimates. This
suggests downward selection bias in the LPM estimate, which would occur if married women
who do not work are more likely to take up the Internet than those who do work, perhaps
because women who spend more time in the home place a higher value on the time-saving
and entertainment uses of home Internet. For example, social uses of the Internet might
be more valuable for a woman who spends the majority of her time in the home than for
a women interacts with coworkers and has access to Internet in the workplace. The IV
estimates are less precise than the baseline LPM estimates, but a Hausman specification
test can reject the consistency of the LPM estimate at the ten percent level in the preferred
specification.30 The IV estimate of 18.6 percentage points is an admittedly large effect,
particularly relative to the mean labor force participation rate of 73 percent. In section 2.6,
I discuss the interpretation of the magnitude of these effects in much greater detail and show
they can be explained by heterogeneity across the population and a decomposition of what
the linear IV estimand identifies from the data.
2.5.3 Different Demographic Groups
Internet availability may have a relatively larger impact on women with more education
and children, since women with more education are more likely to hold highly skilled oc-
30Since standard errors are clustered in both the OLS and 2SLS specification, OLS is not fully efficient and
I compute the Hausman test statistic with bootstrapped variance estimates. I use 500 bootstrap replications
and the p-value on the resulting test statistic is p=0.092.
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cupations in which working at home online is feasible, and women with children may have
more home production tasks to complete or face higher costs to working outside of the home
Therefore, I split the sample by presence of children and education to see how results vary
across groups. In addition to splitting the sample by whether or not a woman has any chil-
dren, I look separately at women who have any children under 6 and those whose children
are all school-aged. Although all women with children are expected to face psychic and non-
psychic costs to working (notably, child care expenses), women with older children may find
working from home an effective replacement to paid after-school child care, whereas small
children may require too much supervision to make working in the home without paid child
care a realistic option.
Panels (a) and (b) of table 2.6 display the results by the presence of children and edu-
cation. Panel (a) column (3) displays the results for women with children, indicating home
Internet usage is associated with a 29.3 percentage point increase in the probability of par-
ticipating, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. Columns (4) and (5)
split this group into women with any children under age 6 and women whose children are all
age 6-18. Results for women with younger children are smaller than the overall average and
insignificant, while the result for women with older children are significant at the 10 percent
level and indicate Internet usage is associated with a 30 percentage point increase in partic-
ipation for this group. Panel (b), columns (1)-(3) display the results for increasing amounts
of schooling. Unfortunately, as the sample size falls first stage F-Statistics fall below the
rule of thumb for the high school drop-out and college groups, so it is difficult to interpret
those results as causal. Therefore, I split the sample by high school degree or less and some
college or more in columns (4) and (5). In this case, the estimate on less educated women is
small and insignificant while the estimate on more educated women indicates home Internet
usage is associated with a statistically significant increase in participation of 38 percentage
points for that group.
The results by demographic group have indicated that home Internet usage is associated
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with a 30 to 40 percentage point increase in participation for women with children and high
levels of educations, and smaller, insignificant effects for other groups. The pattern of the
magnitudes are generally opposite the observed pattern in the LPM estimates. This indicates
that for women with children and more education, the downward bias in the LPM estimates
is larger than the downward bias for other groups. This would be consistent with more
educated women and those with children who do not work being more likely to take up the
Internet than either their working counterparts or other types of women who do not work.
This could occur if these women place more value on Internet services, for example, because
non-working high skill women have more knowledge of the benefits of Internet technology
than non-working low skill women.
2.5.4 Alternative Outcome Variables
Home Internet use may have a different impact on the intensive margin than it does
on the extensive margin. On the one hand, telework and time saved in home production
may allow individuals to increase their hours, while on the other hand, new entrants into
the workforce may work fewer hours. Therefore, table 2.6, panel (c) column (1) displays
the results of re-estimating equation 2.3, where the dependent variable is hours of work.
The sample is limited to working individuals. The results indicate there is a positive and
significant increase in usual hours worked by about 8.5 hours per week, indicating there is
an intensive (as well as extensive) increase in labor supply associated with home Internet
usage.
Next, I look at the choice between full-time and part-time work. Like hours worked, the
predicted effect of Internet usage on part-time versus full-time work is ambiguous. On the
one hand, Internet usage may facilitate engagement in the labor force, but only at the part-
time level. On the other hand, it may be that the flexibility associated with Internet usage
permits full-time participation when an individual would have otherwise only worked part-
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time. Columns (2) of table 2.6, panel (c) displays the results for the impact of home Internet
use on an indicator for working full-time. This indicates that there is a 19.8 percentage point
increase in the probability of working full-time (as opposed to part-time). This suggests that
in fact, Internet usage encourages full-time engagement in the labor force.
Next, I examine changes in family income.31 Table 2.6, panel (c), column (3) displays
the estimated results.32 The point estimate is positive and significant, and indicates a sub-
stantial increase in family income associated with a married women’s high-speed Internet
usage.33 This point estimate is very large: almost $30,000. However, given the large pre-
dicted increases in participation it is fairly reasonable that family income would increase
this substantially. Considering the average cost of a broadband subscription was about $30
a month in real dollars throughout the time period, this suggests high-speed Internet is
potentially very valuable to families.
Finally, I examine the impact of Internet usage on employment status. In addition
to the expansion of Internet services, the 2000-2009 time period was characterized by a
recession and large changes in unemployment rates. It is therefore useful to see if the results
hold alternatively estimating the effects of Internet usage on employment. If the results
differ, it would suggest that Internet usage may encourage individuals to switch from non-
participation to a state of unemployment, as opposed to working. This would change the
interpretation of the results. Results of this specification are displayed in table 2.6, panel (c)
column (4) and indicate that home Internet usage is associated with a statistically significant
17.5 percentage point increase in the probability of working. This result is extremely similar
31I have also alternatively estimated the effects on hourly wages. Unfortunately, however, weekly earnings
information is only asked of outgoing CPS respondents, which means that I can only calculate hourly wages
for one eighth of the original sample. The results indicate Internet usage is associated with a statistically
insignificant $4.49 increase in hourly wages, however, the limited sample reduces the power of the first stage
making causal inference difficult.
32Total family income is discretized, so to make this variable continuous I replace each value with the
median value of the bin.
33I have also estimated the results for the dependent variable hourly wage (not shown here). Wage data is
only recorded for outgoing rotation groups, which means the sample for whom wages are recorded is about
one eighth the original sample. This reduces precision and the estimated effect is positive, but statistically
insignificant.
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to the participation result and suggests the participation results are in fact driven by women
entering the workforce and becoming employed.
2.5.5 Men
Home Internet use should have an impact of individuals who are on the margin of entering
the labor market and can benefit from working from home, job search, and/or time saving
in home production. Since male labor force participation has historically been relatively
inelastic and the home production and telework benefits of home Internet use are likely to
be less relevant for men, there is less a priori reason to think that home Internet use should
impact male labor supply. Column (5) of table 2.6 panel (c) displays results for married
men and indicate that the impact of home Internet use on male participation is small and
statistically insignificant. Although not displayed here, the specification was also estimated
for single men and women and although first stage F-Statistics were too low for reliable
inference for singles, the pattern on the point estimates was not similar to married women.
Those results can be found in appendix table 2.8.
2.5.6 Falsification Test
The identification assumption for interpreting the instrumental variables estimate as
causal is that state MDU rates would not have been correlated with subsequent trends in
labor supply in the absence of broadband Internet diffusion. While there is no formal way
to directly test this assumption, I can informally investigate whether this assumption seems
reasonable by conducting a falsification test of the reduced form impact of the instrument
on labor force participation prior to the availability of high-speed Internet. The intuition
behind this exercise is that if a state’s MDU rate affects labor force participation during a
time period where high-speed Internet was not available, then it must affect labor supply
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through some other mechanism. If that were the case, there would be serious doubt that the
exclusion restriction would be satisfied during the time period in which high-speed Internet
was available.
The time period I use for this falsification test is 1990-1997, since the first residential
broadband subscriptions became available in 1998 (Faulhaber, 2002). The convenient feature
of studying this particular time frame for the falsification test is that both business broadband
subscriptions and residential dial-up subscriptions were plentiful. Therefore, this analysis
should help to shed light on whether or not a violation of the exclusion restriction occurs
through one those channels. For example, one could imagine a scenario where participation
increased in areas with more MDUs not because of residential high-speed Internet access, but
because firms in those areas had differential trends in demand for Internet savvy workers.
Since business broadband access and Internet knowledge were already established in this
period, but home high-speed Internet was not, this strategy will be able to address this
concern.
Figure 2.3 panel (a) displays the results of that exercise for the 1990-1997 period, and as
a comparison, for the 2000-2009 sample used throughout the chapter in panel (b). Note that
panel (a) uses 1990 MDU rates and panel (b) uses 2000 MDU rates. The data indicates that
for the 1990-1997 period, there is no significant impact of an increase in state MDU rates on
participation for any of the years shown (relative to the year 1997) and the point estimates
display no clear trend or pattern, bouncing above and below, but remaining close, to zero.
On the other hand, for the sample period used in this study, coefficients are consistently
above zero and statistically different from zero for half of the years shown. Overall, this
exercise has uncovered no evidence that state MDU rates have an effect on participation in
the time period before high-speed Internet access was available, suggesting that state MDU
rates do not affect participation except through their effect on Internet availability.
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2.5.7 Robustness Checks
I implement a number of robustness checks on the empirical specification and data con-
struction. This includes various tests on the exact definition of an MDU for the instrument,
controlling for MSA level measures of wages, state time trends, and individual computer
use. Those results are described in the appendix to this chapter (section 2.9). Although in
some cases the sample sizes and/or the first stage F-Statistics become small and the results
become imprecise, the point estimates are consistent across all specifications and well within
a 95 percent confidence interval of the estimates obtained thus far.
2.6 Interpreting the Results as LATE
The results presented thus far have been estimated using a linear instrumental variables
model, but it is well known that this strategy can only identify an average causal effect for
those sub-populations whose treatment status is affected by the instrument. This parameter
is called the local average treatment effect (LATE) and the population for whom it applies
are often called the “compliers” (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin,
1996).34 In practice, complier status is unobservable and it is not possible extrapolate the
estimated effects outside this unknown population without assuming homogeneous treatment
effects. Given the observed heterogeneity in treatment effects by demographic subgroup,
this assumption seems unrealistic and suggests an investigation of the external validity of
the LATE is warranted.
In gauging the external validity of the LATE, I begin by considering the magnitude of
the estimated LATE in the context of aggregate trends in female labor supply over the time
period studied. If the LATE estimate of 0.186 represents an average effect that applies
34To interpret the IV estimate as a LATE, the monotonicity assumption must be satisfied. In this context,
that assumption is that while some individuals may choose to use or not use the Internet regardless of their
state of residence, residing in a state with more MDUs (and hence greater access) will only increase the
probability that an individual uses the Internet at home.
36
to the entire population, then one would expect to see an increase in aggregate female
labor supply. Figure 2.4 displays trends in aggregate labor supply over the 2000-2010 time
period obtained from the American Communities Survey. Separate trends are shown for all
married women, women with both a college education and children (for whom I estimate the
largest effects), and as a comparison, men. There is a clear increase in female labor force
participation beginning in about 2005, and this increase is larger for highly educated women
with children. For men, on the other hand, labor force participation remains stable. While
both the sign of these changes and the observed variation across groups is consistent with
the results I have presented thus far, the magnitude of the aggregate changes in labor supply
are much smaller than the estimated effects found in the IV specification. This is indicative
that the magnitude of the LATE may not apply to the majority of the population. In what
follows, I reconcile the difference in magnitude between the estimated effects found using
linear IV and the aggregate trends in female labor supply.
2.6.1 Characterizing the Compliant Population
Without assuming homogenous treatment effects, the LATE found using linear IV is only
interpretable as applying to the compliant population, which are those individuals whose
treatment status is affected by the instrument. In the context of this chapter, that group is
the individuals who use/do not use high-speed Internet because of the differential trends in
access induced by their state’s housing infrastructure. To garner some intuition on the type
of individual that is expected to be a complier, it is useful to separate the first stage effect
of the instrument on treatment status into two conceptual links: (1) the effect of the state
MDU rates on home high-speed Internet access and (2) the effect of state access on take-up.
Focusing on the first link, the compliant population will be states for which state MDU rates
affected the timing of access, or states that would have received access later (or never) in the
absence of this characteristic. I expect this to be states with relatively low latent demand for
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Internet services, since ISPs would have otherwise had little incentive to enter those markets.
For the second link, the compliers are individuals for whom access determines take-up. This
rules out individuals with very low private demand for Internet services.35 Since demand for
Internet services is highly correlated with socioeconomic status, combining the two suggests
that the compliant population should be relatively high SES individuals in relatively low
SES states.
With some intuition on the characteristics of the compliers in hand, I now construct
estimates of the proportion of the population which are compliers and tabulate their av-
erage characteristics. With a single binary instrument, this task is fairly straightforward.
Unfortunately, I use multiple, continuous instruments, which complicates such an exercise.
Fortunately, the IV strategy I use lends itself to a binary interpretation (since identification
arises from differences across states and over time) and it turns out that that using an instru-
ment based solely on comparing states with high/low MDU rates in the early/late periods of
diffusion I am able to generate similar results to those using the more flexible specification
used throughout the chapter.36 Using those results, I can then easily calculate the fraction
of the population which is compliant and compare their characteristics to the rest of the
population.37
Summary statistics on the complier group’s characteristics are displayed in table 2.7,
panel (a). I find that 6 percent of the population is compliant (4 percent are home Internet
users and 2 percent are non-users). This indicates that the LATE estimate applies to a small
minority of the general population. In relation to the aggregate change in female labor force
35The non-compliant population includes the “always takers” and “never takers.” Individuals who would
always use high-speed Internet regardless of broadband access are those willing to pay for expensive satellite
and business line subscriptions. In practice, 0.52 percent of Internet users in my data report having such
an Internet connection 2000-2007, suggesting this group is quite small. The group that would never use
high-speed internet, on the other hand, are individuals who are not interested or cannot afford an Internet
subscription.
36The exact instrument used is Z = 1[MDU ≥ MDU ] ∗ 1[Y ear ≤ 2003]. In this case, the estimated
coefficient on HSI use is 0.201 with a standard error of 0.101
37The fraction is the population which is compliant is P (Z = 1)((E(HSI|Z = 1) − E(HSI|Z =
0))/P (HSI = 1). The average of characteristic, x for the compliers (relative to the non-compliers) is
(E(HSI|Z = 1, x = 1)− E(HSI|Z = 0, x = 1))/(E(HSI|Z = 1)− E(HSI|Z = 0)).
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participation over the period (if we make the strong assumption of a zero treatment effect
for the rest of the population), this would imply a 1.5 percentage point increase in aggregate
labor supply, or approximately half of what was observed.
Table 2.7 also tabulates the characteristics of the compliant population, indicating that
the compliers tend to have lower levels of education, are more likely to be a minority and
are younger. This is suggests that the primary mechanism which restricts the compliant
population size is the first channel described above: the compliers are those in states that
would have otherwise not received access. To more formally investigate this hypothesis, I
construct a composite measure of state socioeconomic characteristics that predict Internet
usage.38 I then calculate the weights linear IV puts on each quartile of that distribution in
construction the IV estimate. The intuition behind this strategy is to investigate whether or
not the compliers primarily come from states that ISPs would have otherwise been reluctant
to provide access because latent demand was relatively low. The results of this exercise are
displayed in the panel (b) of table 2.7 and indicate that indeed, the compliers are predomi-
nately from states whose socioeconomic characteristics would predict lower levels of Internet
usage. In fact, individuals in states in the top quartile of the distribution of the state SES
measure receive no weight in the IV estimate.
The results presented in this section are indicative that the compliant population is
comprised of high SES individuals in states which would not have received Internet access
in the absence of a favorable housing infrastructure which lowered the costs of access for
the ISP. While this exercise has found that the LATE estimate applied to a minority of the
population, it does indicate that the LATE may be of particular relevance for public policy.
Currently, individuals without access are those individuals who reside in places that ISPs
refuse to provide service. Thus, this estimate speaks to the effects of the provision of access
to higher SES individuals in underserved locations.
38This measure as constructed using a linear projection of state-level demographic characteristics (fraction
of the population in each race, education and age group used in the analysis) and economic characteristics
(state-level variables used in the main specification) on individual high-speed Internet usage.
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2.6.2 Marginal Treatment Effects and Linear IV Weights
Thus far, I have presented evidence that the LATE is applicable to a small population,
but I have not explained why the magnitude is so large for that particular population or the
magnitude of the effects for anyone outside that group. In this section, I will address these
questions by decomposing the LATE estimate and estimating marginal treatment effects
(MTEs) across the population.
In the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects the LATE estimate is a weighted
average of subgroup-specific LATEs, where the weights placed on each subgroup will not
in general be proportional to the population weight of the group. Instead, the weights are
proportional to the average conditional variance of the first-stage fitted values for the group.
Moreover, those weights are not always guaranteed to be non-negative. In practice, this
means that not only is it possible for the LATE to over (under) weight some groups, but it
is also possible that linear IV can produce a negative (positive) point estimate even when
all subgroup specific LATEs are positive (negative) (Heckman et al., 2006).
The possibility of negative weights in the IV estimand occurs in the presence of unob-
served heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006). The standard IV framework explicitly allows
for sorting on levels: individuals may be unobservably more or less likely to take up treat-
ment and those characteristics may be correlated with the outcome. It does not allow for
sorting on gains. Sorting on gains occurs when individuals have some knowledge of their
own expected gains from take-up and sort into treatment based on those expected gains. In
the context studied here, this type of sorting would occur if individuals choose to take-up
home Internet at least partly based on their own expected gains from home Internet usage in
the labor market. In this context (and many others) this almost certainly seems likely to be
true. For example, a family debating purchasing a costly Internet subscription will almost
certainly be more likely to take-up the service if they expect it to bring in extra income for
the family. Thus, it is clear that further investigation into the possibility of this type of
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sorting is warranted.
Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) demonstrate that it is possible to decompose the
standard IV estimate into identifiable MTEs at different levels of unobservable factors that
determine treatment status and calculate the weights placed on those MTEs in the standard
IV estimand. This exercise allows me to investigate the labor supply response of individuals
at different levels of unobservable factors that are correlated with home Internet take-up,
and determine whether individuals sort on those unobservables.39 To estimate those MTEs,
I use a non-parametric local instrumental variables estimator (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001,
2005).40 Then, I calculate the weights on linear IV at different points in the distribution of
unobservables from the data using the formulas provided by Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil
(2006), where I evaluate the weights at the mean of the independent variables.
The resulting MTEs and standard errors (calculated using 500 bootstrap replications)
are displayed in figure 2.5 (a). Note that the horizontal axis increases in the unobserved
components that determine treatment status, so MTEs that increase in P(z) are consistent
with positive sorting on gains. What emerges from this figure is a clear pattern of increasing
treatment effects, which start out below zero and increase to very high levels at the extreme
right tail of the distribution. This pattern is consistent with individuals sorting into Internet
usage based on their expected labor market gains from usage. Moreover, figure 2.5 (b)
displays population weights across the distribution of unobservables correlated with Internet
usage. This makes it clear that the majority of the population actually resides in the left
tail, where point estimates are smaller and sometimes negative.
Next, I examine the observable characteristics which are associated with high/low MTEs
(and correspondingly, high/low expected gains from treatment). Table 2.7, panel (c) summa-
39Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) demonstrate that evaluating the treatment effect at different points
in the distribution of the first stage fitted values(e.g., P (z) = Pr(HSI = 1|Z,X)) is equivalent to evaluating
the treatment effect at different points in the distribution of unobserved determinants of treatment status.
Thus, by calculating the treatment effect at each point in the distribution of P(z), I can investigate the
possibility of sorting on gains.
40For the local instrumental variable estimator, I use a flexible polynomial in the propensity score to
estimate the MTE at each point in the distribution of P(z). I estimate the propensity score using probit so
that fitted values are ensure to lie on the interval [0,1]
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rizes those characteristics for individuals in different parts of the distribution of unobservables
correlated with Internet usage. Comparing the top two deciles of the distribution to the rest
of the distribution indicates that the individuals with the very large treatment effects are
significantly more likely to have a college education: 60 percent of individuals in the top
two deciles have a college degree, as opposed to 30 percent for the middle 6 deciles and 22
percent for the bottom two deciles. Those individuals are also much more likely to have
a college educated husband, have children (and particularly school-aged children) and are
more likely to be white. Thus, it is clear that the very large point estimates found earlier
for more educated women and women with children are a reflection of the fact that those
groups tend to have higher treatment effects of home Internet use.
Finally, figure 2.5 (c) displays the weights that the instrumental variables estimator places
on different parts of the distribution of unobservables correlated with Internet usage. To
calculate the weights, I use the single instrument interaction of MDU rates with an annual
time trend, which yields an IV point estimate and MTEs which are extremely similar to
those used in the original specification.41 The shape of the distribution of IV weights stands
in sharp contrast to the shape of the distribution of population weights. Instead of placing
relatively more weight on individuals towards the left tail, which is where the bulk of the
population lies, the IV estimator places relatively more weight on individuals towards the
right tail where the larger treatment effects lie. Moreover, the IV estimator actually places
negative weights on some of the negative MTEs in the left tail, artificially inflating the IV
estimate.
Based on the preceding analyses, it is clear that the large magnitude of the IV estimate
is driven by a minority of individuals with very large treatment effects. From a policy
standpoint, it is useful to uncover the magnitude of the effects that apply to the majority
of the population. Unfortunately, the MTEs are fairly imprecise (particularly at the tails),
41The exact instrument used is Z = MDU ∗ t. In this case, the estimated coefficient on HSI use is 0.184
with a standard error of 0.081. The distribution of MTEs using this instrument, as well as the IV estimate,
can be found in the appendix to this chapter (section 2.9).
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so I exercise caution in interpreting these effects as causal. However, using the weights and
MTEs I have estimated here I am able to recover a predicted linear IV estimate of 0.196, a
number which is extremely close to the actual linear IV estimate of 0.186 and provides some
assurance that this exercise will be instructive.42 Simply weighting the MTEs by population,
I calculate an average treatment effect for the entire distribution of 0.041.43 Yet, for the top
quartile of the distribution of unobservables, the population weighted average is 0.356. This
makes it is clear that the treatment effects that apply to the majority of the population are
smaller than those estimated by linear IV, which applies to a smaller subset of the population
and masks a significant amount of heterogeneity across the population. It also suggests that
home high speed Internet usage can explain 90 percent of the observed increase in women’s
labor force participation over the period in question.44
2.7 Interpreting the Results in the Conceptual Framework
The analysis presented thus far indicates that home Internet use is associated with an
increase in labor market participation, with larger effects found for women with children and
more education. Since telework opportunities are expected to be particularly important for
more educated women and those with older children, and time saved in home production
is expected to be particularly important for women with children, the demonstrated het-
erogeneity in the estimated effects is suggestive evidence in favor of home production and
telework as potential mechanisms explaining the results. Theory does not inform whether
42Note that the MTEs and weights are only calculated every 5 percentage points in the distribution of
P(z) and are evaluated at the mean of the independent variables, so one would not expect to necessarily
recover the exact point estimate. In order to recover the exact LATE, I would need to integrate out the
independent variables, an exercise I do not conduct here.
43This average treatment effect differs from the parameter called the “average treatment effect” (e.g.,
the ATE). The average I describe here is really a local average treatment effect across the portion of the
distribution of unobservables for which I have support of the propensity score. In practice, this is almost
the entire distribution because the support of the propensity score is 0.1-0.97, but to calculate the ATE
parameter would require full support. I could bound the ATE with the information I have, but I do not
carry out that exercise here.
44Scaling by the increase in Internet usage over the period suggests Internet usage can explain 2.9 per-
centage points of the approximately 3.2 percentage point increase in participation.
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or not job search is also a viable mechanism, nor does it identify if the estimated effects are
attenuated by increases in time spent in leisure online. In this section, I explore the role
of each mechanism in explaining the estimated effects. To do so, I examine data on the
activities individuals in the sample report doing online. In 2000, 2001, and 2003, the Cur-
rent Population Survey supplements record detailed information about activities individuals
report engaging in online in the past year, which I use to tabulate summary statistics on
individual’s online behavior. The surveys vary in the specific questions asked, but I will
focus on the following which were consistent across years: home production (with a separate
category for shopping and paying bills), leisure (with separate categories for entertainment
and checking news, weather, and sports scores), work-related and job search.45
Next, I draw a direct comparison between use of Internet for each activity and the
magnitude of the estimated effects by comparing group level usage rates with the magnitude
of the estimated effects of home Internet use on labor supply. To do so, I estimate group-level
predicted changes in labor force participation when home high-speed Internet use increases




sg HSI(task = t). L̂FP g is constructed by estimating group specific β1’s
according to equation 2.3. Rates of use for each task are limited to users only, and groups are
defined by census division, education and the presence of children. The goal of this analysis
is to inform the extent to which Internet use for each activity contributes to the estimated
effect. If there is no correlation between rates of use for a task and the predicted effects,
this would suggest Internet use for that purpose is not an important driver of the results.
On the other hand, a strong positive correlation suggests Internet use for that purpose may
indeed play a role in explaining the results.
45The supplements ask about specific activities performed online in the past year. The data is only
summarized for those who report using the Internet at home. Home production includes shopping and paying
bills online, looking for government or health information, and looking for information about products and
services. Leisure includes recreation (playing games, watching TV or movies, listening to music, recreation,
entertainment or fun) and checking news, weather, or sports (NWS). Work related tasks, email and job
search were consistently asked throughout the sample. See section 2.9 for more information on variable
creation.
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Figure 2.6 displays the results for work, job search, home production (including shop-
ping/paying bills) and leisure (separately for entertainment and checking news, weather, and
sport scores), respectively. Consistent with the predictions of the conceptual framework, each
activity except “games/fun/recreation” is positively correlated with the predicted effects.46
Overall, Internet use for work appears to be the leading explanation for increase partic-
ipation. It has the largest coefficient on the line of best fit (0.19), and a comparison of
individuals across the distribution of L̂FP g indicates that those in the top quartile have
13 percentage point higher rates of Internet use for work, or a 53 percent difference at the
mean. This suggest Internet usage for telework is the primary driver of the results, although
Internet use for job search and home production also play a role. In the third chapter of this
dissertation, I further investigate each mechanism separately and provide further evidence
confirming this result.
2.8 Conclusion
High-speed Internet has changed the way individuals live and work. Using an instrumen-
tal variables strategy that exploits supply-side constraints to high-speed Internet access, I
find evidence that exogenously determined home Internet usage increases the labor market
participation of married women. Estimates indicate that being a home high-speed Internet
user is associated with a 18 percentage point increase in labor force participation. This
estimate is large relative to aggregate changes in labor supply over the period, but a de-
composition exercise indicates this estimate applies to a minority of the population who
exhibit very large treatment effects, and the average effect among the overall population is
4 percentage points. Consistent with the proposed conceptual framework, those individu-
als with the largest estimated response to Internet usage are highly educated women with
46The negative correlation between “games/fun/recreation” and the predicted effects is consistent with
Internet use for leisure mitigating the positive effects of telework, job search, and time saved in home
production. This negative relationship is even more striking when one considers that Internet use for one
task is highly predictive of Internet use for other tasks (correlations between tasks range from 0.15-0.3) and
is reassuring for the validity of the strategy as a whole.
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school-aged children. Supplemental analyses suggest that Internet use for telework is the
primary explanation for the demonstrated increase in participation, although improved job
search and time saved in home production also play a more modest role in explaining the
estimated effects.
The provision of fast, affordable Internet access is a central policy objective. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first work to investigate the net impact of individual home Internet
use on labor supply, recognizing that the Internet is truly a general purpose technology. This
work therefore speaks directly to the potential labor market impact of extending high-speed
Internet access, and for whom access is likely to be most important. More generally, this work
can speak to the labor market impact of the diffusion of home technology. Unlike technology
diffusion in the workplace, which may directly affect productivity, the link between home
technologies and labor market outcomes is less clear. Similar to work on the diffusion of
time-saving appliances in the twentieth century, I find that female labor supply is sensitive
to technological progress in the home sector.
The conflicting demands of work and family force households to make tough decisions.
I find that for highly skilled women with school aged children, Internet use facilitates entry
into the labor market. This suggests that Internet use may allow women who “opted out”
when their children were young to (re)enter the labor force. Moreover, the data indicates
that employer-provided part time telework opportunities associated with home Internet use
are the best explanation for this increase. This speaks to broader policy discussions about
the potential benefits of telework and flexible scheduling policies. While it is generally
accepted that flexibility in the workplace has the potential to benefit employers, employees
and the economy as a whole, adoption is still low and there is little empirical evidence on
the benefits/costs of these policies.47 This chapter has demonstrated that Internet usage,
via take-up of telework opportunities, has allowed a group of highly educated women to join
the workforce, suggesting such policies may have the potential to encourage workforce entry
47See, for example, the report by the Council of Economic Advisers on Work-life Balance, March 2010.
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by productive individuals and increase gender equity in the workplace.
2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Data
Internet use is available in the October 1997, 2003, 2007 and 2009 school enrollment sup-
plements and the December 1998, August 2000, and September 2001 Computer and Internet
use supplements. Internet users are identified individually, while the type of connection is
at the household level. In 1997 and 1998, household high speed, broadband connectivity is
not identified, so those supplements are not used. The process for identifying Internet users
changes slightly over time due to the nature of the questions asked in each supplement. In
the 2000 and 2001 supplements, home Internet users were defined based on series of ques-
tions which asked about household computer and Internet use and finally, an individual level
variable called “Internet use at home recode”, which assigns individual home Internet use
status by compiling household home Internet use information with a series of questions of the
format “Does NAME/do you use the Internet at home for...?” From 2007-2009, identifying
home Internet users is slightly trickier because this recoded variable was no longer available
and dramatically fewer questions were asked. Therefore, home Internet users are defined as
those who are deemed to be (1) in a household that uses Internet at home and (2) Internet
users themselves (at any location). Next, the type of connection is identified at the house-
hold level. In each survey year (except 1997 and 1998), households who have home Internet
were asked about the type of home Internet access they have. High speed access is defined
as NOT using “regular, or ’dial-up’ service.” Note that in 2000, the survey specifically asked
if users had “Higher speed Internet access service”, whereas in following surveys users were
asked if they had some combination of “Cable, DSL, fiber optics, satellite, wireless (such
as Wi-Fi), mobile phone or PDA, or some other broadband Internet connection.” Defining
broadband as “not dial-up” is also how the CPS defines high speed access, which can be
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determined from the universe of respondents to a question in 2001, 2003, and 2009 surveys
which asked “What is the main reason that you do not have high-speed (that is, faster than
dial-up) Internet access at home?”
2.9.2 History of Broadband Deployment
In this section I briefly review broadband network architecture, the history of high speed
Internet deployment and how it relates to my empirical strategy. For a more detailed de-
scription of broadband technology deployment see, for example Jackson (2002). There are
two fundamental ways that high speed Internet services reaches the customer: cable-based
services and DSL services over telephone lines. For both of these services, fiber-optic lines
provide high speed Internet service up to a certain point and then traditional coaxial cable
or copper telephone lines carry service the rest of the way. These fiber-optic lines may reach
the ISPs central office, some remote terminal in the neighborhood, the curb, or reach all the
way to the home. These connections are often called “fiber to the x” (Jackson, 2001). Once
the line reaches residence, wiring inside the home is the property of the home owner (Ames,
2006). In general, those lines do not need to be upgraded, although in very recent years it
is becoming more common to replace this wiring with fiber as well. For the sample period
studied here, this would have been relatively uncommon.
There are a few differences between cable and DSL that are worth briefly highlighting.
Cable companies began developing networks which expanded fiber to neighborhoods (and
then coaxial wiring the rest of the way) beginning in the 1980s. This existing system was
theoretically capable of simultaneously providing both cable and high speed Internet to some
customers, but each additional customer on a single fiber line reduces the “downstream”
capacity, so that if many individuals use Internet at the same time the capacity would be
exhausted. Thus, in order to expand service cable companies needed to move the fiber lines
closer to the home. For DSL, providers were able to take advantage of existing capacity in
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copper telephone wires that were not used for voice services. However, this was limited by
distance of the wire and wire quality and in practice, providers had to upgrade their local
systems to provide consumers with DSL access (Jackson, 2002).
In practice, what this means is that both cable and DSL companies had to make sig-
nificant infrastructure investments to keep up with the rapid growth in demand for high
speed Internet services. The cable companies had to invest in bringing fiber lines closer to
the home and the the phone companies had to deal with wire quality issues. Both had to
send installers to the home for the first installation, for which there was often significant
wait times for consumers (Faulhaber, 2002). All of this meant that supply lagged demand,
particularly in the early years of roll-out. It is clear therefore clear that ISPs would have
had an incentive to choose which markets to enter carefully so as to reach as many potential
consumers as possible quickly.
Simple intuition tells us that Internet service providers should have weighed the potential
costs and benefits of entering each local market and chosen accordingly and there is evidence
that this type of cherry picking did in fact occur. In the early years of diffusion, Internet
service was not surprisingly offered to areas with high predicted rates of take up, e.g., high
income areas. This source of variation in timing, however, is likely to be correlated with
labor market outcomes and would therefore prove unsuitable for an instrumental variables
strategy. My strategy will instead focus on the costs of providing service to local markets.
Recall that both cable and DSL service required investment in moving/upgrading wiring
closer to the dwelling. From there, the dwelling owner was responsible for wiring inside the
home and in most cases this would not need to upgraded since most homes had cable and
phone wiring by the 2000s. Note that this was the case for both a single family homes and
multiple dwelling units (such as an apartment buildings), since the building owner would
have owned the wiring that distributes Internet to each unit. This means that from the ISPs
perspective, providing service to a dwelling with multiple potential customers was more cost
effective than providing service to a single family home with just one potential customer.
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Thus, all else equal, the ISP will prefer to enter markets with more multiple family dwellings.
This is the source of exogenous variation I use to isolate the causal effect of Internet on labor
supply.
2.9.3 Local IV Estimator
This section describes how I estimate the MTEs and weights described in section 3.6.3
using a non-parametric local IV estimator. For a much more detailed description of this es-
timator and its applications, see Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 2005); Heckman et al. (2006).
The goal of this exercise is to decompose the standard IV estimate into MTEs over the dis-
tribution of unobservable factors that determine treatment status and calculate the weights
placed on those treatment effects in the linear IV estimate. Then, using those MTEs, I can
calculate the average MTE over specific intervals, which is the LATE over that interval. Note
that this “LATE” differs from the “LATE” described by Imbens and Angrist (1994), which
I will henceforth refer to as the linear IV estimate. The linear IV estimate is a particular
weighted average of MTEs, while the LATE I refer to here is simply the average MTE over
some specified interval. I will also describe how I calculate those particular weights and
reconstruct the linear IV.
To calculate the MTEs, the first step is to estimate the probability of treatment or the
propensity score, P (z) = Pr(HSI = 1|X,Z). I estimate P(z) using probit so that the
predicted probabilities are guaranteed to lie within the interval [0,1]. Next, I determine
the support of the propensity score, which is critical for determining the set over which
the MTE can be identified. In practice, I find that I have close to full support and can
identify the MTE over the interval [0.1, 0.97]. Next, I calculate the MTE at each point
in the distribution P(z) using the non-parametric local IV estimator, which is a flexible
polynomial in P(z). Note that because P(z) decreases in z, the horizontal axis increases
in the unobservables correlated with treatment status (in the notation of Heckman et al.
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(2006), the horizontal axis is P (z) = 1 − ud, as opposed to P (z) = ud). The weights for
the IV estimate are calculated for specific points in the distribution of P(z) at the mean of
the independent variables using the formula for the IV weights provided by Heckman et al.
(2006). Note that it is difficult to calculate these weights with multiple instruments so I
use the single instrument interaction of MDU rates with a time trend. The MTEs for that
specification are displayed in figure 2.7 of the appendix to this chapter. The population
weights are a simple calculation of the fraction of the population in each interval of the
distribution of P(z).
2.9.4 Additional Results
Table 2.8 displays the results of various extensions and robustness checks. The first row
tests the sensitivity of the estimated results to alternative IV strategies. One robustness
check of particular interest is an investigation into the sensitivity of the results to using
a different instrument. Column (1) presents the results using the instrumental variable
strategy used by Stevenson (2009) to investigate the effects of Internet job search. The
instrument is the interaction of automatic washing machine and telephone usage in 1960
(both constructed from the 1960 Decennial Census) with year fixed effects. The motivation
for this strategy is the fact that state technology take up is highly correlated over time and
states which were early adopters of previous technologies tend to be early adopters of new
technologies (Skinner and Staiger, 2007). This instrument is less powerful than the one I
use, but it is above the rule of thumb of 10. The point estimate of 0.130 is easily within a 95
percent confidence interval of the point estimate using the MDU instrument. A Hausman
test cannot reject the null that the two estimators are both consistent.48
Next I consider alterations on the instrument used throughout the chapter. Column
48I compute a Hausman test with bootstrapped variance estimate, since both instrumental variables esti-
mates are calculated with clustered standard errors and therefore are not fully efficient. The p-value on the
Hausman test is p=0.255.
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(2) presents the results from interacting MDU rates with a time trend as opposed to year
fixed effects. While this specification is less flexible than the main specification, the results
indicate a stronger first stage and nearly identical results to those using year fixed effects.
Column (3) displays the results using a binary instrument based on whether MDU rates are
above or below the median interacted with an indicator for whether the time period is prior
to 2003. Again, the results persist with this less flexible specification. Column (4) from using
both MDU rates and 1960s technology adoption as instruments (both interacted with year
fixed effects). Note that the first stage is actually less powerful in this specification than
that with only MDU rates, which is indicative that the technology adoption instrument has
less predictive power than the MDU rate instrument.
Columns (5) and (6) display the results from altering the definition of a multiple dwelling
unit used for the instrumental variable. It is not possible to perfectly map the FCC’s
definition of a MDU to what is available in the Census. For the main specification, I chose
the one that matched most closest and had the largest first stage F statistic: dwellings with
3 or more units. Here, I alternatively try (5) two or more units, and (6) five or more units.
In each case the results are similar to using the original definition.
Next, I consider several checks on the data construction and specification in row 2 of table
2.8. In the first two columns, I omit from the sample those individuals whose Internet usage
variable was allocated. In columns (3)-(4) I cluster standard errors at the state, as opposed
to state-year level. This was not the main specification because there are 78 regressors and
only 51 clusters, which means I cannot compute the variance-covariance matrix for the 2SLS
specification without partialling out some control variables. In this case, I partial out the
state fixed effects, demographic controls, and year fixed effects. Estimated standard errors
increase slightly, but the point estimate remains statistically significant from zero. Finally,
in columns (5)-(6) I include state-specific linear time trends, which allows for the possibility
that women with plans to participate/not participate in the labor force might move into
states with upward/downward trends in Internet usage. The inclusion of state trends is
52
expected to be problematic for the instrumental variables estimates because the first stage is
identified off of differences over time in the effect of state MDU rates on Internet use. Thus,
state trends are likely to considerably reduce the power of the first stage. It is mechanically
possible, however, to conduct such an estimate and although the power of the first stage
is considerably weakened, the point estimate in 2SLS specifications remains quantitatively
similar.
Next, I text the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of several alternative control
variables. One potential concern is that the included control variables do not accurately
control for unobservables local labor market conditions. A state level measure of MDU living
is used to deal with sorting bias in the instrument, but more local measures could be used for
wages to capture more specific aspects of the labor market. Therefore, MSA level wages for
both males and females are constructed from the Current Population Survey and included
separately in the model. For individuals who do not live in an MSA, I use the rural portion of
the state’s average wage rates. This is shown in columns (1)-(4) of the third row of table 2.8
and the results are very similar to the original specification. Another concern is that Internet
use is related to technology take-up more generally, which may also be correlated with labor
market outcomes. One way to control for selection into technology usage that would lead
to increased rates of Internet use is to specifically control for individual computer usage.
Unfortunately, the sample will be severely limited by including this control variable, which
is only available in 2000-2003 and is only asked at the household level. Results are displayed
in the columns (5) and (6) of the third row of table 2.8. Because of the reduced sample
size, the first stage is no longer strong enough to be confident about a causal interpretation
of the point estimates. However, the point estimate is virtually unchanged in the linear IV
estimation, suggesting that overall selection into technology use is not likely to be biasing
results.
In addition to investigating the impact of Internet use on married women’s participation,
I have also investigated the impact for men and single women in the fourth row of appendix
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table 2.8. For both single women and men, the samples are small and first stage F statistics
are too low to permit a causal interpretation. Overall, however, the magnitude and sign of
the coefficients on HSI is not similar to that for married women. For men, the results are
small and insignificant.
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Figure 2.1: High-Speed Internet Installation Diagram
(a) Single Family Home
(b) Multiple Dwelling Unit (MDU)
Notes: Authors rendering based on Jackson (2002) and Ames (2006). “ISP” refers to the high speed
Internet service provider.
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2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Displayed are the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from a set of unconditional linear
regressions relating yearly high-speed Internet access rates to 2000 state MDU rates. Data on state
residential high-speed Internet access rates was obtained from the Federal Communications Commission
Form 477 filing data for the years 2000-2008. Data on MDU rates and the number of households in each
zip code was obtained from the 2000 Decennial Census. MDU rates are defined as the share of the 2000
state population residing in a structure with 3 or more units. Internet access rates are defined as the
fraction of state’s zip codes with at least one residential high-speed Internet customer in each year,
weighted by the number of households in each zip code.
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2000 2001 2003 2007
Year
Notes: Displayed are the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on the vector MDUs ∗ θt from
estimation of the reduced from version of equation 2.2 and 2.3, which relates MDU rates to labor force
participation. In panel (a) θt=1990-1997 and in panel (b) θt=2000, 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2009. Coefficients
are relative to the base year of 1997 in panel (a) and 2009 in panel (b). 1990-1997 is the time period prior
to the introduction of residential high-speed Internet access and 2000-2009 is the time period used
throughout the chapter.
57




































2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Women High Ed Women w/ Children
Men
Notes: Displayed are aggregate labor force participation rates for married mean and women aged 18-59.
Source is the American Communities Survey 2000-2010. Note that male and female rates are on different
scales for ease of comparison.
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Figure 2.5: Decomposition of Instrumental Variables Estimates
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P(z); Unobservables Correlated With Treatment
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P(z); Unobservables Correlated With Treatment
Notes: Panels (a) displays marginal treatment effects calculated using a local IV estimator. Panel (b)
displays population weights and panel (c) displays the linear IV weights. In all cases the x-axis displays
percentiles of the distribution of unobservables correlated with treatment status (the propensity score
P(z)).
59





























−.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8
































−.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8



































−.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8
































−.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8































−.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8





























−.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Change in LFP
Checking News, Weather, or Sports Scores
Notes: Plotted is subgroup level mean rates of Internet use for each activity listed and subgroup-level
predicted changes in labor force participation when high-speed Internet use increases from 0 to 1 (L̂FP ),
based on estimating equation 2.3 for each subgroup. The sample is limited to married women 18-59 and
subgroups are defined by education, the presence of children and Census divisions.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics on Married Women 2000-2009
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
high-speed Internet (HSI) User 0.356 0.479
.......in 2000 0.054 0.225
.......in 2001 0.112 0.315
.......in 2003 0.250 0.432
.......in 2007 0.662 0.473
.......in 2009 0.786 0.409
Labor Force Participation 0.731 0.444
Usual Hours Worked Per Week 37.51 11.19
Full Time Status 0.731 0.444
Less than High School 0.087 0.282
High School 0.303 0.460
Some College 0.293 0.455
College 0.317 0.465
Spouse-Less than High School 0.103 0.304
Spouse-High School 0.302 0.459
Spouse-Some College 0.265 0.442
Spouse-College 0.330 0.470
Lives in MSA 0.709 0.454
Lives in Central City 0.187 0.390
No Children Under 18 0.454 0.498
One Child Under 18 0.210 0.407
Two Children Under 18 0.218 0.413
3 or More Children Under 18 0.118 0.323
Any Children Under Age 6 0.242 0.428
White (NH) 0.766 0.424




Notes: Displayed are means and standard deviations of the individual level dependent and independent
variables from the 2000-2009 Current Population Survey supplements. The sample is limited to married
women age 18-59. Full time status and hours worked are conditional upon participation in the labor
market. The number of observations is 107,976.
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Table 2.2: Summary of State-Level Variables 2000-2009
Mean Description Source
Income PC $38,951 Income per capita Bureau of
($5,701)
Economic Analysis (BEA)
Avg Wage $43,866 Average annual wage Bureau of
($7,161) income per job
Economic Analysis (BEA)
Pop Density 135.1 Population Density Census Land Area
(378.79) and Population Estimates
HPI 350.03 Housing Price Index Federal Housing
(110.57)
Finance Agency (FHFA)
Unemp Rate 5.48 Unemployment Rate Bureau of
(2.06)
Labor Statistics (BLS)
% Adopt 0.904 sum(Fraction Workers Industry i* Forman et al (2005)
(0.066) Industry i Internet Adoption Rate) and BEA
% Enhance 0.129 sum(Fraction Workers Industry i* Forman et al. (2005)
(0.004) Industry i Enhancement Rate) and BEA
% MDU 0.235 Percent Population 2000 Census
(0.059) in Multiple Dwelling Unit
Notes: Displayed are state-level control variables. Income per capita, average wage, and the house price
index (HPI) are in 2009 dollars, inflated by CPI-U. Standard deviations displayed in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: LPM Home Internet Use and Married Women’s Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var: LFP
HSI Use 0.0670*** 0.0903*** 0.0426*** 0.0494*** 0.0471*** 0.0471***
(0.00520) (0.00699) (0.00541) (0.00531) (0.00518) (0.00518)
Year=2000 0.0471*** 0.0174*** 0.0240*** 0.0185*** 0.00818
(0.00638) (0.00578) (0.00573) (0.00565) (0.0132)
Year=2001 0.0551*** 0.0266*** 0.0326*** 0.0278*** 0.0169
(0.00583) (0.00526) (0.00522) (0.00519) (0.0122)
Year=2003 0.0390*** 0.0168*** 0.0217*** 0.0188*** 0.0101
(0.00549) (0.00499) (0.00497) (0.00481) (0.00901)
Year=2007 0.00751 0.00254 0.00391 0.00280 -0.00834
(0.00469) (0.00463) (0.00461) (0.00452) (0.00829)
Black (NH) 0.0550*** 0.0465*** 0.0488*** 0.0488***
(0.00597) (0.00607) (0.00593) (0.00596)
Hispanic -0.0299*** -0.0296*** -0.0185*** -0.0184***
(0.00605) (0.00601) (0.00563) (0.00564)
Other (NH) -0.0517*** -0.0453*** -0.0486*** -0.0485***
(0.00770) (0.00753) (0.00754) (0.00756)
Age 20-24 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.149*** 0.149***
(0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0246) (0.0246)
Age 25-29 0.162*** 0.165*** 0.199*** 0.199***
(0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0245) (0.0244)
Age 30-34 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.212*** 0.212***
(0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0248) (0.0248)
Age 35-39 0.186*** 0.191*** 0.218*** 0.218***
(0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0248) (0.0248)
Age 40-44 0.221*** 0.227*** 0.207*** 0.207***
(0.0255) (0.0252) (0.0248) (0.0248)
Age 45-49 0.235*** 0.242*** 0.188*** 0.188***
(0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0245) (0.0245)
Age 50-54 0.203*** 0.212*** 0.145*** 0.145***
(0.0255) (0.0252) (0.0248) (0.0248)
Age 55-59 0.106*** 0.117*** 0.0469* 0.0469*
(0.0265) (0.0262) (0.0257) (0.0257)
Central City -0.0112** -0.00873* -0.0143*** -0.0141***
(0.00486) (0.00487) (0.00495) (0.00498)
MSA -0.0175*** -0.0113*** -0.0104** -0.0105***
(0.00408) (0.00401) (0.00404) (0.00403)
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Less than HS -0.248*** -0.282*** -0.278*** -0.278***
(0.00676) (0.00734) (0.00736) (0.00735)
High School -0.0783*** -0.124*** -0.128*** -0.128***
(0.00382) (0.00378) (0.00373) (0.00373)
Some College -0.0297*** -0.0635*** -0.0656*** -0.0655***
(0.00354) (0.00352) (0.00343) (0.00343)
Spouse-Less than HS 0.0511*** 0.0466*** 0.0466***
(0.00563) (0.00570) (0.00570)
Spouse-High School 0.0948*** 0.0853*** 0.0854***
(0.00388) (0.00395) (0.00395)
Spouse-Some College 0.0852*** 0.0781*** 0.0781***
(0.00346) (0.00347) (0.00348)
1 Child 0-5 -0.121*** -0.121***
(0.00605) (0.00605)
1 Child 6-18 0.0000731 0.0000932
(0.00388) (0.00388)
2 Children 0-5 -0.229*** -0.229***
(0.00778) (0.00778)
2 Children 6-18 -0.0430*** -0.0430***
(0.00447) (0.00447)
2 Children 0-18 -0.129*** -0.129***
(0.00726) (0.00727)
3+ Children 0-5 -0.354*** -0.354***
(0.0179) (0.0179)
3+ Children 6-18 -0.111*** -0.111***
(0.00638) (0.00639)
3+ Children 0-18 -0.264*** -0.264***
(0.00721) (0.00722)
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Level Controls Yes
R2 0.005 0.019 0.054 0.061 0.087 0.087
N 107976 107976 107976 107976 107976 107976
Notes: Basic individual demographic variables include fixed effects for age category, race, living in an MSA,
and living in a central city. State-level controls include average wages, income per capita, unemployment
rates, housing prices, population density, percent of state employees’ industry internet adoption and
enhancement, which are matched to the individual-level data at the state-year level. Standards errors
clustered by state-year are in parentheses. The mean labor force participation rate is 0.73 and mean HSI
use rate is 0.36. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.4: First Stage Relationship between Percent of State Residing in MDU and Home
High-Speed Internet Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
%MDU*2000 0.565*** 0.556*** 0.566*** 0.570*** 0.736***
(0.108) (0.0996) (0.0989) (0.0989) (0.0900)
10.54% 10.37% 10.56% 10.63% 13.73%
%MDU*2001 0.583*** 0.582*** 0.585*** 0.589*** 0.716***
(0.119) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.0816)
5.19% 5.18% 5.20% 5.24% 6.37%
%MDU*2003 0.641*** 0.631*** 0.637*** 0.638*** 0.765***
(0.116) (0.105) (0.104) (0.103) (0.0890)
2.57% 2.53% 2.55% 2.56% 3.07%
%MDU*2007 0.280** 0.289*** 0.290*** 0.291*** 0.252***
(0.117) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.0917)
0.42% 0.44% 0.44% 0.44% 0.38%
Control Variables:
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse’s Education Yes Yes Yes
Presence/Age of Children Yes Yes
State-level Controls Yes
F Statistic 11.17 13.33 13.90 14.09 27.55
Over ID Stat 2.595 2.590 2.458 2.513 2.503
N 107976 107976 107976 107976 107976
Notes: Basic demographic variables include fixed effects for age category, race, number and ages of
children, living in an MSA, and living in a central city. State-level variables include average wages, income
per capita, unemployment rates, housing prices, population density, percent of state employees’ industry
internet adoption and enhancement, which are matched to the individual-level data at the state-year level.
%MDU refers to the percent of state living in a multiple dwelling unit and is matched at the state-level.
The left out category is %MDU*2009. Standards errors clustered by state-year are in parentheses.
Percentages listed below each coefficient represent the percent change for a 1% increase in %MDU, scaled
by the mean of the dependent variable in each year. The F Statistic refers to the cluster-robust F statistic
described in the text. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.5: IV Home High-Speed Internet Use and Married Women’s Labor Force Participa-
tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HSI Use 0.215** 0.182* 0.175* 0.204** 0.186***
(0.0963) (0.0954) (0.0932) (0.0945) (0.0714)
Year=2000 0.138* 0.118* 0.115* 0.132* 0.114**
(0.0705) (0.0691) (0.0675) (0.0687) (0.0534)
Year=2001 0.139** 0.120* 0.117* 0.133** 0.114**
(0.0652) (0.0638) (0.0623) (0.0634) (0.0492)
Year=2003 0.106** 0.0908* 0.0885* 0.102** 0.0856**
(0.0519) (0.0508) (0.0496) (0.0504) (0.0380)
Year=2007 0.0231* 0.0199 0.0197 0.0225* 0.0103
(0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0113)
Black (NH) 0.0664*** 0.0554*** 0.0601*** 0.0588***
(0.00929) (0.00844) (0.00855) (0.00764)
Hispanic -0.0108 -0.0147 0.000287 -0.00182
(0.0144) (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0103)
Other (NH) -0.0444*** -0.0383*** -0.0398*** -0.0408***
(0.00936) (0.00934) (0.00959) (0.00867)
Age 20-24 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.155*** 0.154***
(0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0250) (0.0247)
Age 25-29 0.165*** 0.169*** 0.204*** 0.204***
(0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0248) (0.0246)
Age 30-34 0.161*** 0.166*** 0.217*** 0.216***
(0.0261) (0.0258) (0.0254) (0.0251)
Age 35-39 0.188*** 0.194*** 0.224*** 0.223***
(0.0258) (0.0255) (0.0252) (0.0250)
Age 40-44 0.224*** 0.231*** 0.214*** 0.213***
(0.0258) (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0251)
Age 45-49 0.239*** 0.247*** 0.196*** 0.195***
(0.0257) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0249)
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Age 50-54 0.210*** 0.221*** 0.156*** 0.155***
(0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0256)
Age 55-59 0.118*** 0.130*** 0.0622** 0.0604**
(0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0278) (0.0267)
Central City -0.0101** -0.00769 -0.0131*** -0.0130***
(0.00498) (0.00500) (0.00503) (0.00491)
MSA -0.0269*** -0.0186*** -0.0195*** -0.0186***
(0.00797) (0.00703) (0.00705) (0.00604)
Less than HS -0.210*** -0.259*** -0.249*** -0.252***
(0.0272) (0.0187) (0.0190) (0.0154)
High School -0.0562*** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.114***
(0.0162) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.00871)
Some College -0.0197** -0.0580*** -0.0586*** -0.0594***
(0.00795) (0.00545) (0.00549) (0.00491)
Spouse-Less than HS 0.0696*** 0.0697*** 0.0670***
(0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0124)
Spouse-High School 0.107*** 0.101*** 0.0991***
(0.0104) (0.0107) (0.00844)
Spouse-Some College 0.0909*** 0.0853*** 0.0844***
(0.00556) (0.00565) (0.00476)
1 Child 0-5 -0.121*** -0.121***
(0.00613) (0.00612)
1 Child 6-18 -0.00520 -0.00456
(0.00509) (0.00464)
2 Children 0-5 -0.228*** -0.228***
(0.00795) (0.00788)
2 Children 6-18 -0.0481*** -0.0474***
(0.00521) (0.00502)
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2 Children 0-18 -0.129*** -0.129***
(0.00717) (0.00719)
3+Children 0-5 -0.355*** -0.355***
(0.0179) (0.0179)
3+ Children 6-18 -0.115*** -0.115***
(0.00715) (0.00691)
3+ Children 0-18 -0.263*** -0.263***
(0.00738) (0.00732)
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spouse’s Education Yes Yes Yes
Presence/Age of Children Yes Yes
State-level Controls Yes
LPM Estimates
HSI Use 0.0903*** 0.0426*** 0.0494*** 0.0471*** 0.0471***
(0.00699) (0.00541) (0.00531) (0.00518) (0.00518)
First Stage
F Statistic 11.17 13.33 13.90 14.09 27.55
Over ID Stat 2.595 2.590 2.458 2.513 2.503
N 107976 107976 107976 107976 107976
Notes: Basic demographic variables include fixed effects for age category, race, number and ages of
children, living in an MSA, and living in a central city. State-level variables include average wages, income
per capita, unemployment rates, housing prices, population density, percent of state employees’ industry
internet adoption and enhancement, which are matched to the individual-level data at the state-year level.
Instrument is percent of state living in a multiple dwelling unit (MDU) and is matched at the state-level.
The F Statistic refers to the cluster-robust F statistic described in the text. Standards errors adjusted for
clustering by state-year are in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table 2.6: Additional IV Estimates of Home High-Speed Internet Use and Participation
(A) Differences by Presence of Children
All No Children Children Children Under 6 Children 6-18
OLS
HSI Use 0.0471*** 0.0606*** 0.0359*** 0.0492*** 0.0247***
(0.00518) (0.00617) (0.00631) (0.00928) (0.00726)
2SLS
HSI Use 0.186*** 0.0276 0.293*** 0.176 0.302*
(0.0714) (0.0966) (0.112) (0.139) (0.163)
F Stat 27.55 22.82 19.59 14.47 12.99
Mean LFP 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.62 0.76
Mean HSI Use 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.38
N 107976 48745 59231 26128 33103
(B) Differences by Education
LHS HS/SC College HS or Less Some or More College
OLS
HSI Use 0.0925*** 0.0523*** 0.0413*** 0.0681*** 0.0335***
(0.0205) (0.00614) (0.00739) (0.00775) (0.00533)
2SLS
HSI Use -0.136 0.229* 0.380* 0.0905 0.383**
(0.397) (0.125) (0.204) (0.0876) (0.151)
F Stat 3.155 21.12 6.859 19.77 14.12
Mean LFP 0.50 0.73 0.79 0.66 0.78
Mean HSI Use 0.11 0.32 0.49 0.23 0.44
N 8999 64210 34767 41581 66395
(C) Alternative Outcomes and Extensions
Hours Full Time Family Income Employment Married Men
OLS
HSI Use 0.270** 0.00216 16627.3*** 0.0460*** 0.0258***
(0.118) (0.00419) (628.8) (0.00524) (0.00260)
IV
HSI Use 8.513*** 0.198* 27083.7** 0.175** 0.0772
(2.791) (0.107) (13463.0) (0.0711) (0.0512)
F Stat 16.80 21.15 24.04 27.55 19.43
N 70018 76066 91290 107976 99592
Notes: All specifications include the following demographic variables: fixed effects for age category, race,
number and ages of children, living in an MSA, and living in a central city; and state-level variables:
average wages, income per capita, unemployment rates, housing prices, population density, percent of state
employees’ industry internet adoption and enhancement, which are matched to the individual-level data at
the state-year level. Instrument is percent of state living in a multiple dwelling unit (MDU) and is matched
at the state-level. The F Statistic refers to the cluster-robust F statistic described in the text. Standards
errors adjusted for clustering by state-year are in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 2.7: Decomposing the Instrumental Variables Estimates
(a) Individual Characteristics of Compliers
Mean All Mean Compliers Relative Probability
Less than HS 0.09 0.10 1.09
High School 0.30 0.24 0.78
Some College 0.29 0.16 0.55
College 0.32 0.20 0.62
Spouse College Educated 0.33 0.27 0.81
Has Children 0.55 0.57 1.04
White (Non-Hispanic) 0.77 0.27 0.35
Black (Non-Hispanic) 0.06 0.07 1.16
Hispanic 0.11 0.06 0.55
Age 18-34 0.26 0.34 1.31
Age 35-59 0.74 0.65 0.89
(b) IV Weights on Composite State SES Measure





(c) Individual Characteristics across Distribution of Unobservables
0-0.2 Percentiles 0.2-0.8 Percentiles 0.8-1 Percentiles
Less than HS 0.07 0.05 0.00
High School 0.40 0.29 0.08
Some College 0.31 0.31 0.30
College 0.22 0.35 0.62
Spouse College Educated 0.24 0.36 0.62
No Children 0.47 0.46 0.38
Children Age <6 0.24 0.23 0.26
Children Age 6-18 0.29 0.31 0.36
White (Non-Hispanic) 0.77 0.78 0.87
Black (Non-Hispanic) 0.07 0.06 0.03
Hispanic 0.10 0.09 0.02
Age 41.65 42.30 41.58
Notes: In Panel (a), column (1) displays the mean of the characteristic indicated in each row, column (2)
displays the mean of the characteristic for the compliant population, and column (3) dislplays the
likelihood a complier has the characteristic indicated in each row. Column (2) was calculated from columns
(1) and (3). Panel (b) displays the weights placed on each quartile of the distribution of the state SES
measure by the IV estimate. The state SES measure is calculated based on a linear projection of state-level
demographic and economic characteristics on high-speed Internet usage, as described in the text. Panel (c)
displays the mean of the characteristic indicated in each row across different intervals in the distribution of
unobservables correlated with Internet usage (P(z)).
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P(z); Unobservables Correlated With Treatment
Notes: Displayed are marginal treatment effects calculated using a local IV estimator. The x-axis displays
percentiles of the distribution of unobservables correlated with treatment status (the propensity score P(z)).
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Table 2.8: Appendix - Extensions and Robustness Checks
Alternative Instruments
Appliances MDU*t MDU*Pre Both IVs MDU=2+ Units MDU=5+ Units
HSI Use 0.130* 0.184** 0.201** 0.173*** 0.194** 0.222***
(0.0676) (0.0819) (0.1013) (0.0583) (0.0842) (0.0819)
F Stat 12.21 68.94 29.55 15.97 11.82 18.71
Over-ID Stat - - - 12.06 0.241 5.382
N 107976 107976 107976 107976 107976 107976
Drop Allocated Cluster at State State Trends
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
HSI Use 0.0482*** 0.231*** 0.0471*** 0.186* 0.0467*** 0.219
(0.00490) (0.0820) (0.00480) (0.0964) (0.00519) (0.282)
F Stat 23.89 22.92 3.905
N 96770 96770 107976 107976 107976 107976
MSA Male Wages MSA Female Wages Computer Use
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
HSI Use 0.0498*** 0.181** 0.0498*** 0.191** -0.00307 0.158
(0.00603) (0.0762) (0.00604) (0.0786) (0.00517) (0.389)
Male Wage -0.000989* -0.00137**
(0.000581) (0.000606)
Female Wage -0.00121 -0.00172*
(0.000962) (0.000991)
Computer Use 0.0672*** 0.0470
(0.00483) (0.0486)
F Stat 17.76 18.53 2.297
N 76683 76683 76683 76683 68273 68273
Single Women Married Men Single Men
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
HSI Use 0.0681*** -0.260* 0.0258*** 0.0772 0.0438*** -0.461*
(0.00604) (0.151) (0.00260) (0.0512) (0.00492) (0.256)
F Stat 5.609 19.43 4.223
N 79679 79679 99592 99592 76497 76497
Notes:All specifications include fixed effects for age category, race, education, spouse’s education, number
and ages of children, living in an MSA, living in a central city, year and state (when appropriate). Also
included is state income per capita, unemployment rates, housing prices, population density, percent of
state employees’ industry internet adoption and enhancement, which are matched at the state-year level.
Instrument is the percent of state residing in a multiple dwelling unit and is matched at the state level
(except where noted otherwise). Standard errors clustered by state-year are in parentheses (except where
noted otherwise). * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Chapter 3
Home Internet and the Labor Market: Decomposing the Effects of Internet
Usage on Labor Supply
3.1 Introduction
Home Internet technology has altered how, when and where individuals conduct numer-
ous aspect of daily life. In this second chapter of this dissertation, I demonstrate that home
Internet has a sizable impact on the labor supply of married women. This result perhaps
raises more questions than it answers. Namely, if Internet usage had a profound effect on
women’s labor supply, what is the reason for that increase? The fact that Internet is used
for many different tasks suggests numerous plausible candidate explanations – from the in-
creased availability of flexible scheduling arrangements to reductions in the amount time
that needs to be spent in home production. In this chapter, I disentangle the reasons for
the demonstrated increase in female labor supply associated with Internet usage. First, I
propose a theoretical model for investigating the impact of the Internet on labor supply
via four different channels: work at home, home production, leisure and job search. I then
provide empirical evidence on the extent to which each of those mechanisms contributes to
observed change in labor supply for married women.
I begin the analysis of the mechanisms behind the demonstrated increase in labor supply
by examining how the Internet is used, both across groups and over time. Using data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the PEW Internet and American Life Project
I find that the Internet is used by most individuals for a diverse range of tasks. This
includes activities that are best classified as home production, such as shopping, banking
and paying bills, as well as activities that are best characterized as leisure, such as checking
news, weather reports and sports scores and playing games. Individuals also report using
the Internet at high rates for work and job search. Moreover, rates of use for most of these
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activities have increased between 2000 and 2010, both on the extensive and intensive margin.
This is suggestive evidence that the introduction of high speed Internet – which increased
in usage from about 5% of the population in 2000 to 74% in 2009 – may have facilitated
use of Internet services for these activities.49 This indicates that any analysis seeking to
disentangle the reasons for the observed increase in labor supply associated with high speed
Internet usage needs to consider numerous candidate explanations.
To capture the various ways Internet usage for different activities can affect labor supply
decisions, I propose a theoretical framework based on a Becker (1965) model of time allo-
cation. Key to this framework is the recognition that home Internet is not only an input
in traditionally home-based activities such as leisure and home production, but can also be
used for market work if individuals are able to telework or search for jobs online. In this
framework, working from home lowers the costs of working, including the time and monetary
costs of commuting and lost wages when children stay home from school or repairmen need
to be met during work hours. Internet also reduces search frictions in the labor market,
enabling individuals to more easily transition into market work. As with prior home tech-
nologies like washing machines and microwaves, the Internet can be used to save time in
home production tasks, freeing up time for market work. On the other hand, the Internet
offers a wide range of entertainment options, which can potentially offset any increase in
labor supply. In sum, this framework implies that to understand the combined net effect of
Internet usage on labor supply requires an understanding of the extent to which individuals
use Internet for each of these tasks and the responsiveness of individual labor supply along
each margin.
To empirically disentangle the net effect of Internet usage on labor supply, I separately
analyze the effects of Internet usage for telework, job search, home production and leisure.
To do so, I employ various sources of data on Internet usage, telework, employment histories
and time use. An analysis of work at home rates confirms that those most affected by
49Author’s calculation from chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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Internet use are those in occupations with high rates of working from home: individuals in
the top quartile in terms of predicted impact of Internet use on participation have work at
home rates that are 45 percentage points (123 percent) higher than those in the bottom
quartile. In addition, I examine different types of telework arrangements, including full time
or part time, and for contract or through an employer. This analysis indicates that the
impact of home Internet is through increased usage of employer-provided, part time work
from home opportunities. Moreover, a back of the envelope calculation indicates that the
rise in female participation induced by Internet can explain 27 percent of the rise in telework
over the period studied.
To study job search, home production and leisure, I construct work histories for individu-
als who report using the Internet and examine their labor market outcomes for the following
year. This analysis indicates that Internet use for job search increases the propensity for
an individual to join the workforce in the following year and reduces the duration of the
transition from non-participation to participation. Internet use for home production and
leisure do not have significant impacts on participation or the speed with which transitions
are made. However, an analysis of time use data indicates that Internet users spend approx-
imately 2 fewer hours per week in home production than those who do not use the Internet,
confirming that time is saved in home production online, although the effects are small. A
back of the envelope calculation suggest that Internet usage for search and home production
can explain 25 percent of the increase in labor supply induced by Internet usage found in
the second chapter.
Based on the analyses conducted in this chapter, I conclude that telework, job search
and time saved in home production are all plausible mechanisms explaining the results, and
the ability to engage in part-time telework through an employer appears to be the greatest
contributor to the estimated effects. This finding has important public policy implications,
and speaks to broader policy discussions about the potential benefits of telework and flexible
scheduling policies. While it is generally accepted that flexibility in the workplace has the
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potential to benefit employers, employees and the economy as a whole, adoption is still low
and there is little empirical evidence on the benefits/costs of these policies.50 This chapter
has demonstrated that Internet usage, via take-up of telework opportunities, has allowed a
group of highly educated women to join the workforce, suggesting such policies may have
the potential to encourage workforce entry by productive individuals.
3.2 Background on Internet Usage Patterns
To understand the mechanisms via which Internet usage affects labor supply I begin by
investigating how individuals use the Internet. To do so, I first examine data on the activities
individuals report doing online, which is available Current Population Survey Internet and
Computer Use supplements in 2000, 2001 and 2003. The surveys record detailed informa-
tion about activities individuals report engaging in online in the past year, which I use to
tabulate summary statistics on individual’s online behavior. The surveys vary in the specific
questions asked, so for consistency the questions are aggregated into categories: email, home
production (with a separate category for shopping and paying bills), leisure (with separate
categories for entertainment and checking news, weather, and sports scores), work-related
and job search.51 I show components of each category separately because some activities are
more difficult to place into a single category than others. For example, while “entertainment”
is almost certainly a leisure activity, “reading news” is more ambiguous.
Table 3.1 displays a summary statistics of this data and indicates that individuals use
the Internet for a wide range of tasks that fall within each of the categories. Among married
50See, for example, the report by the Council of Economic Advisers on Work-life Balance in March 2010
(Council of Economic Advisers, 2010).
51The supplements ask about specific activities performed online in the past year. The data is only
summarized for those who report using the Internet at home. Home production includes shopping and paying
bills online, looking for government or health information, and looking for information about products and
services. Leisure includes recreation (playing games, watching TV or movies, listening to music, recreation,
entertainment or fun) and checking news, weather, or sports (NWS). Work related tasks, email and job search
were consistently asked throughout the sample. See section 2.9 of this dissertation for more information on
variable creation.
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women, 36 percent use the Internet at home, and approximately 81 percent of those women
use the internet for “home production”, 75 percent for “leisure”, 28 percent for work and 15
percent for job search. Within the home production and leisure categories, 54 percent use
the Internet for “shopping or paying bills” and 29 percent use it for “entertainment.” Among
different groups, more educated women use the Internet more intensively for almost all tasks,
including work and “shopping/paying bills”, than either men or less educated women.
It is clear that the Internet is used across demographic groups for a variety of activities.
It is also important to understand how these patterns have changed over time. This is
particularly relevant for understanding the impact of broadband (as opposed dial-up), since
that is the focus of the second chapter of the dissertation. Since the CPS data is only
available until 2003 it is difficult to study trends using that data source. Fortunately, the
PEW Internet and American Life Project collects trend data on Internet usage which is
available from 2000 to 2010.52 Although this data does not have the detailed demographic
information the CPS has, it does have the advantage of having a measure of intensity of
Internet usage: it asks individuals if they have “ever” done an activity online as well as their
usage patterns “yesterday.”
Figure 3.1 displays trends in Internet usage for email, work, job search, shopping, banking,
and “just for fun.” Figure 3.1 (a) displays trends in “ever use” and figure 3.1 (b) displays
trends in use “yesterday.” There is a clear pattern of increasing use of Internet shopping
and banking, both extensively and intensively. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
broadband might be particularly important facilitating those tasks. There is also a large
increase in use of Internet “just for fun,” suggesting usage for leisure has increased as well.
While Internet usage for email and work “ever” remained fairly flat between 2000-2008 (data
was not available post 2008 for this category), usage “yesterday” increases substantially for
both uses over the period. This is also potentially consistent with increased usage for work
52PEW Internet and American Life Project “Usage Over Time” data can be found online at http:
//pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Usage-Over-Time.aspx. The PEW Internet
and American Life Project bears no responsibility for the interpretations presented or conclusions reached
in this dissertation.
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associated with broadband deployment, although an important caveat is that the question
does not distinguish between Internet usage in the home and at work.
Both the CPS and PEW Internet usage data indicate that individuals use the Internet
for a diverse range of tasks, including home production tasks like shopping, leisure activities,
work and job search. Moreover, trend data is indicative that usage of the Internet for those
activities increased over the time period studied, and individuals are using Internet more
intensively for most activities. In the next section, I propose a theoretical framework for
incorporating these various uses of the Internet into labor supply decisions.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
To analyze the theoretical impact of Internet use on labor supply, I begin with a Becker
(1965) model of time allocation. In this model, an agent has preferences over a set of
commodities that are produced in home using a combination of inputs purchased in the
market and the agent’s own time. These commodities include home production goods like
meals or a clean home, as well as leisure goods like watching television. As an example,
purchased inputs may include raw ingredients and cooking utensils, which produce a meal in
combination with time spent cooking and eating. The agent’s time can be allocated between
home and market work. Time in the market earns a wage, and this income can be used to
purchase inputs for production.
To understand the impact of home Internet use and guide the empirical analysis, it is
useful to consider the following formulation of Becker’s (1965) model, which is similar to
the framework outlined by Greenwood and Vandenbroucke (2005).53 This framework will
facilitate the illustration of the impact of Internet as a source of technological progress in
the production of home goods and leisure, as well as an input in job search and telework.
It should be noted that the goal of this exercise is not to specify a structural equation to
53Their model is a simpler, static version of the framework used in Greenwood, Sheshadri, and Yorukoglu
(2005) to describe the impact of technological change in the home on female labor supply.
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be estimated, but to serve as a framework for conceptualizing the various ways Internet use
may affect labor supply in order to inform the empirical analysis that follows.
Consider an agent who has preferences over two goods: a market purchased consumption
good c and a home produced good h. For the moment, the home produced good may be
either a leisure good or a home production good, both of which are produced in the home
using time and purchased inputs. Utility is described by the following additively separable
function:
U(c) + V (h) (3.1)
Where Uc, Vh > 0 and Ucc, Vhh < 0.54 The home produced good is produced using the
agents time th and market purchased inputs x according to the following constant returns
to scale production function:
h = f(th, x) (3.2)
Where ft, fx > 0, ftt, fxx < 0.55 The price of x is q and the price of c is normalized to
one. Time on the market is represented by tm. When the agents spends tm units of time in
market work, he pays a time cost wρtm to working, where 0 < ρ < 1 . ρtm represents time
spent in commute, or in transit when an emergency or family obligation requires the agent
to leave work (say, to meet a repairman).56 The price of this time spent in commute is its
opportunity cost, which is captured by the market wage w. The budget constraints can be
written as:
c+ qx = w(1− ρ)tm +B (3.3)
54Uc = ∂U/∂C.
55Diminishing marginal returns with time occur because agents get tired, begins to produce goods that
have more market substitutes, and/or inputs start to wear out over time.
56This implies that commute time increases linearly in hours worked. While this assumption is oversimpli-
fied, it is not entirely unreasonable since commute time does tend to increase in days worked. Other authors
have alternatively modeled commute as a fixed time cost. In this case, the budget constraint is non-convex
which is problematic for optimization, but the resulting predictions in a static framework are the same (Black
et al., 2008).
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where B is unearned income. In a married couple (assuming no joint labor supply
decisions) this might represent the husband’s income, plus any household assets that earn
income. The time endowment is T and the time constraint is:
th + tm = T (3.4)
Maximizing utility subject to the time and budget constraints leads to the following




Where w̃ = w(1 − ρ). This expression indicates that entry into the market depends on
whether or not the net real wage is greater than or equal to the ratio of the marginal benefit
of time spent in home production to the marginal utility of consumption. The ratio on the
right hand side thus represents the reservation wage. Therefore, equation 3.5 indicates that
the agent enters the market when the net market wage (the left hand side of 3.5) is greater
than or equal to the reservation wage (the right hand side of 3.5). At an interior solution
where the agent both works and spends time in home production, the agent is equating the
marginal benefit of time spent in home production with its marginal cost (in terms of lost
57The Lagrangian optimization problem is represented by the following expression:
L = U(c) + V (f(th, x)) + λ((1− ρ)wtm +B − qx− c) + µ(T − tm − th)
For simplicity, suppose expenditures on inputs qx = qx are fixed so that qx > 0 (i.e., there is some
indivisibility associated with x in production). Then, maximizing over c,th, and tm implies that:
λw(1− ρ) ≤ µ
Vhft ≤ µ
Uc ≤ λq
Thus, for the case where c > 0 :
w̃ = w(1− p) < VhftUc if tm = 0
w̃ = w(1− p) = VhftUc if 0 < tm < T
w̃ = w(1− p) > VhftUc . if tm = T
Thus, market entry (tm > 0) occurs when 3.5 is satisfied.
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wages and foregone consumption utility).
It is then straightforward to show that in this framework to show that the ability to
work from home can lead to an increase in labor force participation. Working from home is
captured by a decrease in the fraction of time which much be spent in commute ρ, which
implies an increase in the net wage w̃. For some individuals, w̃ will then become sufficiently
large to satisfy 3.5 and these individuals will be induced to enter the market.
Internet may also affect the observed market wage w. Suppose the observed market wage
is represented by the following function: w = pwhigh + (1− p)wlow, so that with probability
p the agent observes a high market wage and with probability (1-p) he observes a lower
market wage. If the Internet reduces search frictions, this can be captured by an increase
in p, and for some individuals w̃ will become sufficiently large to induce entry. Similarly,
if home Internet changes the agent’s wage offer distribution by increasing his productivity
at work, this can be expressed as an increase in whigh and/or wlow, which will also induce
entry. This could be the case, for example, if telework increases the agent’s productivity by
decreasing absenteeism or if agent’s are more productive working at home because there are
fewer distractions.58
Next I consider the impact of Internet technology on the production of leisure and home
production goods. In this case, home Internet can be viewed as technological progress in the
purchased inputs to production, x. This is captured in the model by an increase in inputs
x accompanied by a decrease in the price of inputs q. For simplicity, I assume that total
expenditures qx remains unchanged.59 Due to constant returns to scale in production, an
increase in x leads to an increase in the amount of the home good h that can be produced
given the same time input th.60 The intuition behind this is fairly straightforward. Consider
the example of purchasing clothing and other necessary household items. Prior to the Inter-
58To be clear, home Internet use (not workplace Internet use) is the mechanism considered that could alter
productivity. There is some recent experimental evidence that telework can in fact increase productivity
(Bloom, Liang, Roberts, and Ying, 2012).
59The assumption that qx remains unchanged is innocuous and eases interpretation.
60Suppose the new technology allows the production of αh goods given th, then constant returns to scale
implies αh = αf(th, x) = f(th, αx).
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net, to produce this home good the agent would have spent time traveling to multiple stores
and waiting in lines. With Internet technology, the agent can shop with a click of a mouse,
meaning that given the same time input, the agent can now produce much more “shopping”
(alternatively, the agent can decrease the time cost associated with production of the old
amount of “shopping”).
For ease of composition, let the utility of home produced goods be represented by:
Z(th,x) = V (f(th, x)) (3.6)
An increase in x affects the reservation wage, or the right hand side of 3.5. Substituting
3.6 and differentiating the right-hand side of 3.5 with respect to x leads to the following











Since Uc > 0, the sign of this expression depends on the sign of Ztx, which describes
the extent to which time and goods are substitutes or complements in utility. For a leisure
good, time and inputs are expected to be complements in utility, which implies Ztx > 0 .
This means that technological improvements in the production of leisure goods like watching
television will increase the reservation wage, leading to a decrease in participation for those
on the margin. Home production goods such as shopping and paying bills, on the other hand,
are goods for which time and inputs are expected to be substitutes in utility. In this case,
Ztx < 0, which implies that for home production goods, technological progress in x leads to
a decrease in the reservation wage, and an increase in labor force participation. Therefore,
if home Internet is used exclusively for home produced goods such as shopping or paying
bills, labor supply will increase. On the other hand, if home Internet is used exclusively for
leisure, labor force participation will decrease. Since it is likely that Internet is an input
82
in both types of goods (as well as telework and job search), the net predicted impact on
participation is ambiguous.
The model also has an ambiguous prediction for hours of work conditional on participation
in the market. When the agent works and spends time in home production, 3.5 holds with
equality. Fully differentiating 3.5 leads to the following expressions for the impact of telework
and job search (a change in w̃ via a change in either w or ρ) or an improvement in home
production or leisure technology (an increase in x) on time in the market tm:
dtm
dw̃








The denominators of 3.8 and 3.9 are negative.61 The numerator of 3.8 is ambiguous and
depends on the relative magnitudes of Uc and Uccw̃tm, since the former is positive and the
latter is negative. The intuition behind this ambiguous prediction is offsetting income and
substitution effects: the income effect of an increase in the wage leads the agent to demand
more of all goods (including home produced goods), decreasing time on the market, while
the substitution effect leads the agent to substitute away from home produced goods towards
market purchased goods. As in the participation decision, the sign of 3.9 will depend on the
sign of Ztx, which is positive for leisure and negative for home production tasks (leading to
an increase in hours for home production goods and a decrease in hours for leisure goods).
Next, I conduct an empirical investigation which considers separately the effects of Inter-
net usage for each of the proposed mechanisms on labor supply. To do so, I will pool together
various sources of data on each of mechanisms in question. The goal of these analyses will be
to obtain a rich picture of how the Internet is used and how those uses contribute to affecting
labor supply decisions, using the conceptual framework outlined above as a framework for




Telework or “work from home,” is growing in popularity and usage. A recent report by
the Council of Economic Advisers finds that in 2008, 50 percent of employers allow some
of their employees to work at home occasionally, and 23 percent allow some employees to
work at home on a regular basis (2010). Moreover, the propensity to telework increased
substantially. WorldatWork, which publishes statistics on telework behavior, finds that the
propensity to work from home at least once per week increased 63 percent between 2002
and 2008 (WorldatWork, 2006, 2009). Moreover, that study also notes that teleworkers
increasingly use broadband to work from home (WorldatWork, 2006). Oettinger (2011)
finds that the wage penalty for working from home has decreased over time, which the
author attributes in part to the rise of Information technology. Taking some liberty with
that result would suggest that Internet usage may have made work from home easier and
encouraged its take-up, both by employers and employees. To the best of my knowledge,
however, there are no papers directly investigating the impact of Internet technology on
telework take-up or telework patterns. In this section, I will investigate the link between
Internet technology and telework usage.
3.4.1 Summary Statistics on Telework
In order to investigate the importance of telework in explaining the results, I begin by
investigating data on telework trends across demographic groups, which can be found in
the CPS Work Schedule Supplements from 2001 and 2004. Table 3.2 displays those data.
Overall, about 24 percent of married women report working at least some hours in the
home. Women have a slightly higher propensity to work from home than men, and they
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work slightly more days/hours in the home when they do so. The average woman who works
from home does so approximately 3.5 days per week, 1.2 of which are spent working from
home exclusively (i.e., not going into an office at all). Across groups, college educated women
are much more likely to work from home than less educated women, although they do so
less intensively. This appears to a product of the type of occupations each type of woman
tends to hold. Column (6) of table 3.2 indicates that women with children are more likely
than any other group to report working from home to “coordinate schedules with family or
personal needs.” This is direct evidence that working from home is a tool women use to
balance the demands of work and family.
The information presented on telework patterns suggest that these may be tools women
use to balance work and family needs, and therefore, this might be responsible for the
increase in women’s labor supply associated with Internet usage. An investigation into the
effect of high speed Internet on work at home would be a more direct way of establishing this
link, but unfortunately, the CPS Work Schedule data does not ask respondents about their
own Internet usage so I cannot make this link using these data alone. As an alternative, I
look across occupations in CPS Internet data and the CPS Work Schedule data to examine
whether or not Internet users tend to have occupations where it is likely the individual
teleworks. Figure 3.2 displays the correlation between occupation-specific work at home
rates and occupation-specific Internet usage rates and indicates there is a strong, positive
relationship.62 Occupations in the top quartile of the distribution of mean Internet usage
rates have work at home rates that are five times higher than those in the bottom quartile. A
closer examination indicates that the top occupations in terms of work at home and Internet
usage are computer scientists, lawyers and post-secondary teachers. This is suggestive evince
that indeed, home Internet usage can facilitate telework.
62The CPS work schedule data is available in 2001 and 2004, while the CPS Internet data is available
is 2000, 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2009. I construct averages using all available data for each occupation.
Since occupation classifications changed dramatically between the 2000/2001 supplements and 2003-2009
supplements, I use the BLS CPS extracts to harmonize occupations over time http://www.nber.org/data/
cps_extract.html.
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Next, I investigate trends in telework to see if there have been any major changes in
take up and/or types of telework arrangements in the period in which high speed Internet
diffused. Figure 3.3 displays trends in telework between 2002 and 2010, which was compiled
based on data presented in WorldatWork (2006, 2009, 2011). Figure 3.3 (a) displays trends
in various types of telework defined by the type of contract, while Figure 3.3 (b) displays
trends in types of telework defined by intensity of use. Both indicate that there have been
large increases in telework, with telework “once per month” increasing from just over 20
million workers in 2002 to a peak of almost 35 million workers in 2008. Within the group
of teleworkers, interesting trends also emerge in type of telework. Figure 3.3 (a) indicates
“employee” telework, (working from home through an employer) has increased substantially
while “contract/self-employed” telework (working from home on a for contract basis and/or
through self-employment) has remained fairly stable. In terms of intensity, figure 3.3 (b) is
suggestive that telework “once per year” and “once per week” have remained fairly stable
while “every day” telework has declined. Telework “once per month” has grown the most
substantially, suggesting that take up of occasional telework through an employer appears
to be the major area of growth during the period in which high speed Internet was deployed.
In the next section, I will more formally investigate the link between Internet usage, type of
telework contract, and intensity of usage.
3.4.2 Self Employment and Full Time Telework
As described above, there are variations in the way in which an individual can engage in
telework, from engaging full-time and exclusively working at home, to working at home just
a few hours per month. Additionally, some individuals telework through an employer, while
others do so on a contract basis or are self-employed. Figure 3.3 indicated that during the
period in which high speed Internet diffused, occasional employer-provided telework was on
the rise, and in this section I will more directly investigate this link. These distinctions are
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of particular interest for understanding the policy implications of the observed increase in
labor supply associated with Internet usage. For example, if the observed change in labor
supply can be attributed to an increase in employer-provided telework that would suggest an
increase in the availability of those types of workplace policies could lead to further increases
in female participation. On the other hand, if the increase in coming through increased rates
of self-employment, that would suggest alternative policy levers could achieve those goals.
To formally investigate which types of telework arrangements are affected by Internet
usage, I begin by investigating the link between individual high speed Internet usage and
self-employment. Self-employment can be found in the CPS data that was summarized in
this chapter, and used in the second chapter of this dissertation to study the link between
home Internet usage and labor supply. To address the fact that Internet usage may be
endogenous to the self-employment decision, I employ the instrumental variables strategy
used in the second chapter of the dissertation. This strategy is motivated by the observation
that diffusion of high speed Internet access was hampered by the presence of significant
supply-side constraints. Namely, I exploit the fact that aspects of the underlying housing
infrastructure affected the profitability of installation in particular areas, leading to different
trends in access, and hence usage, of broadband Internet. To do so, I construct a measure
of the fraction of the state population which resides in a multiple family dwelling – called a
multiple dwelling unit (MDU) – and interact that measure with year fixed effects to capture
the fact that this cross-sectional variation in the housing infrastructure created differential
trends in access. The identification assumption is that the fraction of the population residing
in a MDU would not have been systematically correlated with trends in labor supply in the
absence of broadband Internet diffusion.
More formally, I estimate the following relationship between individual high speed In-
ternet usage and self-employment using two stage least squares. The first stage is a linear
probability model of the impact of the percent of the state residing in an MDU on HSI use:
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HSIist = MDUsθtγ1 +Xiγ2 + Sstγ3 + θt + ηs + νist (3.10)
HSIist is a dummy variable for whether or not individual i reports using the Internet
in a household with broadband in state s and year t. MDUs is the percent of the state’s
2000 population which resides in a housing unit that is classified as an MDU, which was
collected from the 2000 Census.63 MDUs is expected to affect home Internet use via the
timing of Internet access, since places with a higher MDUs are expected to receive Internet
access earlier. Therefore, it is interacted with the vector of year fixed effects θt to allow the
impact to vary separately by year. The instrument is the vector MDUsθt. The main effect
ofMDUs only varies at the state level and is perfectly correlated with the state fixed effects,
thus, it cannot be included in the model. The second stage is a linear probability model of
HSI use on self-employment:
selfemployedist = ĤSI istβ1 +Xiβ2 + Sstβ3 + θt + ηs + εist (3.11)
Where selfemployedist is self-reported self employment. The sample is limited to mar-
ried, working women 18-59. The coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the impact of
HSIist on the propensity to be self-employed. Xi is a vector of individual controls and Sst
is a vector of state-level controls, both of which are the same as described in detail in the
second chapter of the dissertation. θt are year fixed effects , ηs are state fixed effects and εist
is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. Table 3.3 panel (a)
present the results of that analysis. In columns (1)-(2) equations 3.10 and 3.11 are estimated
for the entire sample of married women, so that the dependent variable is an indicator for
whether an individual is self-employed or in any other employment/non-employment sce-
nario. In columns (3)-(4), the sample is limited to employed individuals, so that dependent
variable is instead an indicator for whether an individual is self-employed or working through
63Chapter 2 describes the data in more detail.
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an employer. Columns (1) and (3) display the linear probability model (LPM) results, while
columns (2) and (4) display the IV results. The baseline LPM results are indicative of
a positive and statistically significant relationship between high speed Internet usage and
self-employment in both samples, however, these are likely to be biased by reverse causality
if self-employed individuals are more likely to take up home high speed Internet. The IV
results on the other hand, are indicative of a negative, but statistically insignificant relation-
ship. This suggests the naive LPM estimates are indeed biased upwards and that high speed
Internet usage is not related to self employment in a statistically significant way.
In addition to differences in the type of contract, there are differences in the intensity
with which individuals telework. This is also important in terms of policy, because if the
results are explained by full-time telework, that is a very different workplace policy than
allowing employees to work from home when necessary and engage in flexible scheduling.
Unfortunately, as described above, information on telework behavior is not available in the
CPS. Information on full-time work at home is, however, available in the American Com-
munities Survey (ACS). This can be found in the survey question which asks “means of
transportation to work”, in which respondents may report “worked at home” as their means
of transportation. The ACS does not, however, include information on Internet usage. Since
geographic identifiers are available in both data sources over the same time frame, I can
employ a two sample instrumental variables strategy (TSIV) (Angrist and Krueger, 1992).
To do so, I use the CPS survey data to estimate the first stage relationship in equation 3.10
for the impact of MDU rates on home Internet use, and apply those parameter estimates
to the ACS to estimate ĤSI and the second stage relationship between home high-speed
Internet use and full time telework.
Table 3.3 panel (b) display those results. In column (1) the first stage relationship for
equation 3.10 is estimated. Column (2) displays the reduced form relationship between the
instrument and full time work from home. This indicates that the instrument cannot predict
full time work home. Column (3) displays the two sample IV estimate for the effect of ĤSI
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on full time work from home. The standard error on this estimate was calculated using
500 bootstrap replications. The results indicate that home high speed Internet usage is
associated with a statistically insignificant 2.5 percentage point decline in the probability
of working from home full time. This is consistent with the summary data on trends in
telework presented in figure 3.3, which indicated full time telework was falling slightly in the
late 2000s. Overall, these analyses indicate that home high speed Internet usage does not
increase full time telework or self employed telework, and trends in telework are consistent
with high speed Internet usage increasing occasional telework through an employer.
3.5 Job Search
The idea that the Internet could have a profound effect on job search and the labor market
was recognized early by economists (e.g., Autor, 2001). To date, however, the empirical
evidence has been somewhat mixed on the effectiveness of Internet as a tool for job search.
Kuhn and Skuterad (2004) study the effect of Internet search on unemployment durations
using data from the CPS and find that Internet search increases unemployment durations.
Subsequent work, however, has tended to find the opposite result (e.g.,Stevenson (2009),
Kuhn and Mansour (2011)) or no relationship (e.g., Kroft and Pope (2010)). While previous
literature has studied the relationship between Internet usage and unemployment durations,
it has not looked at the effect of Internet usage for job search on labor force participation. In
this section, I conduct such an analysis, using similar strategies to those used in the previous
literature.
To study the effect of Internet usage for job search on transitions from non-participation
to participation I will exploit the longitudinal nature of the CPS sampling frame to look at
the post-survey labor market outcomes of respondents who were asked whether or not they
used Internet for job search in the initial survey. In order to do so, I construct employment
histories for the sample of married women who use Internet at home and do not participate in
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the labor force. Importantly, I need information on use of Internet for job search activities,
which is included in the CPS supplements from 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2003. I no longer
focus only on use of high speed Internet and look at all Internet users and compare those
who used the Internet for job search to those who did not. Since the sample is limited to
individuals with Internet at home, I do not need to be concerned about the endogeneity
of Internet take-up to work patterns and I do not use the instrumental variables strategy
used earlier. However, I do need to be concerned about take-up of job search practices in
general, so I include as a control variable an indicator for whether or not the individual
was “doing something to look for work in the past 4 weeks.” I also include controls for the
individual’s age, race, ethnicity, age category, presence of children, year of the survey and
state of residence. However, there is still a possibility that Internet take-up for job search is
endogenous to work patterns and because I do not use an IV strategy, these results are best
interpreted as descriptive and not causal.
In order to investigate the effect of Internet job search on labor force participation, I begin
by estimating a linear probability model for the propensity for an individual to be a labor
force participant one year after the initial survey according to the following specification:
LFPist+12 = ijobsearchistβ1 +Xiβ2 + Sstβ3 + θt + ηs + εist (3.12)
Where LFPist+12 is an indicator for whether or not an individual i in state s who is an
Internet user in time period t was a participant in the labor force in time period t+12, or one
year later. The coefficient of interest is β1 which captures the effect of use of Internet for job
search on future participation. Table 3.4 columns (1) and (2) display the results. Column
(1) indicates that internet use for job search is associated with a positive and statistically
significant increase in the probability of participating in the labor force. This relationship
may be biased, however, if the indicator for Internet job search captures the effect of actively
searching for work. Therefore, in column (2) I include as a control an indicator for whether or
not an individual was “looking for work” in the past for 4 weeks. The effect of Internet use for
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job search is attenuated slightly but still indicates a positive and statistically significant 17.6
percentage point increase in the probability of participating. Not surprisingly, the coefficient
on “looking for work” is also positive and statistically significant.
The preceding analysis indicates that Internet usage is associated with increased propen-
sities to be a labor force participant in one year. However, this disregards information about
how long the seeker searched. If home Internet eases transitions into participation, it may
operate by allowing the individuals to become employed sooner. In order to incorporate all
of the information available about length of time out of the labor force, I employ a duration
model. I use the same method used by Kuhn and Skuterad (2004) in their analysis of Internet
job search in the CPS, which addresses several unique features of the CPS sampling frame,
including the fact that the CPS data is discrete, there are both left and right censored spells
and eight month gaps in the data while respondents are out of the sample. The authors
develop a discrete-time hazard model that accounts for those large windows but still uses a
flexible baseline hazard. 64
Table 3.4 columns (3)-(4) displays estimates of participation hazards, which include the
same control variables described above. Again, column (3) omits the control for “looking
for work” and column (4) includes it. The results indicate that, indeed, Internet job search
is associated with a statistically significant increase in hazard rates (i.e., Internet search
reduces non-participation durations). Thus, I conclude that Internet job search does in fact
speed up transitions into participation among individuals who use Internet at home.
3.6 Home Production and Leisure
The final potential mechanisms through which home Internet usage may affect labor
supply that I will consider is usage for home production and leisure. In this section, I
64 See Kuhn and Skuterad (2004) for a detailed description of the model.
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study the effect of Internet usage on these activities by conducting two separate analyses.
First, I look at time use patterns for Internet users and non-users since Internet usage is
expected to reduce/increase participation by changing the amount of time individuals spend
in production of those goods (and hence, their valuation of time spent at home). Next,
I use information from the CPS to look at the impact of Internet usage for leisure and
home production on employment outcomes in the following year, using the same framework
described above to study job search.
3.6.1 Evidence from Time Use Data
Internet usage for home production and leisure are expected to reduce/increase partic-
ipation by changing the amount of time individuals spend in production of those goods.
To discern whether or not those mechanisms are important I consider whether there are
differences between home Internet users and non-users in how much time is spent in the
production of those goods using the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), a survey which
records time diaries of its respondents for 24 hours periods. The survey is administered to
CPS respondents, so I am able to identify home Internet users in the ATUS data by linking
it to the CPS Internet data.65
Table 3.5 summarizes time spent in work, home production, child care, and leisure among
respondents in the linked ATUS and CPS data.66 For each group, the top row is the difference
between Internet users and non-users in the amount of time spent in each activity, while the
bottom row is the group average hours per week spent in the activity.67 The sample is
65ATUS data can downloaded from ATUS-X, which also provides the procedure for linking CPS and
ATUS respondents. http://www.atusdata.org/index.shtml . The ATUS is a time-use survey which asks
individual to record the number of minutes spent in various activities in a 24 hour period. I convert minutes
per day into hours per week. Since there can be a a large time lag between when the supplement was
administered and when the ATUS is administered, I limit the sample to only those individuals who respond
to the ATUS within 6 months of the CPS supplement. This leaves a sample of approximately 2000 women.
66Child care is tabulated separately from home production as advised by Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney
(2007).
67Data are collected in terms of minutes per day and converted into hours per week.
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limited to adults 18-59 who are married. Note that these differences are merely correlations,
although in panel (b) the sample is limited to individuals who are employed full time, so
those results are conditional on differences across groups in the propensity to work.
The data suggest there are differences in time spent in each type of activity between
Internet users and non-users. For women overall, Internet use is correlated with 1.88 fewer
hours per week spent in home production and 1.5 more hours per week spent in market
work. These estimates, however, are misleading due to differential rates of participation
across demographic groups and between users and non-users. Panel (b) presents correlations
conditional on employment, which indicate that employed women spend 0.63 more hours
per in market work, 1.3 fewer hours per week in home production, and 0.5 more hours in
leisure. In terms of heterogeneity, these gaps are largest for college educated women and
women with children, while the relationships have the opposite sign for less educated women
or men. This is consistent with the labor supply effects found in the second chapter of this
dissertation, which indicated that Internet does not affect the labor supply decisions of less
educated women or men, but has large effects on women with children and college educated
women. Interestingly, I also find that Internet users spend more time in child care than
non-users. This suggests some time saved in home production tasks or commuting may be
used to spend time with children. I leave it to future work, however, to determine the impact
of Internet use on children’s well-being.
3.6.2 Evidence from the Current Population Survey
The preceding analysis suggested that Internet usage is associated with reductions in
time spent in home production and increases in time spent in leisure for the groups whose
labor supply was affected by Internet usage. These gaps, however, are small relative to the
average amount of time an individual spends working and the approximately 8 hour change
in hours worked per week induced by Internet usage that was found in the second chapter
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of this dissertation. Therefore, in this section I will directly estimate the effect of Internet
usage for home production and leisure on participation to see if these factors can indeed
explain the effects found. To do so, I conduct a similar exercise to the one used in section
3.5 to study the effect of Internet job search on participation.
Table 3.6 displays the results using the CPS data. In columns (1)-(2) I display the results
of the LPM analysis, where the dependent variable is the probability an individual works in
period t+12 if she used the Internet for each activity in period t (and was not in the labor
force in period t). This indicates that women who use the Internet for home production are
approximately 2.5 percentage points (with a standard error of 1.7 percentage points) more
likely to both be a participant, while those who use Internet for leisure are approximately
1.11 percentage points (with a standard error of 1.8 percentage points) less likely to be a
participant. While this is consistent with the time use data and predictions of the model,
neither of these results is statistically significant at conventional levels. In columns (3) and
(4) I present estimates from the duration model presented in section 3.5. Unlike Internet job
search, it is not clear ex ante that use of Internet for home production should necessarily
operate by reducing non-participation durations since there is no clear mechanism via which
that might occur. Nonetheless, I conduct the analysis which indicates that use of the Internet
for home production and leisure both increase non-participation durations, although neither
of those results are statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, these analysis
suggest that Internet usage can save time in home production and may increase time spent
in leisure, but neither is able to significantly explain changes in participation.
3.7 Decomposing the Net Effect
The evidence presented above has indicated that all of the potential mechanisms outlined
in the conceptual framework have some explanatory power in explaining the estimated effects.
Internet usage for occasional part-time telework has trended in a way that is similar to the
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diffusion of high speed Internet. Internet use for job search has been shown to increase the
propensity for an individual join the labor force in a year’s time and speed up transitions from
non-participation to participation. Internet users do spend less time in home production and
more time leisure, but Internet usage for those tasks cannot significantly predict changes in
participation. In what follows, I will attempt to disentangle how much of the estimated
effects on labor supply found in the second chapter of this dissertation can be attributed to
each mechanism.
In order to decompose the extent to which each mechanism can explain the observed
change in participation, information on the effects of each must be combined with informa-
tion on usage rates for each activity. For example, even if Internet job search significantly
predicts changes in employment, if only a small fraction of users use Internet for that activity
than it cannot plausibly explain the bulk of the aggregate change in participation induced
by high speed Internet usage. Therefore, I revisit the summary data present in table 3.1,
which I combine with the point estimates from table 3.4 and 3.6 to construct “back of the
envelope” estimates of the magnitude of each explanation in explaining changes in partic-
ipation estimated in the second chapter of the dissertation. I take the point estimates in
tables 3.4 and 3.6 and multiply each by the information in table 3.1 on the fraction of female
Internet users who have used Internet for each activity. This exercise indicates that Internet
job search can explain about 2.6 percentage points, or 14 percent of the estimated effect
of Internet use on participation. Similarly, Internet use for home production can explain
around 2 percentage points of the estimated effect, or 11 percent of the estimated increase
in participation. In sum, use of Internet for search and home production can explain only
25 percent of the estimated positive effect Internet usage on participation combined.
Gauging the relative contribution of telework is less straight forward than it is for home
production and search. Ideally, I’d use the same strategy to look at Internet use for work as I
did above to look at job search and home production. Unfortunately, I cannot look at use of
the Internet for work using this framework because individuals in the initial survey who do
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not work would not report using the Internet for work in that period. As an alternative, I use
the labor supply results from the second chapter and compare them to changes in telework.
I do so to gauge whether the observed aggregate changes in participation are plausibly
related to changes in telework. If I make the strong assumption that all of the increase in
labor force participation induced by Internet usage led to telework take-up, then diffusion of
home broadband technology (via the effect on women’s labor force participation) can explain
27 percent of the rise in telework.68 Since Internet use for search and home production can
only explain a combined 25 percent of the estimated effects, and telework take up changed so
dramatically over this period, I conclude that Internet use for telework is leading explanation
for the change in women’s labor force participation induced by the diffusion of high speed
Internet technology.
3.8 Conclusion
High speed Internet has affected many aspect of daily life, from facilitating telework to
saving time shopping and paying bills. In this chapter, I provide theoretical and empirical
evidence for the role of Internet in various aspects of daily life, and how those changes are
related to the net effect of Internet usage on female labor supply. By investigating data
on Internet usage for various activities, telework patterns, employment histories, and time
use I find that use of Internet to engage in occasional telework through an employer is the
primary explanation for the demonstrated increase in participation associated with high
speed Internet use, although improved job search and time saved in home production also
play a more modest role in explaining the estimated effects.
The role of telework in affecting women’s labor supply has important public policy im-
plications. While it is generally accepted that flexibility in the workplace has the potential
to benefit employers, employees and the economy as a whole, adoption is still low and there
68Telework increased by 13 million 02-08. The results from chapter two imply 3.56 million more workers
would join the workforce.
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is little empirical evidence on the benefits/costs of these policies.69 This chapter has demon-
strated that Internet usage, via take-up of telework opportunities, has allowed a group of
highly educated women to join the workforce, suggesting such policies may have the potential
to encourage workforce entry by productive individuals.
69See, for example, the report by the Council of Economic Advisers on Work-life Balance, March 2010
(Council of Economic Advisers, 2010).
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Figure 3.1: Internet Usage Trends
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Job Search Shop
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Notes: Displayed are trends in Internet usage for various activities. Data source is PEW Internet and
American Life Project, “Usage Over Time” trend data (2012).
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Mean Work Home Rate 2001, 2004
Notes: Plotted are occupation-specific work at home rates and occupation-specific high-speed Internet
usage rates. Only occupations with at least 100 observations are shown and rates are calculated for
working, married women 18-59. Internet usage rates were calculated in the 2000, 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2009
Current Population Survey supplements used in the main analysis and work at home rates were calculated
in the 2001 and 2004 Current Population Survey work schedule supplements.
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Figure 3.3: Trends in Telework 2002-2010
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Notes: Displayed are trends in different types of telework. Data source is WorldatWork (2006, 2009)
(2011).
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Table 3.1: Activities Conducted Online: CPS 2000-2003
Home Production: Leisure:
All All Shop/Bills All Recreation Check NWS Work Job Search
(a) All
Married Women: 0.356 0.813 0.546 0.749 0.290 0.574 0.288 0.149
N=46690 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Less than HS 0.106 0.697 0.336 0.691 0.358 0.477 0.107 0.118
N=1338 (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
HS/Some Coll 0.319 0.787 0.500 0.729 0.309 0.542 0.208 0.139
N=27262 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
College 0.492 0.860 0.632 0.783 0.256 0.628 0.422 0.167
N=18090 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
No Children 0.341 0.805 0.535 0.738 0.277 0.573 0.298 0.150
N=19998 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Children 0.369 0.818 0.555 0.757 0.300 0.574 0.282 0.149
N=26692 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Single Women 0.309 0.733 0.449 0.724 0.354 0.538 0.204 0.232
N=30383 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Married Men 0.345 0.806 0.532 0.814 0.338 0.703 0.373 0.172
N=41728 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Notes: Displayed are means and standard errors of for various reported uses of the Internet. The sample is
limited to individuals 18-59. In columns (2)-(7) sample is only individuals who are reported to use the
Internet at home. Source is 2000, 2001 and 2003 Current Population Survey Supplements.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics on Telework
Work Home Days Days Hours Work Home
Work Once Per Work Home Worked for Family
Home Week+ Home Only at Home Reasons
Married Women:
All 0.239 0.811 3.480 1.231 12.998 0.069
(N=4871) (0.006) (0.006) (0.029) (0.030) (0.231) (0.004)
Less than HS 0.064 0.892 4.769 3.566 32.351 0.049
(N=82) (0.027) (0.035) (0.189) (0.283) (2.390) (0.024)
HS/Some College 0.146 0.758 3.585 2.006 17.415 0.094
(N=1780) (0.008) (0.010) (0.051) (0.059) (0.469) (0.007)
College 0.436 0.841 3.388 0.756 9.886 0.056
(N=3009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.035) (0.029) (0.219) (0.004)
No Children 0.233 0.817 3.592 1.212 12.634 0.033
(N=2353) (0.009) (0.008) (0.043) (0.043) (0.322) (0.004)
Children 0.247 0.791 3.241 1.351 13.846 0.144
(N=929) (0.014) (0.013) (0.064) (0.070) (0.559) (0.012)
Single Women 0.164 0.763 3.282 1.010 10.861 0.045
(N=2577) (0.007) (0.008) (0.040) (0.037) (0.282) (0.004)
Married Men 0.228 0.812 3.268 0.898 10.954 0.043
(N=7110) (0.005) (0.005) (0.025) (0.022) (0.170) (0.002)
Notes: Displayed are means and standard errors of various measures of working from home. The first
column includes all full time working adults 18-59. The rest of the columns include only those individuals
who report working from home. N also refers to number of individuals in cell who work from home. Source
is 2001 and 2004 Current Population Survey.
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Table 3.3: Home Internet and Telework Patterns
(a) Home Internet Use and Self-Employment: IV Using CPS
All Employed
OLS IV OLS IV
HSI Use 0.0148*** -0.0525 0.0166*** -0.0987
(0.00226) (0.0433) (0.00306) (0.0748)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.074 0.074 0.102 0.102
F Statistic 27.55 21.15
N 107976 107976 76066 76066
(b) Home Internet Use and Full Time Telework: TSIV Using CPS and ACS
First Stage : CPS Reduced Form: ACS TSIV











Mean Dep. Var. 0.378 0.051 0.051
F Statistic 21.15
N 76066 962005 962005
Notes: Panel (a) displays results when the dependent variable is self-employment status. In columns (1)
and (2) equation 3.10 is estimated for the whole sample, and in columns (3) and (4) for employed
individuals only. The instrument described in more detail in the text. Panel (b) displays results from the
two sample IV analysis, where column (1) shows the first stage results estimating equation 3.10 in the
CPS, column (2) displays the reduced form results estimating equation 3.10 (except the outcome variable is
full time telework in the ACS and column (3) displays the two sample IV estimate of the effect of HSI Use
on full time telework. The standard error on the two sample IV estimate was calculated using 500
bootstrap replications. Demographic variables included in all specifications include fixed effects for age
category, race, number and ages of children, living in an MSA, and living in a central city. state-level
variables include average wages, income per capita, unemployment rates, housing prices, population
density, percent of state employees’ industry internet adoption and enhancement are matched at the
state-year level. %MDU refers to the percent of state living in a multiple dwelling unit and is matched at
the state-level. The left out category is % MDU*2009. Standards errors clustered by state-year are in
parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 3.4: Internet Usage for Job Search and Participation
LPM: LFP One year later Duration Model: Participation Hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internet Job Search 0.192*** 0.176*** 0.489*** 0.435***
(0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0640) (0.0646)
Looking For Work 0.267*** 0.977***
(0.0528) (0.188)
N 4292 4292 4111 4111
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) display the results for estimation of a linear probability model for participation in
the labor force 12 months after the initial survey. Columns (4)-(6) display the results estimating the
duration model described in the text, where the dependent variable is the participation hazard for the year
following the initial survey. Includes controls for age, race, education, number and age of children, state of
residence, and year of survey. The estimates for Internet job search also include a control for participation
in active job search. The sample is limited to the married women 18-59 who use the Internet at home and
were not participating in the labor force in the initial survey. Standards errors are in parentheses. Data
source is Current Population Survey 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2003. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 3.5: Means and Differences Between Users and Non-Users In Hours Spent per Week
Spent In Different Time Use Categories
Home Production Child Care Work Leisure
(a) All
Married Women Difference -1.88 2.87 1.54 -0.30
Mean 25.81 9.51 19.12 30.53
Less than High School Difference 1.14 3.37 -5.14 1.07
Mean 31.79 6.01 13.62 32.20
High School/Some College Difference -0.88 1.02 0.53 0.58
Mean 26.33 7.69 18.49 32.24
College Difference -0.69 2.06 0.60 1.20
Mean 23.98 12.64 20.99 27.87
No Children Difference -1.55 0.88 6.84 -2.81
Mean 24.70 1.08 21.41 35.20
Children Difference -2.33 1.75 -0.24 1.94
Mean 26.34 13.55 18.02 28.28
Single Women Difference -1.94 -0.34 6.99 -1.40
Mean 19.17 4.91 24.47 34.54
Married Men Difference 1.06 0.76 1.62 -2.24
Mean 16.15 5.16 33.50 33.88
(b) Employed
Married Women Difference -1.30 2.55 0.63 0.05
Mean 24.34 7.93 25.44 28.44
Less than High School Difference 6.08 3.57 -11.71 6.11
Mean 30.07 5.16 24.33 27.49
High School/Some College Difference -0.12 1.02 -0.91 0.22
Mean 25.12 6.46 24.63 29.93
College Difference -1.13 2.48 2.08 0.83
Mean 22.69 10.12 26.61 26.66
No Children Difference -1.28 1.32 4.72 -3.11
Mean 23.42 1.07 27.23 31.90
Children Difference -1.53 1.74 -1.02 2.36
Mean 24.81 11.44 24.53 26.68
Single Women Difference -2.45 -0.77 5.18 0.42
Mean 18.66 4.48 29.34 32.77
Married Men Difference 1.06 0.76 1.62 -2.24
Mean 16.03 5.21 35.44 32.47
Notes: The top row displays the difference between high speed Internet users and non-users in hours per
week spent in each activity. The bottom row displays the group mean hours per week spent in each
activity. Sample includes adults 18-59, and in the bottem panel only those who are currently employed full
time. Data source is American Time Use Survey and CPS 2000, 2001 and 2003.
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Table 3.6: Internet Usage for Home Production or Leisure and Participation
LPM: LFP One year later Duration Model: Participation Hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internet for Home Production 0.0248 -0.0213
(0.0172) (0.0493)
Internet for Leisure -0.0112 -0.0789
(0.0172) (0.0493)
N 4292 4292 4111 4111
Notes: Columns (1)-(2) display the results for estimation of a linear probability model for participation in
the labor force 12 months after the initial survey. Columns (3)-(4) display the results estimating the
duration model described in the text, where the dependent variable is the participation hazard for the year
following the initial survey. Includes controls for age, race, education, number and age of children, state of
residence, and year of survey. The estimates for The sample is limited to the married women 18-59 who use
the Internet at home and were not participating in the labor force in the initial survey. Standards errors
are in parentheses. Data source is Current Population Survey 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2003. * p < .1, **
p < .05, *** p < .01
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Chapter 4
House Prices and Birth Rates: The Impact of the Real Estate Market on the
Decision to Have a Baby
4.1 Introduction
This project investigates how changes in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-level house
prices affect household fertility decisions. The conceptual approach is based on an economic
model of fertility that recognizes that changes in house prices potentially have offsetting
effects on fertility. Assuming that children are normal goods, and recognizing that housing
is a major cost associated with (additional) children, an increase in the price of housing
will have a negative substitution effect on the demand for children in the current period,
ceteris paribus. This is true for both potential first-time homeowners (i.e., current renters
who would buy a house with the addition of a child) and current homeowners who might
buy a larger house with the addition of a child. On the other hand, for a homeowner, an
increase in MSA-level house prices increases home equity. This could lead to an increase
in birth rates among homeowners through two channels – a traditional wealth effect and/or
an equity extraction effect. In either case, when home prices increase, homeowners might
use some of their new housing equity to fund their childbearing goals. The net effect of
house prices on aggregate birth rates will depend on individual’s responsiveness along these
margins and rates of home ownership.
We are interested in identifying the causal relationship between movements in local area
house prices and current period fertility rates. Conceptually, we are examining how short-
term fluctuations in house prices affect current period fertility rates, separately for owners
and non-owners, all else equal. Our main analyses focus on the housing price cycle of 1997
to 2006, a period of general housing price growth. We additionally separately consider the
adjacent housing market cycles characterized by falling house prices. We begin our empirical
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investigation with a set of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of MSA-demographic
group level fertility rates on MSA level house prices interacted with a baseline measure of
MSA-group level home ownership rates, controlling for conditional variable main effects,
time-varying MSA conditions, and MSA fixed effects. Fertility rates are constructed from
vital statistics natality files and groups are defined by age and race/ethnicity. Our main
source of house price data is the Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index (FHFA
- HPI), which we use in combination with 2000 MSA-level median home values to generate
house price levels over time. Our regression specification controls for MSA fixed effects so
that the estimated relationship between house prices and birth rates is not confounded by
time-invariant differences in preferences for children across MSAs. If couples with lower
preferences for children sort into areas with higher costs of living – driven by other amenities
– there will be a negative correlation between house prices and fertility. Our estimated
relationship of interest will be net of any such sorting patterns.
The key to our empirical approach is to separately identify effects for owners and non-
owners. As a preview of our findings, the data suggests that as the non-owning share of
an MSA increases, rising house prices exert a negative effect on current period fertility
rates; as the owning share increases, rising house prices exert a net positive effect on current
period fertility rates. Any alternative explanation (other than a causal effect of house prices)
for these observed relationships must differentially impact owners and non-owners. The
underlying assumption of our empirical strategy is that conditional on all of the controls in
our regression model, there are not omitted factors that drive both local area house prices
and affect the fertility behavior of owners and renters differently.
To address the possibility that other local factors are biasing our OLS estimates we addi-
tionally implement an instrumental variables (IV) strategy that exploits exogenous variation
in house price movements induced by variation across MSAs in their housing supply elastic-
ity. We predict annual MSA-level house prices using the interaction between the national
version of the FHFA house price index with the cross-sectional MSA housing supply elastic-
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ity, as measured by Saiz (2012). This instrument was first proposed by Chetty and Szeidl
(2012) who define it at the state level in their analysis of the relationship between hous-
ing equity and debt and portfolio choice. The conceptual motivation for this instrumental
variables strategy is that it isolates movements in local-area housing prices coming from the
local area response to national-level aggregate demand shocks, as determined by the degree
of local-area housing supply elasticity. The intuition is that MSA-level house prices will tend
to covary more with national prices in places where the housing supply is more constrained.
Both our OLS and IV results indicate that as the proportion of individuals in a de-
mographic cell who are home owners increases, an increase in house prices is conditionally
associated with an increase in current period fertility rates. This is consistent with a positive
“home equity effect” that dominates any negative price effect. The data also indicate that
as the proportion of homeowners approaches zero, an increase in MSA-level house prices
leads to a decrease in current period fertility rates, which is consistent with a negative price
effect among non-owners. In general, the main results hold across race/ethnic groups and
are equally driven by first, second, and higher-parity births.
These main results are statistically significant and economically meaningful. Employing
our regression estimates in a straightforward simulation exercise, we find that a $10,000
increase in home prices is associated with a 5 percent increase in fertility rates in MSA cells
with 100 percent ownership rates. For MSA cells with zero percent home ownership rates,
we estimate a corresponding decrease in fertility rates of 2.4 percent. For an MSA-group, as
the home ownership rates increase from 30 to 40 percent, the net effect of a $10,000 increase
in house prices becomes positive. Under the assumption of linear effects, these estimates
suggest that all else held constant, the roughly $108,000 average increase in house prices
during the housing boom of 1997 to 2006 would have led to a 9 percent increase in births
over that time.70
We implement a number of robustness checks on the model specification and sample
70The population weighted average home price change for the 154 MSAs in our sample from 1997 to 2006
was $108,038
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construction. We also examine longer averages of house prices; compare the effects across
different demographic subgroups; and examine, first, second, and higher parity births. We
also turn to individual-level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to confirm that
the pattern of effects we see in the aggregate data is found at the individual-level in the ways
expected. In addition, we estimate our model on data from two housing bust periods, to see
how the estimated relationships compare to those estimated during the 1997-2006 housing
boom period. And finally, we tabulate data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) to
see if home equity extraction - via mortgage refinancing or home equity loans/lines of credit
- is a viable mechanism contributing to the positive effect of house price increases on fertility
for home owners.
The main contribution of the chapter is to provide an empirical examination of how
aggregate movements in house prices affect aggregate level birth rates. First, as an issue
of economic demography, it is informative to understand how movements in the real estate
market affect current period birth rates, overall and for various demographic subgroups. Sec-
ond, within the research literature on the nature of the demand for children, an examination
of the effect of house prices on the fertility outcomes of homeowners constitutes a useful test
of wealth effects. Third, our work highlights the importance of including housing markets
in any model of how economic conditions affect fertility outcomes. In fact, as an empirical
matter, we find that changes in house prices exert a larger effect on current period birth
rates than do changes in unemployment rates. Fourth, our results potentially speak to the
role of credit constraints, and imperfect capital markets, in affecting the timing of fertility
decisions. This is an issue that features prominently in the literature on the cyclicality of
fertility timing, as reviewed in Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997). Our finding of a positive
effect among home owners suggests that some individuals may consume out of home equity
to fund their childbearing goals. And finally, there is a literature, described below, on the
tendency of individuals to consume out of housing wealth. To our knowledge, that literature
has not previously considered children as a potential “consumption” good in this regard.
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Our results provide clear empirical support for the idea that house prices impact birth rates
in a statistically significant and economically meaningful way.
4.2 Conceptual Framework and Related Literature
There is a large literature in neoclassical economics investigating the nature and determi-
nants of fertility in developed countries. In the most simple static approach to this question,
parents are viewed as consumers who choose the quantity of children that maximizes their
lifetime utility subject to the price of children and the budget constraint that they face.
Children are conventionally thought to be normal goods, but an empirical puzzle presents
itself in both time series and cross-sectional data, which tend to show a negative correlation
between income and number of children.
There are two leading explanations for this observed correlation that maintain the basic
premise of children as normal goods: (1) the quantity/quality trade-off (Becker, 1960) and
(2) the cost of time hypothesis (Mincer (1963); Becker (1965)). The first refers to the
observation that parents have preferences for both the quantity and quality of children. If
the income elasticity of demand for quality exceeds the income elasticity of demand for
number of children, then as income rises, parents will substitute away from the number of
children, toward quality per child. The second hypothesis attributes the observed negative
relationship between income and fertility to the higher cost of female time experienced by
higher income families, either because of increased female wage rates or because higher
household income raises the value of female time in non-market activities. There is a long
and active literature that attempts to estimate the effect of changes in family income and of
own-prices on fertility.71
71The key empirical challenge in this literature is to find variation that is exogenous to women’s (or
couple’s) preferences and that alter price or income without affecting the opportunity cost of women’s time.
Many of these papers are reduced-form in nature, and include examinations, for example, of the effect of
direct pro-natalist government payments (e.g., Milligan (2005); Cohen, Dehejia, and Romanov (2007)) and
of exogenous changes in income (Lindo (2010); Black et al. (2011)).
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There exists a closely related literature investigating the cyclicality of fertility, which is
a literature about fertility timing (e.g., Galbraith and Thomas (1941); Becker (1960); Silver
(1965); Ben-Porath (1973)). Changes in the unemployment rate are typically thought to
affect the wages of women and their husbands. Under the standard assumption that women
bear the primary responsibility for child rearing, it becomes optimal for woman to select
into childbearing at times when their opportunity cost is lowest, that is, when economic
conditions are least favorable. Another consideration affecting optimal timing with regard
to unemployment rates is skill depreciation (Happel, Hill, and Low, 1984).
In a world with imperfect capital markets and credit constraints, women might not
be able to optimally time fertility with regard to opportunity cost and skill depreciation
considerations. In particular, though some women might optimally choose to select into
childbearing during economic downturns, they might not be able to afford to do this, if
husbands’ income is also negatively affected. Schaller (2011) provides a recent examination
of this issue and explicitly considers the role of gender-specific labor market conditions. Her
results confirm previous empirical findings that increases in overall unemployment rates are
associated with decreases in birth rates. In other words, her empirical work confirms that
births are pro-cyclical. In support of the predictions of Becker’s time cost model, she further
finds that improved labor market conditions for men are associated with increases in fertility,
while improved labor market conditions for women have the opposite-signed effect.72
In many respects, the context of real estate markets is more straightforward to consider
conceptually because changes in house prices do not affect the cost of parental time. Our
conceptual framework is thus not encumbered by considerations of skill depreciation or op-
portunity cost of time. We motivate our empirical model and interpret our estimated effects
simply in terms of housing costs (which affect the price of childbearing) and housing income
72Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) suggest that relatively more white women opt into childbearing during
economic downturns than black women; they attribute this difference to credit constraints facing blacks.
Neither Schaller (2011) nor we find evidence in the data consistent with this idea. In particular, we find a
statistically significant negative relationship between unemployment rates and birth rates among whites and
a statistically insignificant relationship among blacks.
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effects (which affect ability to consume in the current period).73 Our focus on current period
prices and contemporaneous fertility allows us to look separately for price and “income”
effects. Changes in the real estate market are expected to generate price effects because
housing costs are estimated as the greatest portion of the annual cost of raising a child:
greater than food, child care, or education (Lino, 2007).
We qualify the term “income” because an increase in house prices does not necessarily
imply increased wealth or income for home owners. If price increases are viewed to be
permanent and homeowners see their home as a store of wealth, an increase in house prices
can be thought of as an increase in (perceived) wealth for existing homeowners. This could
lead to an increase in the demand for children in the current period, as well as in a completed
lifetime setting. But, if homeowners do not intend to “cash out” and move to a lower-
priced real estate market during their lifetime, or if they view the increase in house prices as
transitory and expect it to be undone at a later period, there is no change in actual wealth or
permanent income. However, if homeowners are otherwise credit constrained but can liquefy
increases in home equity, there can be an increase in current period accessible income and this
could lead to an increase in current period birth rates. To the extent that equity extraction
is driving our results, our work potentially speaks to the role that credit constraints play in
affecting the timing of childbearing. For the sake of convenience of exposition, we refer to
this general class of explanations as a “home equity effect”.
One could reasonably argue that in contrast to unemployment rates – which are generally
understood to be cyclical – movements in the housing market over the period we analyze
were likely to have been perceived at least in part as permanent. This would follow from the
observation that the national trend in housing prices between 1997 and 2006 was steadily
increasing. This suggests our results may be indicative of a change in completed fertility, as
73There exists a class of dynamic or life-cycle models of fertility decisions, which recognize that changes
in prices and income over the life cycle may result in changes in the timing of childbearing, even if they do
not cause completed lifetime fertility to change. The Handbook chapter by Hotz et al. (1997) provides an
overview of these theoretical models. Heckman and Walker (1990) provides an empirical examination of the
effect of income and wages on life-cycle fertility using data from Sweden.
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opposed to simply a story about timing or cyclicality. We give a cursory treatment of this
possibility in our empirical analyses below - in particular by looking at higher-order births -
but we leave it to future research to thoroughly examine this possibility.
Finally, we acknowledge that we talk about fertility throughout the chapter as though it
is a simple decision. Of course, fertility is a stochastic outcome, albeit one that is to a large
extent controllable by individual’s actions with regard to sexual activity, contraceptive use,
fertility treatments, and abortion. We recognize, however, that latent demand for fertility
timing will not be perfectly realized. Thus, any response we see of fertility to house prices
will be a muted reflection of a couple’s desired fertility response.
4.3 Data and Empirical Approach
The main empirical approach of this chapter is to empirically relate MSA level fertility
rates to demeaned MSA-level house prices, interacting house prices with a baseline measure of
group-level home ownership rates and controlling for time-varying MSA level characteristics.
The three main data requirements are (1) MSA-level fertility rates, (2) MSA-level house
prices, and (3) group-level home ownership rates. In this section we describe our main data
sources and briefly describe how we construct the relevant variables. Table 4.1 provides
details on explanatory variables and associated data sources.
4.3.1 Data
Data on births come from the Vital Statistics Natality Files, years 1990 to 2007. Vital
statistics data contain birth certificate information for virtually every live birth that takes
place in the United States. Vital statistics data identifies the race/ethnicity, marital status,
age, and education of the mother, as well as some limited information about the baby’s
pregnancy conditions, and the baby’s health status at time of birth. (These data do not in-
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clude information about home ownership status of the parent.) For the purposes of matching
births to our explanatory variables, we create a file of conceptions for the years 1990 to 2006,
using information on the date of birth and length of gestation to identify year of conception.
We do this because in terms of the decision-making process, the most relevant decision is the
decision to get pregnant in a given time period. It is thus the economic conditions that exist
at the conception decision point that are relevant, as opposed to the economic conditions in
place at the time when the birth actually occurs (typically 40 weeks later.) To be precise,
our analysis sample is a sample of conceptions that result in live births in year t.
We construct MSA-year-group level fertility rates by aggregating births and female pop-
ulation counts to the MSA-year-group cell, where groups are defined by the interaction of
race/ethnicity and age category. We define three mutually-exclusive race/ethnic groups:
Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, and Hispanic. We exclude other race/ethnicities
from the analysis. We define two age categories, 20-29 and 30-44. We obtained annual fe-
male population counts (by age, race, ethnicity, and county) from the National Center for
Health Statistics (National Center for Health Statistics, 2003 2010). We use these data to
construct MSA-group-level fertility rates, defined as the total number of births to women in
the MSA-year-group cell divided by the MSA-year-group population. We obtained access
to confidential natality files that identify the mother’s state and county of residence. We
use the county-level identifiers in the confidential Vital Statistics natality files to construct
MSA level fertility rates, using the MSA definitions that are used in the federal housing data
sets: 5-digit MSAs and Divisions as defined by the Office of Management and Budget in
December 2009 (Bulletin 10-02).
We identify a total of 384 MSAs in the birth records. We restrict our sample to MSAs
that have at least five births in every year-group cell, which leaves us with a sample of 222
MSAs.74 When we further restrict the sample to those MSAs for which all explanatory
74Other empirical papers that have used aggregate level MSA data have used the following rules: Blau,
Kahn, and Waldfogel (2000) look at MSA level marriage rates and MSA level indicators of labor and marriage
market conditions. They use a rule of 20 observations per race-education group. Blau et al. (2004) look at
MSA level single motherhood and headship rates and welfare benefits. They use a rule of 10 observations
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variables used in the baseline specification are available, we are left with a sample of 154
MSAs.75
The main data source used to construct MSA-level house prices is the Federal Hous-
ing Finance Agency (FHFA) housing price index (HPI), previously known as the OFHEO
housing price index. The FHFA index is available for nearly all metropolitan areas in the
United States.76 It measures the movement of single family home prices by looking at repeat
mortgage transactions on homes with conforming, conventional mortgages purchased or se-
curitized through Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since 1975.77 Since the index looks at repeat
mortgages of the same home, it is continually revised to reflect current MSA boundaries.
This is the reason we must use the most current definitions of MSAs in constructing the
birth data. We annualize the index (which is available quarterly) by taking the mean value
of the index over the four quarters of a year.
We use the FHFA index to construct real house prices for each MSA-year by combining
it with information on median home values obtained from the 2000 census. The 2000 Census
records median home values for each county in the U.S. We use the same county crosswalk
used to construct MSAs in the birth data to construct MSA-level median 2000 house values,
which are the population-weighted average across all counties in each MSA. Home values are
scaled by the relevant change in the FHFA index over time and are adjusted to 2006 dollars
using the CPI-U “All items less shelter” series. This measure serves as a proxy for real house
per race-education group.
75While this process eliminates 60 percent of MSAs, it only eliminates about 15 percent of births.
76FHFA requires a metro area to have at least 1,000 transactions before it is published.
77Conventional mortgages are those that are neither insured nor guaranteed by the FHA, VA, or other
federal government entities. Mortgages on properties financed by government-insured loans, such as FHA or
VA mortgages, are excluded from the HPI, as are properties with mortgages whose principal amount exceeds
the conforming loan limit. Mortgage transactions on condominiums, cooperatives, multi-unit properties, and
planned unit developments are also excluded. This contrasts to the alternative Case-Shiller index, which
includes all homes, but is only available for 37 states and a more limited set of MSAs. Additional differences
between the two indices are that the Case-Shiller index puts more weight on more expensive homes and the
Case-Shiller index uses purchases only, whereas the FHFA index also includes refinance appraisals. As a
robustness check, we have re-estimated our results using the Case-Shiller index. Note that we use the “all
transactions” version of the FHFA index, which includes both sales and refinancings of existing mortgages.
We do not use the “sales only” version of the index because it is available for only a small subset of MSAs.
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price movements of median value homes in each MSA.78
The third main variable we need to construct is a measure of mean group-level home
ownership rates at the MSA level. This is key to our analysis because conceptually, we
expect there to be heterogeneous responses of birth rates to home prices across groups
with different rates of home ownership. Recall that Vital Statistics data do not include
information about home ownership status, so we can not separately tabulate current period
births (or conceptions) separately for home owners and non owners. Furthermore, we ideally
do not want to use an individual-level measure of realized home ownership rate, as that is
potentially endogenously determined with childbearing outcomes. Our implemented solution
is to use MSA-group level home ownership rates calculated from the 1990 five percent sample
of the decennial census. As above, groups are defined by race/ethnicity and age category.
We match the MSA definitions provided in the Census to the 2009 MSA definitions used
for the birth and housing price data according to the crosswalk procedure described in the
appendix (section 4.7). To be clear, our group-level measure of home ownership is taken at
baseline and is time invariant.
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Trends
Figure 4.1 displays trends in mean (CPI adjusted) house prices, constructed as described
above, in our sample, both in levels (panel (a)) and yearly percentage changes between year
t− 1 and t (panel (b)). Figure 4.1 also displays house prices alternatively constructed using
the Case-Shiller Index to scale 2000 median home prices. The three housing cycles that fall
within our period of study are highlighted: the 1990-96 period of price decline, the 1997-2006
housing boom, and the subsequent 2007-2010 housing bust. Appendix table 4.11 lists the
154 MSAs included in our analysis sample, ranked according to the percentage increase in
housing prices between 1997 and 2006. The table also lists the computed median home price
78This is the same procedure used by Glaeser et al. (2008).
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in 2006 and the fertility rate in 2006. The top seven ranking MSAs/MSADs in terms of
the percent change in house prices during the boom cycle are all in California. Among the
top 25 ranked, fifteen are in California, nine are in Florida, and the remaining one is the
Washington, DC Metropolitan area. The most expensive housing market in the nation is
the San Francisco MSA, with a 2006 median home price of $781,891. The MSAs with the
least house price growth during this boom cycle are Dayton, OH (3.92 percent), and Fort
Wayne, IN (3.27 percent).79
Figure 4.2 displays the time-series correlation between fertility rates and house prices
and then between fertility rates and unemployment rates, for the period 1990-2006, averaged
across the MSAs in our sample. These plots suggest that movements in fertility rates track
movements in house prices fairly closely, particularly in more recent periods. In fact, a
comparison of the graphs reveals that the time-series correlation between aggregate fertility
rates and housing prices is much greater than it is between aggregate fertility rates and
unemployment rates, .85 versus -.04 This provides a prima facie case for the importance of
considering housing prices when investigating how economic conditions affect current period
birth rates.
Table 4.2 provides summary statistics from the 1997-2006 Vital Statistics natality files
and the 1990/2000 Census. These data are used collectively in various analyses presented
below. All measures are female-population weighted. The first three columns summarize
the main dependent variable of interest: fertility rates (group-level births per 1000 women
age 20-44), overall and for first and higher parity births. The overall fertility rate in our
sample is 70 births per 1000 women aged 20-44. The highest fertility rates are found among
79There is an active literature exploring various explanations for the boom and bust in house prices
experienced in recent decades. As summarized by Sinai (2012) – who offers citations for the various factors
– these potential explanations include “changing interest rates, sub-prime lending, irrational exuberance on
the part of home buyers, a shift to speculative investment in housing, contagion and fads, and international
capital flows.” Sinai’s 2012 paper presents a set of empirical facts about the recent housing cycle, including
information about how the amplitude and timing of house price appreciation and depreciation varied across
MSAs. One of the observations he makes that is particularly relevant to our current empirical approach is
that “demand fundamentals” do not have the same amplitude as price cycles nor does the time pattern of
the growth in fundamentals match the timing of the growth in house prices across MSAs.
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Hispanics age 20-29: 154 births per 1000 women. The lowest rate is among Black mothers
age 30-44: 38 births per 1000 women.
The next column summarizes data from the 1990 census on MSA-group level home own-
ership rates. The overall home ownership rate among our sample of women age 20-44 is 44
percent. The highest home-ownership rates are found among older (age 30-44) white women,
who have an ownership rate of 67 percent. The lowest rates are found among younger (age
20-29) Black women, whose ownership rate is on average 8 percent. This indicates there is
substantial variation across groups in rates of ownership. For the sake of comparison, the
next column shows the rates as calculated from the 2000 census. Comparing the group-level
ownership rates in 1990 and 2000 we see that home ownership rates are extremely stable
over this time period. The final column displays the range of the 1990 ownership rate across
MSAs, for each group. These numbers indicate that in addition to the substantial variation
across groups in rates of home ownership, there is also substantial variation within groups
across MSAs.
4.3.3 Empirical Specification
Our initial empirical analysis consists of ordinary-least squares regressions (OLS) at the
MSA-group-year level. For our baseline analysis, we restrict our attention to the housing
cycle of 1997-2006. This facilitates interpretation as the period was one of nearly uniform
house price growth, and is recognized by the real estate literature as a housing boom period.
We will subsequently consider two housing bust periods: the early 1990s bust period (1990-
1996) and the post-2006 housing bust (2007-2010).
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We estimate regression models of the following form:
ln(FertRatemtg) = β0 + β1(HousePricesmt−1 ∗OwnRatemg) + β2HousePricesmt−1
+β3OwnRatemg + β4Xmt−1 + FracCollmgt + γm + γt + γg
+γm ∗ (t− 1) + γm ∗OwnCatmg ∗ (t− 1) + εmgt
(4.1)
The level of analysis is an MSA-year-group cell. In the above equation, the subscript m
denotes MSA division, t denotes year of the birth (where t-1 refers to the year of concep-
tion), and g denotes group.80 There are six groups, defined by the interaction of our three
race/ethnic groups (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic) and two age cat-
egories (age 20-29 and age30-44). Our final analysis sample consists of 9,240 observations
(10 years * 6 groups * 154 MSAs). All regression are weighted by the total number of births
in each cell.81
The coefficients of primary interest are β1 and β2 , which capture the conditional effect,
respectively, of MSA-year house price index (HPI) interacted with a baseline measure of
MSA-group-level ownership rates and the conditional main effect of the MSA-year house
prices (HousePricemt−1) on fertility rates. The former indicates how an increase in home
ownership rates affects the relationship between de-meaned (and sometimes de-trended)
MSA house prices and births. The conditional main effect of HousePricemt−1 indicates how
movements in house prices affect fertility rates net of ownership interactions, all else held
constant. We interpret this to be the conditional relationship between HousePricemt−1 and
log fertility rates among a non-home-owning population of households.
The variable OwnRatemg is the MSA-group level home ownership rate measured in the
1990 five percent sample of the decennial census. This measure is taken at baseline to
minimize concerns about the endogeneity of year-specific MSA-home ownership rates and
year-specific MSA-fertility rates. Taking a baseline measure of home ownership rates for a
80For the sake of convenience, we write t-1, but our empirical analysis is precise in dating the year of
conception by taking the date of birth and subtracting off the reported weeks of gestation.
81Results alternatively weighting by total female population in each cell are similar and available from the
authors upon request.
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group is therefore preferable. As reported in Table 4.2, there is considerable heterogeneity
across groups in home ownership rates, as well as heterogeneity within groups across MSAs.
It is also true that home ownership rates are quite stable over time within groups, which
means the baseline measure is highly predictive of current period home ownership rates.
Therefore, this approach does not entirely eliminate any concern about endogenously deter-
mined current period births and our measure of home ownership rates. We control for this
conditional main effect to facilitate a causal interpretation of β1, but we are careful not to
assign a causal interpretation to the coefficient on ownership rates.
We are interested in identifying the causal relationship between lagged house prices and
fertility rates. It is thus important to control for other time-varying MSA-level economic
conditions that potentially covary with real estate markets and also fertility timing decisions.
Our regression specification includes controls for MSA-year unemployment rate, MSA-year
male wages included in the vector Xmt in equation 4.1. The specification also controls for
FracCollmgt, the fraction college educated in each MSA-group-year. This is calculated as a
three year moving average using data from the Current Population Survey. Data on MSA-
year level unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area
Unemployment Statistics. Our measure of MSA-year level male wages is the 25th, 50th, and
75th percentile male wage, which was calculated by MSA and year in the Current Population
Survey. Percentiles of the wage distribution were constructed based on hourly earnings for
full-time, full-year male workers.82 Unemployment rates were collected at the county level
and aggregated to MSAs using the crosswalk procedure described in the appendix (section
4.7). The wage and fraction college measures were calculated using the MSA definitions
available in the CPS and translated to 2009 MSAD definitions using the crosswalk procedure.
The regression also includes controls for MSA fixed effects (γm), year fixed effects (γt),
group fixed effects (γg), and in some specifications, MSA-specific time trends (γm ∗ (t− 1))
82We construct wages as in Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008). We define full time as 35 or more hours per
work, and full year as 40 or more weeks worked in the past year. We drop individuals who make less than
one half the 2006 minimum wage (in 2006 dollars). Top-coded observations are multiplied by 1.5.
122
and MSA-ownership-cell-specific time trends (γm ∗OwnCatmg ∗(t−1)). It is imperative that
the regression specification control for MSA fixed effects so that the estimated relationship
between house prices and birth rates is not confounded by time-invariant differences in
preferences for children across MSAs. If couples with lower preferences for children sort
into areas with higher costs of living – driven by other amenities – there will be a negative
correlation between house prices and fertility.83 Given our goals in this chapter, we want to
isolate the effect of house prices on current period fertility net of these sorting patterns. It
is thus important that our regressions control for mean MSA-level differences in birth rates.
The resulting regression estimate of the relationship between house prices and birth rates is
identified off within-MSA changes in house prices.
We additional include MSA specific time trends in some specifications to allow for the
possibility that individuals with plans to increase or decrease their fertility move into MSAs
with upward or downward trending house prices. If there exist trends of this kind that are
distinct for groups with high and low ownership rates, our estimated β1 might be a biased
estimate of the conditional causal effect of interest. We thus additionally allow for separate
MSA specific time trends based on whether a group’s level of ownership (in a particular
MSA) is above or below the median home ownership rate (of 30.5 percent in our sample
of MSA*group cells), yielding two values of OwnCatmg. So, for example, this allows for
white women age 30-44 in the Boston metro area to be on a different trend then black
women age 20-29 in the Boston metro area. Finally, we directly address the possibility that
reverse causality or correlated unobservables are biasing the OLS estimates of β1 and β2 by
implementing an instrumental variables approach that exploits this exogenous variation in
83For example, consider the hypothetical case of two couples, in which one moves to San Francisco, where
household expenses are high, because they expect to have few children and spend their time and money
instead indulging in city-type amenities. The other couple moves to Wichita, in expectation of buying a
big house at a much lower cost per square foot, and filling it with kids. If these couples are typical, then
high-latent-fertility couples will sort into lower priced real estate markets and low-latent-fertility couples will
sort into lower priced real estate.Simon and Tamura (2008) examine the cross-sectional relationship between
fertility and the price of living space across U.S. metropolitan areas, as captured by the average rent per
room in an urban area (calculated among renting households.) Their baseline specification, which controls
for region effects and demographic composition, suggests that a one percent increase in rent is associated
with 0.16 fewer children per household.
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house price movements induced by the interaction between national house price movements
and MSA housing supply elasticities. We describe these approaches in more detail below.
As noted above, our empirical analysis is designed to capture current period fertility
responses to movements in local house prices. Certainly it would be interesting to know
whether any short term responses observed translate into changes in completed fertility. To
the extent that we observe a change in higher-order births, we can speculate that those
changes reflect changes in total completed fertility. But, we leave it to future research to
carefully consider the lifetime implications of any short term changes that we find. Such an
analysis requires a different empirical framework.
4.4 Estimation Results
4.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Specifications
Table 4.3 presents the results of estimating equation 4.1. Column (1) reports the results
with all fixed effects included, but without MSA-specific controls for labor market conditions.
This sparse specification yields a point estimate of β1 of 0.0468 and a point estimate on β2 of
-0.0124, both statistically significant at the one percent level. The positive and statistically
significant point estimate on the interaction term HousePricemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg indicates
that as home ownership rates increase, higher house prices lead to an increase in current
period births, all else held constant. This implies that a positive home wealth effect domi-
nates any negative price effect among current home owners. The negative and statistically
significant point estimate on HousePricemt−1 is consistent with a negative price effect of
house prices on current period fertility for non-home owners. Column (2) adds the unem-
ployment rate and wage measures. The main point estimates of interest are qualitatively
unchanged. Looking at other explanatory variables, we see that the estimated coefficient on
the mean ownership rate is positive, but statistically insignificant. As noted above, we do
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not propose a causal interpretation to this relationship. The unemployment rate is found
to be negatively related to the fertility rate in all specifications, but it does not enter with
statistical significance.
We next check the sensitivity of the results presented above to the inclusion of MSA-
specific linear trends, MSA-specific quadratic trends, and MSA-ownership category specific
linear trends. Columns (3) and (4) report the results with MSA specific linear trends and
MSA specific quadratic trends, respectively. The pattern remains the same – a positive
coefficient on HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg and a negative coefficient on HousePricemt−1–
and the magnitudes of the coefficients are similar to the specification without any trend
terms included, giving us no reason to suspect that individuals with plans to increase or
decrease their fertility systematically move into MSAs with upward or downward trending
house prices.
In Column (5), we include distinct MSA-specific trends for cells with ownership rates
above and below the median home ownership rate. These trends also do not alter the pattern
of estimates, but the point estimates are attenuated toward zero. In this model, the estimated
coefficient on the HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg interaction is 0.0276 (with a standard error
of .00375) and the estimated coefficient on HousePricemt−1 is -0.00509 (standard error of
.00184).84This is arguably the most conservative of the OLS specifications. These estimates
suggest that if house prices increase by $10,000, as we move from an MSA-group with an
ownership rate of 0 to a cell with an ownership rate of 1, there would be a relative increase
of 2.5 percent in fertility rates. More usefully, if house prices increase by $10,000, comparing
MSA-groups with ownership rates of 0.25 to those with ownership rates of 0.75, we would
see a relative increase of 1.25 percent in fertility rates.
84As described earlier, these estimates are weighted by the total number of births in each cell. If we
alternatively weight by total female population in each cell we obtain an estimate of 0.0316 with a standard
error of 0.00429 on the interaction term and an estimate of -0.0087 with a standard error of 0.0021 on the
main effect.
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4.4.2 Instrumental Variables (IV) specifications: Exploiting local housing
supply elasticity
The main threat to assigning a causal interpretation to the estimated β1 and β2 is the
possibility of reverse causality or some correlated unobservable to house prices that affect
fertility rates. If it were simply the case that in MSAs where people demanded more children
house prices were driven up in equilibrium, ceteris paribus, then both β1and β2 would be
estimated to be positive. For the finding of separating effects to be explained by the alterna-
tive reverse causality story, it must be the case that fertility-related demand pressures occur
disproportionately in areas with relatively higher rates of home ownership (as measured in
a pre-period baseline year). This confounding story is one of fertility-preference demand
driven price changes.
In order to address the possibility that reverse causality or correlated unobservables are
biasing our estimates we make use of the Saiz (2012) measure of housing supply elastic-
ity. The measure is based on non-linear combinations of both the Saiz (2008) geographic
limitations measure and the Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index created by
Gyourko et al. (2008). We propose that concerns about fertility-preference demand driven
price changes are less likely to be a concern in places with lower housing supply constraints, or
higher housing market supply elasticities. We thus estimate our regression models separately
for MSAs with higher and lower levels of supply elasticity, as captured by the Saiz (2012)
measure. If the estimated relationship is maintained in less supply constrained places, we
are more confident in the assumption that our estimated effect is not driven by homeowners
with babies (or fertility intentions) bidding up the prices of inelastically supplied houses.
Table 4.4 reports the results using the baseline specification displayed in column (2) of
table 4.3, which includes both MSA and year fixed effects. We choose this to be our baseline
specification because it is the one we will estimate with the IV specification, as described
below. Column (1) reports the results for the sample of MSAs with supply elasticities below
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the median and column (2) above the median. In fact, moving from column (1) to (2), the
estimated positive coefficient on HousePricemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg increases in magnitude, as
does the estimated conditional negative main effect of HousePricemt−1. This is opposite of
what would be expected under the reverse causality scenario.
Next, we more formally incorporate the supply elasticity measure by employing an in-
strumental variables strategy similar to that employed by Chetty and Szeidl (2012); we
instrument for MSA-level house prices with the interaction of a baseline supply elasticity
measure with the national trend in housing prices. The intuition here is that aggregate
demand shocks that affect the national housing market are expected to exert a relatively
larger influence on local housing prices in MSAs which are more supply constrained. The
identification assumption is that the interaction between baseline MSA housing supply elas-
ticity and national house price trends would not have been systematically correlated with
trends in fertility rates in the absence of MSA house price changes.
In order to implement this strategy we interact the measure of supply elasticity with the
national version of FHFA housing price index. Since we have two potentially endogenous
variables –the level measure of house prices and the interaction term with MSA-group level
ownership rates–we use the triple interaction of the MSA supply elasticity with the national
house price index and MSA-group level ownership rate as a second instrumental variable.
Since nationally, house prices grew almost linearly in this time period, we do not include
MSA-specific time trends as our baseline IV specification; MSA-specific time trends are
highly collinear with the instrument, which substantively reduces the statistical power of the
first stage. 85We also do not include the conditional main effect of housing supply elasticity
because it is measured at the baseline and does not vary across groups, so it is absorbed by
the MSA fixed effects. Table 4.4 presents the first-stage estimation results for the interaction
term Housepricemt−1∗OwnRatemg (column (3)) and the level term Housepricemt−1 (column
85If we include MSA time trends, the results are very similar but the first stage F Statistics fall below
conventional levels. The coefficients on β1and β2 are 0.07148 and -0.01439 (with standard errors of 0.0098
and 0.0039), respectively. However, the first stage F Statistic is the equation for Housepricemt−1 is reduced
to 8.71, which is below the conventional rule of thumb of 10.
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(4)). As expected, increasing supply elasticity is associated with reductions in MSA level
house price growth as national house prices increase.
Table 4.4, column (5) presents the IV results. The estimated effects of interest maintain
their signs of direction, but increase in magnitude. The point estimate of β1 of 0.0723 and a
point estimate on β2 of -0.0239, both statistically significant at the one percent level. These
estimates suggest that if house prices increase by $10,000, as we move from an MSA-group
with an ownership rate of 0 to a cell with an ownership rate of 1, there would be a relative
increase of 7.2 percent in fertility rates. More usefully, if house prices increase by $10,000,
comparing MSA-groups with ownership rates of 0.25 to those with ownership rates of 0.75,
we would see a relative increase of 3.6 percent in fertility rates. These estimates are larger in
magnitude than the OLS results and a Hausman specification test can reject the consistency
of the OLS estimate at the 1 percent level.86 However, the net effect at the mean is almost
identical between the OLS and IV specification: both specifications indicate that at the
mean U.S. home ownership rate, the net effect of a $10,000 increase in house prices is a 0.8
percent increase in fertility rates.We put these numbers into context below with the use of
simulation exercises.
4.4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we implement various robustness checks on the model specification and
sample construction. We begin by considering how our estimates change if we replace the
house price in the year of conception with alternative measures of house prices. We do not
have a strong a priori reason to believe that house prices in the year of conception is the
most relevant measure, as opposed to, say, house prices averaged over the three years prior.
It may be the case that couple’s fertility decisions are based on a longer time horizon or on
86Since standard errors are clustered in both the OLS and 2SLS specification, OLS is not fully efficient and
I compute the Hausman test statistic with bootstrapped variance estimates. The variance was calculated
using 500 bootstrap replications.
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longer terms averages. Table 4.5 reports the results of estimating alternative models of this
sort, using both the OLS and IV strategies. Columns (1)-(4) use house prices in the years
1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, prior to conception. Columns (5), (6), and (7) use the 3-year
moving average of house prices over the two, three, and four years, respectively, prior to
conception. In all of these cases, we instrument for house prices using the same instrumental
variables strategy described above. In all of these seven alternative models, the familiar
pattern emerges of a positive coefficient on the interaction between HousePricemt−1 and
OwnRatemgand a negative coefficient on HousePricemt−1. for both the OLS and IV results.
Results are within a reasonable range of magnitudes – with the point estimates of β1 ranging
from 0.0468 to 0.0718 for the OLS and 0.0723 to 0.0995 for the IV results, giving us no
reason to prefer one of these specifications over our baseline specification.
Next, we estimate various alternative specifications to equation 4.1 above, providing some
robustness checks on the main MSA-group level analysis. Table 4.6 reports these results.
Column (1) reproduces the main OLS and IV results from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 for the sake
of comparison. First we consider alternative measures of the labor market conditions. In
column (2) we replace male wages with separate measures of male and female wages. In
column (3) we replace the wage distribution measures with the mean wage. In column (4)
we replace the wage distribution measures with a measure of income per capita collected
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regional economic accounts. To create this
variable at the MSA-year level, we employ our crosswalk procedure described in the appendix
(section 4.7). Income included in this measure includes all wage and salary income as well as
supplements to wages and salaries, proprietor’s income with inventory valuation and capital
consumption adjustments, rental income of persons with capital consumption adjustment,
personal dividend income, personal interest income, and personal current transfer receipts,
less contributions for government social insurance. In each case, the coefficients are virtually
unchanged.
Next, we consider that owners and non-owners might be differentially affected by general
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economic conditions in a way that is not captured by simply including a measure of wages.
If this were the case, the coefficient on HousePricemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg might capture this
difference, leading to a biased estimate of the causal effect of interest. To do this, we interact
the home-ownership rate with the wage measures. Column (5) displays the results of this
exercise. The coefficient on 75thWagemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg is positive and statistically signifi-
cant, indicating owner’s fertility decisions are positively effected by increases in male wages
at the top of the distribution. However, the coefficients on HousePricemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg
and HousePricesmt−1 remain unaffected.
Next, we add a control variable for average rental prices in the MSA-year. Average rental
prices and house prices tend to covary, but there are years during which the two series are
more or less closely aligned. Our measure of average rental prices comes from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Fair Market Rents program, used for the purpose
of calculating rent for the Section 8 housing assistance payment program.87 We adjust the
nominal values of rental prices to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U “all items less shelter” series
(as we do for the HPI). As shown in the table, the inclusion of this control variable does not
appreciably change the estimated coefficients on our two explanatory variables of interest:
HousePricemt−1 and HousPricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg.
Finally, in column (7) of Table 4.6 we consider an alternative sample of MSAs to check
on whether the changing boundaries of MSAs over the sample period is influencing our
estimates. We re-estimate the specifications reported in Table 4.4 using a restricted set of
MSAs. In particular, we limit the sample to MSAs whose boundaries did not change between
1990 and 2009. This is done as a check on the sensitivity of our estimates to the crosswalk
procedure we have used to link current MSAs (2009 OMB definitions) to vintage MSAs (1983
OMB definitions) which we use to match the group level home ownership rates to the rest of
the data. This procedure effectively ignores boundary changes that have occurred over our
87Calculated rent is inclusive of utilities and is typically calculated at the 40th percentile of the rent
distribution by number of bedrooms. Prior to 1995, rent was calculated at the 45th percentile. Some cities
are calculated at the 50th percentile. We take the unweighted average of the reported fair market rental
value for zero to four bedroom units as the average rental price in a given city.
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sample period. Though the sample size is reduced, the range of point estimates on the two
coefficients of primary interest is not qualitatively altered.88
4.4.4 Different Demographic Groups
In Table 4.7, we report the results of estimating equation 4.1 for various demographic
subgroups and for first and higher order births using both the OLS and IV strategies. Column
(2) reports the results for non-Hispanic whites, column (3) reports the results for non-
Hispanic blacks and column (4) reports the results for Hispanic whites. The point estimate
on the interaction term HousePricemt−1∗OwnRatemg is always positive while the coefficient
on HousePricemt−1 is negative, implying a net positive effect of house price increases among
home owners and a negative effect among non-owners across all groups
We next consider whether the effects of house prices on current period births are driven
by first births, second births, or higher parity births. It is not clear a priori which would
be more price or income elastic. On the one hand, the optimal timing of first births might
be less constrained, since mothers tend to be younger and might consider that a deliberate
delay will be less consequential, as they have more childbearing years ahead of them. Also,
if couples have specific ideas about optimal spacing, they might be more flexible about the
timing of their first birth. On the other hand, subsequent births might be more “marginal”
and thus might exhibit a great degree of elasticity with respect to price or a wealth shock.
An additional motivation for this analysis is that an effect on higher order births might be
indicative of a change in completed fertility.
Table 4.7 columns (5)-(7) report the results. For both first, second, and higher parity
births, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between HousePricemt−1 and owner-
ship rate is positive and statistically significant, with similar magnitudes: 0.0538, 0.0474
88An additional specification we estimated uses only variation across MSA/age cat cells to define average
ownership rates. This approach purges that ownership variable of variation coming from race/ethnic groups.
The results are very similar to those obtained when ownership rates are defined by MSA/age cat/race-
ethnicity. We do not report those results here for the sake of space.
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and 0.0434 in the OLS specification and 0.0947, 0.0754 and 0.0574 in the IV specification,
respectively. The point estimate for the coefficient on HousePricemt−1 is negative and statis-
tically significant for first, second, and higher-order births. The finding of an effect on both
first and higher-order births is potentially informative about the nature of the effects we are
estimating. Increases in first births might reasonably be interpreted as a change in timing,
while changes in higher order births might reasonably be interpreted as an increase in the to-
tal number of children, particularly for third and higher parity births. These interpretations
are merely speculative, and warrant further investigation.
Given that a previous literature exists on the relationship between unemployment rates
and contemporaneous fertility rates, it is interesting to consider the estimated coefficients
on the unemployment rate. Our regression models yield statistically significant negative
estimates of the relationship between unemployment rates and fertility rates among whites,
but not among blacks or Hispanics. When house prices are not included in the model (not
shown in the table), the estimated relationship is largely unchanged for whites (a statistically
insignificant -0.0036), but it becomes positive and statistically significant for blacks and
Hispanics. It is also interesting to note that in terms of separate effects by birth parity, the
unemployment rate is negatively related to first and second births, but not discernibly related
to higher-order births. This would be consistent with the unemployment rate having an effect
on the timing of childbearing initiation, but potentially not with completed fertility. To the
extent that this interpretation is warranted, this is an interesting contrast to the potentially
more permanent effect of house prices. Again, we think these considerations deserve further
examination, although it is outside the scope of this work.
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4.4.5 Individual level estimation – using Current Population Survey (CPS)
1996-2006
The empirical results presented above suggest that an increase in MSA-level house prices
exert a negative price effect on births among non-owners and a net positive effect on births
among owners, all else equal. These estimates are generated by an aggregated cell-level
analysis, but the underlying conceptual framework is at the individual level. We thus turn
to individual-level Current Population Survey (CPS) data to check that the story told by
aggregate level data is confirmed with individual level data. We map the older MSA desig-
nations provided in the CPS (as in the Census) to the 2009 MSA designations provided in
the FHFA house price data using the crosswalk procedure described in the appendix (section
4.7). In the CPS we do not see the full population of births, as we do with an analysis of
Vital Statistics birth data. However, as a supplementary data source, the CPS offers the
distinct advantage of directly identifying home-owners.
In this individual level analysis, we define Owni as an indicator for whether the individual
in the CPS is the household head or head’s spouse and the household is reported to own
their home. In the aggregate analysis above, ownership was defined at the group level in
the baseline year of 1990. Here it is defined at the individual level in the current year, as
we have no measure of lagged home ownership available. Caution should thus be exercised
in assigning a causal interpretation to the HousePricemt−1 ∗ Owni interaction term in this
specification, since individuals who intend to have a baby this year might decide to buy
a house in anticipation of that event. This is another reason we consider this analysis
supplementary to the main analysis above.
We define the dependent variable Pr(Birth)i to be one if there is a child under the age
of one in the household. All the other variables are defined at the MSA level as defined in
equation 4.1 above. Explanatory variables, including the house price index, are matched to
observations by the year prior to the survey year in order to capture the effect of conditions
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in the year of the baby’s conception. (We do not have perfect birth-date or gestation infor-
mation, as we do in the Vital Statistics natality files, and so here we use year minus one as
an approximation.) Recall that our goal is to obtain an estimate of the causal relationship of
house prices on current period birth rates. Even if we had individual level house prices, we
would not use them because individuals are likely to sort into houses at least in part based
on their expectations of number of children. For example, individuals intending to have more
children will likely seek larger houses or houses in better school districts, which tend to be
more expensive. We thus use MSA-level house prices conditional on MSA fixed effects (to
control for endogenous sorting into higher or lower priced MSAs) in all our analyses.
Table 4.8 reports the results estimated using a linear probability model.89 In the pooled
sample regression reported in column (1), we see the familiar pattern of point estimates – a
negative point estimate on HousePricemt−1and a positive point estimate on the interaction
of HousePricemt−1 ∗ Owni (significant at the 1 percent level). Columns (2)-(3) report the
results including the additional MSA and year fixed effects and the time-varying MSA-
level controls, unemployment rates and wages. Column (4) reports the results from the
IV specification described above. Although the IV results are not precisely estimated, the
magnitudes of the coefficients of primary interest are similar to the OLS estimates. We have
additionally estimated these models restricting the CPS sample to individuals who do not
report moving over the past year. The results are not qualitatively altered. Overall, this set
of individual-level results give us confidence that our interpretation of the results from the
aggregate level analyses is appropriate. In particular, we see that the positive effect is being
driven by individuals that are self-reported to be home owners.
89Probit marginal effects are similar and available upon request.
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4.4.6 Housing Bust Periods
Our analysis has thus far been limited to a period of history characterized by rising house
prices. It is interesting to consider explicitly the relationship between housing price decreases
and birth rates. There might be asymmetric effects, whereby an increase in housing wealth
might lead people move up their period of childbearing to a greater extent than a decrease
in housing wealth will lead people to delay. One possible reason for such an asymmetry is
that there is a biological timing constraint that individuals are reluctant to push against.
It becomes an empirical question as to whether there are differential responses to house
price rises and declines. To consider this explicitly, we want use data from two periods of
house price decline: 1990-1996 and 2007-2010. Figure 4.1 shows these two periods: between
1990-1996 prices declined gradually and between 2007-2010 there is a dramatic decline in
prices. Unfortunately Vital Statistics birth data is not available for conception years past
2006, so we can only look at the 1990-1996 housing bust period using the approach of the
main analysis. We therefore turn to individual level data sources for 2007-2010 period.
We begin by examining the 1990-1996 bust period using the approach used in the main
analysis. Table 4.9, columns (1) and (2) display the results using OLS and the IV strategy,
respectively. The pattern on the coefficients remains similar to the 1997-2006 period – a
positive coefficient on HousePricemt−1 ∗Ownmg and a negative coefficient HousePricemt−1.
In columns (3) and (4) we report results from an individual level analysis from the CPS for
this time period. Again, results are very similar to those found in the 1997-2006 period: a
positive and statistically coefficient on HousePricemt−1 ∗ Ownmg and a negative, but not
statistically significant effect on HousePricemt−1. As in the analysis for 1997-2006 period,
the the IV estimates are similar but less precise.
Next, we move on to the 2007-2010 housing bust period, which is characterized by a
steep decline in prices. First, we repeat the individual-level CPS analysis for this period.
Table 4.9, columns (5) and (6) displays results. The pattern on the coefficients is extremely
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similar to both the earlier bust period (1990-1996) and the housing boom period (1997-2006).
Since Vital Statistics birth data is not available for this period, we supplement the analysis
by examining data from the American Communities Survey (ACS), conducted annually by
the U.S. Census Bureau, beginning in 2000. We obtained this data from IPUMS. The data
is available with the equivalent of MSA identifiers starting in 2005.90 We construct the
indicator variables “Pr(Birth)” and “own home” in the same manner as described above for
the CPS data. Again, the coefficient on HousePricemt−1 ∗Owni is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on HousePricemt−1 is positive, although it is not
statistically significant.
These findings give us some confidence that it is appropriate to use our preferred aggregate
results above – generated from data for the years 1997-2006, a period characterized by house
price increases – to make out-of-sample predictions to more recent years, characterized by
house price declines. Between 2006 and 2010, housing prices fell $63,000 among the MSAs
in our sample. At the mean rate of home ownership, our estimates imply that this would
lead to a 7.5 percent decline in subsequent year births. We can also simulate the effect of
the rise in unemployment rates over the period. 91Between 2006 and 2010, unemployment
rates rose 5.14 percentage points. Holding housing prices fixed, our estimates imply that this
corresponds to a 6.8 percent decline in births. A simulation of the two changes in tandem
implies that in the great recession period 2007-2011 the decline in housing prices and increase
in unemployment rates is associated with a 13.8 percent decline in current-period birth rates.
According to the National Center for Health Statistics, the national fertility rate dropped
from 69.3 in 2007 to 63.8 in 2011, a 7.9 percent decline.
90The ACS identifies PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas), which IPUMS has matched to MSAs. We
then use the crosswalk procedure described in the data appendix (section 4.7) to match to the housing data
(Ruggles et al., 2010). PUMAs are also identified in 2003, but we do not use this data.
91Both the average fall in home prices and the average increase in unemployment rates are population
weighted average changes for the 163 MSAs in our sample between 2006 and 2010.
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4.5 Interpreting the Results
4.5.1 Interpreting the Magnitudes of the Estimated Effects: Simulation Ex-
ercise
Our analysis of Vital Statistics birth data coupled with MSA-level house prices shows
that an increase in MSA-level house prices, all else held constant, is associated with fewer
births among non-owners and a net increase in births among owners. We interpret this pair
of findings as indicative of a negative price effect among non-owners and a dominant housing
wealth/equity effect among owners. These patterns hold for whites, blacks, and Hispanics
and appear for both first and higher parity births.
In order to facilitate an understanding of whether these results are economically large
or small, we have conducted a simple simulation exercise. Figure 4.3 presents the predicted
effect of a $10,000 increase in house prices on births for each race/ethnic group as well as
first and higher parity births.92 The x-axis represents group home ownership rates and the
y-axis represents the net predicted percentage change in births from of a $10,000 increase in
house prices, conditional on each level of home ownership. The prediction is indicated by the
solid line and a 95% confidence interval is indicated by the dashed lines.93 The predictions
are calculated based on IV point estimates displayed in Table 4.7, which include all of the
main demographic group and MSA level control variables, and MSA and year fixed effects.
In all cases, the exercise suggests a positive, linear relationship between home ownership
rates and the change in births due to a $10,000 increase in house prices. The net effect for
92Since the effects are similar for second and third or higher parity births we combine the two for these
simulation exercises.
93We predict the percentage change in fertility rates from a $10,000 increase in mean housing prices for own-
ership rate o: (FertRate|HousePrice = h+ 10k,OwnRate = o)−(FertRate|HousePrice = h,OwnRate =
o)/(FertRate|HousePrice = h,OwnRate = o). For each group, we calculate the standard error of the pre-
diction at the mean of the independent variables using 100 bootstrap replications and apply that standard
error to calculate the confidence interval at each level of o.The solid line represents the predicted effect and
the dashed line represents a 95% confidence interval, both of which were smoothed using a locally weighted
linear regression.
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all demographic groups implies that as the ownership rate increases from 30 percent to 40
percent, the net effect become positive. This implies that in MSAs with sizable rates of home
ownership, the positive home equity effect among owners is large enough to outweigh the
negative price effect, leading to increases in MSA-level birth rates. Among whites, the impact
switches from negative to positive between 40 and 50 percent ownership. For blacks, the
impact becomes positive between 20 and 30 percent, and for Hispanics, it switches between
40 and 50 percent.
We also consider what changes in home prices imply for group specific fertility rates,
since there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of the price and home equity effects as well
as in rates of home ownership. Overall in our data the population weighted mean home
ownership rate is 44 percent. At this rate, the net effect of a $10,000 increase in prices
is a 0.8 percent increase in births. Among whites, the mean home ownership rate is 53
percent, which is associated with a 0.7 percent increase in births for that group. Among
blacks, the mean home ownership rate is 24 percent, which is associated with a net increase
of 0.2 percent in births. And among Hispanics, the mean home ownership rate is 29 percent,
which is associated with a net decrease in births of 0.3 percent. This indicates that although
Hispanic home ownership rates are higher than Black home ownership rates, the net effect
is smaller for Hispanics because the estimated home equity effect is smaller for that group.
Finally, it is useful to consider an out-of-sample prediction assuming extreme values of
ownership rates, to have an estimate of the effect among owners and non-owners. Assuming
a 100 percent ownership rate, the net impact of a $10,000 house price increase is a 5 percent
increase overall. Separately by race/ethnicity, our simulations suggest a 5.9 percent increase
for whites, a 7.9 percent increase for Blacks, and a 1.9 percent increase for Hispanics. These
figures imply that among owners, the increase in house prices during the recent housing
boom led to a sizable impact on the likelihood of giving birth in a given year.94
94These results are comparable to those found in a contemporaneous working paper by Lovenheim and
Mumford (2011), which investigates the relationship between changes in home value and current period
fertility using individual-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1990-2007. The
authors estimate linear probability models of the probability that a woman gives birth in a given year as a
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An interesting empirical exercise is to consider the relative impact of unemployment rates
versus housing prices. Using the same simulation procedure described above, we estimate
the relative impacts of a one standard deviation increase in housing prices and decrease
in unemployment rates. We find that at the mean rate of ownership (44 percent), a one
standard deviation increase in housing prices leads to a 8.3 percent increase in births while a
one standard deviation increase in unemployment rates leads to only a 2.1 percent decrease
across all rates of ownership (note that this estimate is based on the point estimate in
table 4.4, column (5). Even among renters, the negative price effect an increase in housing
prices is 21 percent, 10 times as large as the effect of unemployment rates. This highlights
the importance of considering housing markets in any empirical analysis of how economic
conditions affect fertility outcomes.95
function of two and four year changes in the reported market value of her home. The authors find that a
$10,000 increase in an individual’s real housing wealth is associated with a 0.07 percentage point (1.3 percent
at the mean) increase in the probability of having a child. It is also useful to compare our estimates to those
found by Black et al. (2011), in their analysis of the effect of earnings on current period birth rates. Those
authors use the experience of the coal boom and bust during the 1970s and 1980s in the Appalachian region
of the U.S. to examine the effect of an exogenous increase in male’s earnings (because females almost never
work in the coal industry) on fertility rates. They estimate changes in county-level birth rates as a function
of differences in lagged county level log earnings, conditional on state and year fixed effects. They find that
a ten percent increase in county-level earnings is associated with a one percent increase in the subsequent
year’s birth rates. For earnings increases coming specifically from the coal boom, they estimate that a ten
percent increase in coal-related earnings is associated with a seven percent increase in the subsequent year’s
birth rates. To put our findings in comparable terms, recall that we simulated that a $10,000 increase in
house prices is associated with a 0.8 percent net increase in birth rates. Consider that a $10,000 increase in
house prices is about a five percent increase off the 2006 median house price in the U.S. of roughly $260,000.
So our estimates would suggest that a 10 percent increase in house prices would be associated with a 1.6
percent net increase in birth rates.
95Schaller (2011) provides the most up to date and arguably compelling empirical analysis of the rela-
tionship because local area unemployment rates and current period birth rates. Her analysis finds that a
one percentage-point increase in unemployment rates is associated with a 0.7 to 2.5 percent decrease in
birth rates, depending on specification. Our specification finds that a one percentage-point increase in un-
employment rates is associated with a 1.37 percent decrease in birth rates, which is well within her range
of estimates. It is this estimated coefficient that we translate into a standard deviation measurement to
compare to the effect of house prices. Therefore, our conclusion that house prices exert a larger effect on
birth rates than do unemployment rates would apply even if we took an estimate of the cyclicality of birth
rates from outside our own analysis.
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4.5.2 The Home Equity Effect
We have interpreted the positive effect of house price increases for owners – inferred from
the estimated coefficient on the HousePricemt−1∗Ownmg interaction in the MSA-group level
analyses and the individual-level CPS analysis – as a net positive housing wealth effect. As
noted above, we use this term to encompass two potential mechanisms. First, there could
be a traditional wealth effect that increases the demand for children. Second, there could
be an increase in liquifiable housing wealth that otherwise credit-constrained consumers use
to fund current period consumption, including child-related expenses. (Note that the first
effect likely implies an increase in the number of children ever born, while the second effect
could simply reflect a change in timing.) We are agnostic about the extent to which each
of these two mechanisms is separately contributing to the empirical effect we observe in the
data. However, it is interesting to consider the feasibility of the home equity extraction
explanation.
Before examining data on home equity extraction, it is useful to place our finding in the
context of the existing literature on consumption and housing wealth. There is a large body
of research on the propensity for households to fund current consumption out of housing
wealth (See for example, Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005); Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud
(2004); Bostic, Gabrial, and Painter (2009); Haurin and Rosenthal (2005)). Most work in
this literature finds that the propensity to consume out of housing wealth is substantially
higher than the propensity to consume out of financial wealth, although there is disagreement
about the magnitudes of these distinct marginal propensities to consume (Greenspan and
Kennedy, 2007). It is also understood that there are two distinct effects of housing values on
consumption – the traditional wealth effect and a home equity extraction effect. According to
the Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances, among families in the 40-60th percentile of
the income distribution in 2004, housing represents an average of 48 percent of a household’s
total assets (Bucks et al., 2009). This indicates an increase in home prices could lead to
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a substantial increase in wealth for many homeowners. But, if households do not intend
to realize these gains over their lifetime by selling their current house and moving to a
lower-priced real estate market, there is not necessarily an increase in permanent wealth.
However, there might still be an equity extraction effect. That effect is practically realized
by refinancing one’s mortgage, or obtaining a second mortgage, home equity loan, or home
equity line of credit.
Greenspan and Kennedy (2007) empirically investigate the use of home equity extractions
to fund consumption during the period 1991 to 2005, a similar time period to the one that
we study in the present chapter. They report that during this period, free cash resulting
from the three types of equity extraction averaged about $530 billion annually. Equity
extracted through sales of existing homes accounted for about two-thirds of total free cash;
home equity loans accounted for close to 20 percent, and cash-out refinancings about 13
percent. The extracted cash was used to finance consumer spending, outlays for home
improvements, debt repayment, acquisition of assets, and other uses. In general, the use of
housing equity to fund consumption is a relatively expensive approach. Hurst and Stafford
(2004) propose that extracting home equity to fund consumption, as opposed to tapping
into more liquid assets, should be relatively more common among individuals with lower
amounts of liquid assets. They empirically confirm this pattern using individual-level data
on households during the period 1991 to 1996 (Hurst and Stafford, 2004). Mian and Sufi
(2009) estimate that the average homeowner extracted 25 to 30 cents for every dollar increase
in home equity during the 1997 to 2009 period. They further find that money extracted from
increased home equity was not used to purchase new real estate or pay down high credit card
balances, which they interpret as suggesting that borrowed funds were used for consumption
or home improvement expenses. In addition, they find that home equity-based borrowing was
strongest among younger households. We view these patterns as being potentially consistent
with the suggestion of our work that individuals used increased housing equity to pay for
child-related expenses.
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We use data from the 1997-2009 files of the American Housing Survey (AHS) to tabulate
rates of home equity borrowing and refinancing, and the extent to which this is related to
rising house prices. Our main goal is to simply observe the extent to which households are
accessing their housing wealth. This speaks to the possibility that part of our documented
“home equity effect” might be driven by the use of extracted home equity to fund current
childbearing-related expenses. The AHS includes a survey of about 60,000 housing units
across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. It is conducted every two years, in odd-
numbered years.96
Table 4.10 reports the results from estimating regressions of the likelihood of having an
equity loan/line or a refinanced mortgage on HousePricemt, as well as MSA-year means for
the relevant variables. The top panel of the table reports rates of housing equity loans and
lines of credit and mortgage refinancing. These questions are asked of home owners only.
We see in the data that 20 percent of owners report having an equity loan or line of credit
and as prices increase homeowners are more likely to tap into housing wealth in this matter.
In column (3) we can see that this is being driven by increases in home equity lines of credit.
The AHS also gives information about rates of refinancing. The mean rate of having
refinanced a first mortgage is 35 and the mean rate of having refinanced a second mortgage
is 7 percent. The survey asks homeowners who report having refinanced why they chose to
refinance, which is reported in the bottom panel of table 10. Eighty-six percent respond to
obtain a lower interest rate. Lower interest rates leave people with lower monthly payments,
which would make more disposable income available to fund current consumption. Interest-
ingly, the only motivating factor in the decision to refinance which is increasing with house
prices is explicitly “to get cash.” This speaks directly to the use of housing equity to fund
current consumption and its relationship to rising home prices.
96The AHS also includes a metropolitan area survey that has included varying numbers of areas and has
been conducted at varying intervals over the past 30 years.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated how current house prices affect current period fertility. Our
results suggest that house prices are a relevant factor in a couple’s decision to have a baby at
the present time. House prices lead to a negative price effect that conditionally reduces birth
rates in the current period, and an offsetting positive home equity effect that leads to a net
increase in births among homeowners. We use the estimated coefficients from our regression
analyses to simulate the effect of a $10,000 increase in house prices on current year births.
This exercise indicates that when home ownership rates reach 30 percent, the net effect
becomes positive. At the mean U.S. home ownership in our sample period, the net effect of
a $10,000 increase in prices is a 0.8 percent increase in births. Given underlying differences
in home ownership rates and heterogeneity in the point estimates, the predicted net effect of
house price changes varies across race/ethnic groups. We simulate that a $10,000 increase in
MSA-level house prices leads to a 0.7 percent increase in current year births among whites, a
0.2 percent increase in births among blacks, and a 0.2 percent decrease in births among white
Hispanics. Interestingly, these effects are substantially larger than the effects of changes in
the unemployment rate. Moreover, using our estimates to make an out-of-sample prediction
of the the impact of the “Great Recession”, we find that the fall in housing prices between
2006 and 2010 was associated with a 7.5 percent decline in births.
Our work is written within the paradigm of the empirical literature on the cyclicality
of fertility and as such, it is about the timing of fertility decisions. The evidence presented
in this chapter suggests that couples use some of their increased housing wealth to “fund”
their childbearing goals. This chapter potentially demonstrates empirically that (imperfect)
credit markets affect fertility timing. We have discussed our results in terms of the decision
couples make with regard to whether or not to have a baby in the current period. We leave
it to future research to investigate how house prices affect completed fertility or the demand
for children more generally. In addition, it might also be true that when house prices increase
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or decrease, parents increase (or decrease) quality investments in children, where quality of
children is meant in the Beckerian sense. For example, perhaps some home-owning parents
use their increased home equity to purchase, say, private education for their children. Once
we allow for this possibility, it becomes clear that our empirical analysis is not designed to
capture the full range of how real estate markets might affect childbearing and child rearing
decisions.
4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Metropolitan statistical areas are defined by the Office of Management and Budget.
Their geographic definitions are based on core urban areas with a population of 50,000
or more and adjacent counties with a “high degree of social and economic integration (as
measured by commuting to work) with the urban core” (Census Bureau documentation).
Current metropolitan area definitions include both metropolitan areas (MSA) and divisions
(MSADs), which are smaller units within this metropolitan area. Current definitions also
include an alternative to the MSA/MSAD for metropolitan areas in the New England states,
which are called New England City Town Areas (NECTAs). The boundaries of MSAs change
over time as city populations change. The Office of Management and Budget releases revised
definitions based on the decennial census and yearly census population estimates, and in
addition to changing MSA compositions, sometimes changes the labels associated with each
type of unit. A major change was done in 2003, at which point the coding system changed
from a 4-digit coding system to a 5-digit coding system. Prior to 2003, instead of MSADs
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs) were used and instead of NECTAs, New
England Metropolitan County Areas (NECMAs) were used.
The housing price index is available at the level of MSA/MSAD, based on the November
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2008 definitions (released in December 2009) , Since the index is based on repeat sales of the
same home, the 2009 definitions apply throughout the data. For example, suppose a home
sells once in 1980, 1990, and 2005. Suppose that in 1980 and 1990 it was not in an MSA, but
in 2005 it was. Then, the home is considered part of the MSA and the housing price indices
for 1980 and 1990 are revised to reflect the current boundaries.The rest of this appendix
explains how we harmonize all other data sources to match this level of aggregation. Table
4.1 lists the level of geographic detail available for each of our control variables.
Whenever county level data is available, it is the preferred level of disaggregation because
we can use it to construct MSA/MSADs which will exactly match the housing price index
data. Data available at this level of disaggregation includes the Vital Statistics Natality
Data (confidential files), Vital Statistics population data, Census median home value data,
Bureau of Labor Statistics Unemployment data, Bureau of Economic analysis income per
capita data, and the Rappaport and Sachs (2003) coastal measure. To construct MSAs
from the county level data, we use the 2009 metropolitan area definition files available from
the Census Bureau at: http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/lists/2009/
List1.txt. These files map entire counties to a 2009 OMB MSA/MSAD definitions, thus,
we can construct MSAs/MSADs that are exactly equivalent to those used in the housing
price data.
It is worth noting a few technical points about linking counties to MSAs. First, Miami-
Dade County, FL was renamed between the 1990 and 2000 census; so in all cases we have
assigned the post-2000 FIPS code to this county.97 Another issue concerns BLS Local Area
Unemployment (LAU) Statistics, which are calculated at the county level, but use a coding
system based on what are called “areas”. For the most part, the area codes are simply county
FIPS codes. However, for counties which had large populations (50,000-100,000 and 100,000




the two using state FIPS codes and county names using vintage 2009 county FIPS codes.99
Finally, in the BEA personal income data, BEA combines some counties/county equivalents
in Virginia and assigns new county codes. We re-assign those counties which are contained
within an MSA to one of the combined counties’ FIPS code. In all cases these combinations
were wholly contained within one MSA/MSAD.100
For the case when counties are not available, but vintage metropolitan area definitions
are available, we use those. By vintage metropolitan area definitions, we are referring to
metropolitan areas based on historical definitions which may differ in composition from
the 2009 definitions. Data that is available in this manner includes the 1990 and 2000
Census microdata (used to construct home ownership rates), the Current Population Survey
data (used to construct wages and fraction college educated), and the Saiz (2012) elasticity
measure. The vintage definitions used in these data include the 1983 MSA/PMSA, 1993
MSA/PMSA, 1999 MSA/NECMA, and 2003 MSA/NECTA codes, as described in table 4.1.
To match the vintage definitions to the 2009 definitions, we begin by creating a crosswalk
that links the counties that make up the different metropolitan areas over time. Unlike the
current 2009 MSA/MSAD definitions (and vintage 2003 MSA/MSAD definitions) which
directly map entire counties to MSAs, the earlier metropolitan area (and NECTA/NECMA)
definitions allow for a single county to be in multiple metropolitan areas. For the case when
a single county is in multiple MSAs/PMSAs/NECTAs/NECMAs, we use 1990 population
counts of the minor civil divisions (a smaller unit within the metropolitan area) to assign
the county to whichever MSAs/PMSAs/NECTAs/NECMAs the majority of the population
resides.
From this county-msa crosswalk, we construct vintage MSA-to-2009 MSA/MSAD cross-
walks. In most cases, there is a one to one match between the vintage MSA definitions and
the 2009 definitions. In some cases, however, its possible for a vintage metropolitan area to




areas that have combined to form one metropolitan area by 2009, we use 1990 population
weights to create a population weighted average of the data. For metropolitan areas that
have split , we apply the single data point to all the split-off areas.
In the individual level data, we are given the vintage metropolitan area codes. In this
case, we need to construct the housing price, wage, and unemployment data according to
those definitions. In the individual CPS we are provided with 1983, 1993 and 2003 MSA/2003
NECTA codes and in the AHS we are provided with 1980 MSA codes. For the ACS, only
PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas) are provided, however, IPUMS has created a cross-
walk procedure and attached 1993 MSA codes, which we will use Ruggles et al. (2010).
Recall the unemployment data is at the county level. In this case, we use county-to-vintage
MSA cross walk described in the section above. For the wage data, linking to the CPS is
trivial since it was constructed in the CPS and therefore uses the same MSA definitions.
For linking the wage data to the ACS and for linking the housing data to the CPS, ACS
and AHS , we again use the county-to-vintage MSA crosswalk described above. In this
case, if multiple 1980/1983/1993/2003 MSA/2003 NECTA combine to form a single MSA
in 2009, we assign the housing price data to each vintage MSAs. For the case when a
single 1980/1983/1993/2003 MSA/2003 NECTA splits to form multiple MSAs in 2009, we
we use 1990 population weights to assign a weighted average of home prices to the vintage
metropolitan areas codes. Finally, since CPS uses different MSA codes over time which are
not consistent, we use the linked 2009 MSA definition for the fixed effects. In the case where
the vintage MSA split into multiple 2009 MSADs, we use assign the code of the MSAD with
the largest population share.
4.7.2 Construction of House Prices
We use the same procedure used by Glaeser et al. (2008) to construct house prices. First,
we construct a 2000 median home value from county-level census data, using the crosswalk
procedure outlined above to create a population-weighted median home value. We inflate
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this value to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U “All Items-Less Shelter Series.” We then take
this value and scale it by the percent change in the housing price index from 2000 to the
year of interest, which is calculated: (hpit−hpi2000)/hpi2000. The housing price index is also
inflated to 2006 dollars using the the CPI-U “All Items-Less Shelter Series” prior to scaling.
This gives us a value that proxies for the price growth of a median value home in each MSA
over time.
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Year t
FHFA HPI CS HPI
Notes: House prices are calculated using 2000 MSA median home values, which are scaled by either the
FHFA house price Index or the Case-Shiller house price Index to create MSA-year median home values,
which are then averaged over the 154 MSAs (27 MSAs for the Case-Shiller Index) in our sample each year
1984-2010. Both are adjusted to 2006 dollars using CPI-U "all items less shelter" series. Percentage change
in home prices is calculated as (HousePricet−HousePricet−1)/HousePricet−1. In both figures, the left
y-axis is represents the mean value of the FHFA-constructed prices and the right y-axis represents the
mean value of the Case-Shiller constructed prices.
149




































1990 1995 2000 2005
year



































1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Fertility Rate Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Rates
Notes: Displayed are trends in fertility rates, housing prices, and unemployment rates. Annual fertility
rates (births per 1000 women) are calculated using yearly totals of MSA-level births to women age 20-44
divided by total female population age 20-44, both obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics,
National Vital Statistics System. House Prices are 2000 median home values scaled by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) housing price Index, and are displayed in 2006 dollars. Unemployment rate is the
annual mean unemployment are taken from Bureau of Labor Statistics local area unemployment statistics.
All three measures are yearly mean values calculated based on the 154 MSAs in our sample.
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Notes: These figures display the results of simulation exercises using estimates from the group spe-
cific IV regression specifications displayed in Table 7. We predict the percentage change in fertil-
ity rates from a $10,000 increase in mean housing prices for each ownership rate o displayed on the
x axis: (FertRate|HousePrice = h + 10k,OwnRate = o)−(FertRate|HousePrice = h,OwnRate =
o)/(FertRate|HousePrice = h,OwnRate = o). For each group, we calculate the standard error of the
prediction at the mean of the independent variables using 100 bootstrap replications and apply that stan-
dard error to calculate the confidence interval at each level of o.The solid line represents the predicted effect









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3: Housing Prices and Fertility Rates: 1997-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var. log(FertRate)mgt
HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg 0.0468*** 0.0468*** 0.0481*** 0.0485*** 0.0276***
(0.00443) (0.00448) (0.00481) (0.00488) (0.00375)
HousePricemt−1 -0.0124*** -0.0128*** -0.0111*** -0.0160*** -0.00509***
(0.00103) (0.00115) (0.00243) (0.00195) (0.00184)
OwnRatemg 0.0545 0.0542 0.0460 0.0445 0.0852
(0.318) (0.318) (0.320) (0.323) (0.267)
WhiteAge20− 29 0.948*** 0.949*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.902***
(0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.128) (0.120)
BlackAge20− 29 1.335*** 1.334*** 1.337*** 1.335*** 1.255***
(0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.186) (0.174)
HispanicAge20− 29 1.569*** 1.569*** 1.570*** 1.567*** 1.500***
(0.164) (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164)
BlackAge30− 44 0.0112 0.0111 0.0121 0.00995 -0.0484
(0.0749) (0.0748) (0.0743) (0.0749) (0.0680)
HispanicAge30− 44 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.369*** 0.365*** 0.328***
(0.0790) (0.0790) (0.0784) (0.0791) (0.0599)
FracCollmgt−1 -0.349*** -0.352*** -0.375*** -0.395*** -0.358***
(0.0641) (0.0648) (0.0682) (0.0710) (0.0679)
UnempRatemt−1 -0.00255 -0.00116 -0.00156 -0.00155
(0.00335) (0.00211) (0.00204) (0.00200)
25thWagemt−1 0.00138 0.000674 0.000237 0.000744
(0.00106) (0.000660) (0.000550) (0.000621)
50thWagemt−1 0.000166 0.000978* 0.000475 0.000839*
(0.000904) (0.000534) (0.000424) (0.000480)
75thWagemt−1 0.000623 0.000241 0.000182 0.000199
(0.000552) (0.000236) (0.000216) (0.000230)
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Trends No No Yes Yes Yes
MSA Quadratic No No No Yes No
MSA-Own Category Trends No No No No Yes
R2 0.908 0.908 0.910 0.910 0.937
Number of MSAs 154 154 154 154 154
N 9240 9240 9240 9240 9240
Notes: Fertility rates are total births over the total female population in each MSA, year of conception, age
category and race/ethnicity cell for women age 20-44. Mean home ownership rates are calculated in 1990
Census by year, msa, age category, and race/ethnicity. Fraction of cell that is a college graduate is matched
by msa, year, age category and race. House prices (10,000s), unemployment rates, and male wages are
matched by msa and year of conception. Data sources are described in the text. All specifications are
weighted by the total number of births in the cell. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the msa level
are in parentheses. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 4.4: Housing Prices and Fertility Rates by MSA Supply Elasticity: 1997-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low High First Stage 1: First Stage 2: IV
Elasticity Elasticity Hprice*Own Hprice
HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg 0.0428*** 0.0609*** 0.0723***
(0.00448) (0.0128) (0.00997)
HousePricemt−1 -0.0104*** -0.0170*** -0.0239***
(0.00117) (0.00498) (0.00328)
Elasticitym ∗HPIt ∗OwnRatemg -0.0137*** -0.000647**
(0.00200) (0.000287)
Elasticitym ∗HPIt -0.0111*** -0.0571***
(0.00186) (0.00956)
OwnRatemg 0.143 -0.394 17.93*** 0.193 -0.171
(0.433) (0.363) (2.332) (0.353) (0.291)
FracCollmgt−1 -0.419*** -0.111 4.995*** 0.674 -0.492***
(0.0856) (0.0762) (0.804) (0.673) (0.102)
UnempRatemt−1 -0.00644 0.0000946 -0.111 -0.994*** -0.0137**
(0.00459) (0.00270) (0.0887) (0.321) (0.00563)
25thWagemt−1 0.00253 -0.00106 -0.0147 0.0338 0.00226
(0.00152) (0.000871) (0.0319) (0.101) (0.00166)
50thWagemt−1 0.00134 -0.00117* 0.0154 0.116 0.00153
(0.00141) (0.000674) (0.0268) (0.0786) (0.00115)
75thWagemt−1 0.00111 0.000417 -0.0000601 0.0304 0.00120*
(0.000790) (0.000314) (0.0188) (0.0434) (0.000704)
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.900 0.939 0.876 0.932 0.897
F Statistic 29.60 18.32
Number of MSAs 77 77 154 154 154
N 4620 4620 9240 9240 9240
Notes: Fertility rates are total births over the total female population in each MSA, year of conception, age
category and race/ethnicity cell for women age 20-44. Mean home ownership rates are calculated in 1990
Census by year, msa, age category, and race/ethnicity. Fraction of cell that is a college graduate is matched
by msa, year, age category and race. House prices (10,000s) are matched by msa and year of conception (or
years prior to conception where noted). Elasticity refers to the Saiz (2011) supply elasticity measure and
HPI refers to the national version of the FHFA house price index. First stage 1 refers to the first stage
regression where the dependent variable is HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg and first stage 2 refers to the
first stage regression where the dependent variable is HousePricemt−1. All regression include group, MSA
and year fixed effects, as well as MSA-year unemployment rates and male wages. Data sources are
described in the text. All specification are weighted by the total number of births in the cell. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the msa level. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 4.5: Alternative House Price Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pricemt−1 Pricemt−2 Pricemt−3 Pricemt−4 AvgPricemt−2 AvgPricemt−3 AvgPricemt−4
Dep. Var. log(FertRate)mgt
OLS
HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg 0.0468*** 0.0534*** 0.0630*** 0.0718*** 0.0501*** 0.0541*** 0.0581***
(0.0045) (0.0052) (0.0063) (0.0077) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0057)
HousePricemt−1 -0.0128*** -0.0145*** -0.0172*** -0.0199*** -0.0136*** -0.0146*** -0.0157***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015)
IV
HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg 0.0723*** 0.0823*** 0.0919*** 0.0995*** 0.0770*** 0.0814*** 0.0853***
(0.0100) (0.0111) (0.0120) (0.0127) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0113)
HousePricemt−1 -0.0239*** -0.0274*** -0.0313*** -0.0353*** -0.0255*** -0.0272*** -0.0288***
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0038)
OwnRatemg -0.171 -0.301 -0.423 -0.509* -0.232 -0.288 -0.336
(0.291) (0.282) (0.275) (0.271) (0.287) (0.283) (0.280)
UnempRatemt−1 -0.0137** -0.0137** -0.0120** -0.00893* -0.0138** -0.0134** -0.0126**
(0.00563) (0.00573) (0.00547) (0.00494) (0.00567) (0.00559) (0.00542)
25thWagemt−1 0.00226 0.00222 0.00211 0.00202 0.00224 0.00220 0.00216
(0.00166) (0.00164) (0.00155) (0.00146) (0.00165) (0.00162) (0.00158)
50thWagemt−1 0.00153 0.00145 0.00134 0.00137 0.00149 0.00144 0.00142
(0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00109) (0.00103) (0.00115) (0.00112) (0.00109)
75thWagemt−1 0.00120* 0.00121* 0.00120* 0.00113** 0.00120* 0.00120* 0.00118*
(0.000704) (0.000701) (0.000649) (0.000561) (0.000702) (0.000685) (0.000653)
FracCollmgt−1 -0.492*** -0.505*** -0.502*** -0.491*** -0.498*** -0.499*** -0.497***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.0991) (0.0951) (0.102) (0.101) (0.0997)
Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Stat 1 29.60 27.83 25.94 23.78 28.87 28.24 27.67
F Stat 2 18.32 18.69 18.84 18.23 18.61 18.91 19.27
Number of MSAs 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
N 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780
Notes: Fertility rates are total births over the total female population in each MSA, year of conception, age
category and race/ethnicity cell for women age 20-44. Mean home ownership rates are calculated in 1990
Census by year, msa, age category, and race/ethnicity. Fraction of cell that is a college graduate is matched
by msa, year, age category and race. House prices (10,000s) are matched by msa and year of conception (or
years prior to conception where noted). Average house price refers to the average home price from the year
indicated up to the year of conception. The instrumental variable is the interaction between Saiz (2011)
supply elasticity measure and the national version of the FHFA house price index. First stage 1 refers to
the first stage regression where the dependent variable is HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg and first stage 2
refers to the first stage regression where the dependent variable is HousePricemt−1. F Stat 1 refers to the
first stage F statistic where the dependent variable is HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg, and F Stat 2 for
HousePricemt−1. All regression include group, MSA and year fixed effects, as well as MSA-year
unemployment rates and male wages. Data sources are described in the text. All specification are weighted
by the total number of births in the cell. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.8: Individual Level Analysis Using CPS: 1997-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No MSA/Year FE MSA/Year FE MSA/Year FE IV
Dep. Var. Pr(Birth)i
HousePricemt−1 ∗Owni 0.000631*** 0.000569*** 0.000567*** 0.000427
(0.000197) (0.000197) (0.000197) (0.000409)
HousePricemt−1 -0.000134 -0.000307** -0.000331** -0.0000331
(0.0000985) (0.000131) (0.000138) (0.000337)
Owni 0.0367*** 0.0377*** 0.0378*** 0.0403***









Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
IV No No No Yes
Mean Had Baby 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
Mean Own 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.498
F Stat 1 25.64
F Stat 2 17.08
N 192788 192788 192788 192788
Notes: Sample is women age 20-44 in March Current Population Survey 1998-2007. Dependent variable is
an indicator for having a child under one. House prices (10,000s), unemployment rates, and male wages are
matched by msa and year. Ownership is the household’s home ownership status, which is assigned as a 1
when the household owns a home and the respondent is the household head or spouse of the household
head. All regressions include fixed effects for education, year, age category, race, Hispanicity, and msa. The
instrumental variable is the interaction between Saiz (2011) supply elasticity measure and the national
version of the FHFA house price index. First stage 1 refers to the first stage regression where the
dependent variable is HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg and first stage 2 refers to the first stage regression
where the dependent variable is HousePricemt−1. Data sources are described in the text. Standard errors




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.10: House Prices and Home Equity Withdrawal Behavior
Dependent Variable: Does the Home Owner Currently Have a....?
Equity Loan Equity Line Equity First Mortgage Second Mortgage
or Line of Credit of Credit Loan Refinanced Refinanced
HousePricemt 0.00182** 0.00299*** -0.000478 0.00269* -0.00171
(0.000752) (0.000890) (0.000509) (0.00145) (0.00219)
Mean Dep Var. 0.196 0.185 0.0835 0.349 0.0755
(0.00272) (0.00329) (0.00193) (0.00449) (0.00642)
R2 0.055 0.262 0.026 0.104 0.072
N 21209 13948 20527 11289 1696
Dependent Variable: Why Did You Refinance Your First Mortgage?
Lower To Get Renew Increase Reduce
Interest Rate Cash or EYestend Payments Payments
HousePricemt -0.00319 0.00491*** -0.000503 0.000822 0.0000489
(0.00199) (0.00187) (0.000527) (0.000830) (0.00147)
Mean Dep. Var 0.857 0.131 0.00965 0.0221 0.104
(0.00558) (0.00537) (0.00156) (0.00234) (0.00487)
R2 0.107 0.053 0.043 0.043 0.068
N 3937 3937 3937 3937 3937
Notes: Displayed is the coefficient of MSA-year house prices on the probability of making different types of
home equity withdrawals, as well as the mean of each dependent variable. All regressions include control
for msa, year, race, ethnicity, and age. House prices (10,000s) are matched by MSA and year. Source is
American Housing Survey, National Version, Every other year 1997-2009. Refinancing is only available in
2001-2009. Questions only asked of home owners. Data is in panel form and respondents are asked if they
have ever done the specific activity. For instance, the question will ask, "is the respondents first mortgage a
refinancing of a previous mortgage?" "Why refinance?" is only asked for those who have refinanced. The
categories are not mutually exclusive and respondents may respond yes to multiple categories.
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Table 4.11: Characteristics of Metropolitan Areas in the Sample
Percent Change Home Fertility Elasticity Unemp Median
Metropolitan Area Name (2009 MSAD) Prices 97-06 Price 2006 Rate 2006 of Supply Rate 2006 Wage 2006
Salinas, CA 171.4% $ 588,736 103.5 1.10 6.92 $ 15.83
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 165.5% $ 628,696 86.3 0.89 4.04 $ 12.02
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 162.7% $ 338,547 90.6 0.94 4.92 $ 16.83
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 162.6% $ 515,061 76.1 0.63 4.78 $ 16.83
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 151.9% $ 398,870 77.8 1.14 4.87 $ 18.27
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 151.4% $ 474,242 81.1 0.67 3.96 $ 19.23
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 148.7% $ 556,284 86.3 0.75 4.30 $ 19.23
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL 146.5% $ 267,370 67.9 0.65 3.07 $ 15.11
Stockton, CA 146.4% $ 331,468 92.6 2.07 7.42 $ 21.31
Modesto, CA 145.8% $ 314,814 90.7 2.17 7.96 $ 18.69
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 144.1% $ 564,108 74.7 0.70 4.37 $ 24.04
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 142.6% $ 295,201 71.4 0.60 4.08 $ 15.11
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL 140.7% $ 290,506 76.3 0.83 3.64 $ 15.11
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 131.4% $ 510,412 73.5 1.00 3.99 $ 28.00
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 131.3% $ 241,947 86.4 1.28 2.88 $ 17.79
Fresno, CA 126.2% $ 264,992 97.8 1.84 8.01 $ 16.17
North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL 125.7% $ 247,504 75.6 0.92 3.06 $ 19.40
Port St. Lucie, FL 125.4% $ 238,298 79.9 1.19 3.89 $ 17.55
Bakersfield-Delano, CA 123.9% $ 230,694 105.8 1.64 7.54 $ 18.33
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 122.9% $ 781,891 64.0 0.66 3.89 $ 24.04
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL 117.7% $ 194,512 65.8 1.07 3.24 $ 16.83
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 117.2% $ 401,637 74.7 1.61 3.13 $ 23.08
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 117.0% $ 210,691 67.1 1.04 3.23 $ 17.55
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 116.9% $ 698,468 82.6 0.76 4.55 $ 24.04
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 112.7% $ 186,334 69.3 1.00 3.43 $ 19.23
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 107.0% $ 221,037 72.3 1.12 3.12 $ 15.42
Bethesda-Rockville-Frederick, MD 106.4% $ 445,442 80.1 1.61 2.87 $ 23.08
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ 106.4% $ 252,298 87.2 1.61 3.62 $ 16.35
Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ 105.1% $ 258,536 71.7 1.12 5.68 $ 23.32
New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ 104.7% $ 472,658 69.3 0.80 4.79 $ 21.63
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 98.4% $ 272,732 61.2 1.34 5.37 $ 13.10
Visalia-Porterville, CA 94.6% $ 224,105 108.8 1.97 8.50 $ 16.83
Boston-Quincy, MA 94.2% $ 349,966 61.4 0.86 4.66 $ 25.56
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 94.0% $ 290,782 73.6 1.79 4.12 $ 23.61
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 92.6% $ 288,093 85.8 1.39 4.28 $ 17.55
Jacksonville, FL 92.6% $ 181,653 73.2 1.06 3.26 $ 19.62
Baltimore-Towson, MD 89.8% $ 258,936 66.9 1.23 4.00 $ 23.45
Ocala, FL 89.2% $ 147,002 74.9 1.73 3.39 $ 12.02
Newark-Union, NJ-PA 88.6% $ 381,183 73.0 1.17 4.65 $ 21.63
Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC 85.6% $ 176,563 74.0 1.20 5.10 $ 19.23
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 85.5% $ 221,630 71.6 0.82 3.32 $ 16.68
Reno-Sparks, NV 84.7% $ 316,406 80.0 1.39 4.12 $ 16.83
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 82.9% $ 141,875 84.9 1.56 3.60 $ 15.68
Peabody, MA 81.8% $ 335,451 68.9 0.86 5.09 $ 25.56
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 81.0% $ 468,745 74.9 0.98 3.90 $ 29.91
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 80.7% $ 276,183 67.0 1.88 4.24 $ 23.02
Worcester, MA 80.6% $ 245,583 66.0 0.86 5.10 $ 20.00
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 77.4% $ 369,177 66.6 0.88 4.28 $ 23.94
Tucson, AZ 76.5% $ 198,430 73.7 1.42 4.01 $ 14.42
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA 76.0% $ 380,977 63.6 0.86 3.94 $ 25.56
Gainesville, FL 75.6% $ 169,875 52.6 2.48 2.66 $ 16.67
New Haven-Milford, CT 71.3% $ 261,064 65.8 0.98 4.85 $ 23.62
Tacoma, WA 71.0% $ 261,712 73.2 1.21 5.05 $ 23.94
Camden, NJ 70.5% $ 232,665 69.7 1.65 4.68 $ 21.45
Norwich-New London, CT 68.2% $ 252,431 61.6 1.46 4.17 $ 17.31
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Philadelphia, PA 67.6% $ 211,020 67.9 1.65 4.50 $ 21.45
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 66.5% $ 221,112 74.0 1.45 3.83 $ 22.12
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 63.9% $ 232,676 68.8 1.95 3.92 $ 21.45
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 61.2% $ 154,225 73.7 1.48 3.07 $ 15.38
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 61.0% $ 166,452 89.8 1.85 6.92 $ 19.23
Springfield, MA 59.4% $ 209,209 57.4 1.52 5.20 $ 20.60
Richmond, VA 58.0% $ 185,521 69.2 2.60 3.19 $ 19.23
Olympia, WA 57.3% $ 248,438 66.9 1.75 4.56 $ 21.06
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 54.2% $ 238,239 63.0 1.50 4.54 $ 24.04
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 52.9% $ 283,856 72.1 1.07 5.02 $ 20.41
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 52.8% $ 207,168 67.6 1.77 4.55 $ 19.23
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 52.8% $ 187,483 60.3 1.70 3.96 $ 18.63
Asheville, NC 51.8% $ 159,848 69.3 1.55 3.75 $ 17.79
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL 49.7% $ 251,216 74.0 0.81 4.46 $ 20.66
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 40.1% $ 216,292 77.5 1.53 4.46 $ 21.37
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 38.2% $ 180,640 71.3 1.03 4.85 $ 20.14
Spokane, WA 37.4% $ 182,067 71.9 1.64 4.94 $ 15.87
York-Hanover, PA 36.8% $ 172,685 68.4 1.99 3.97 $ 21.15
St. Louis, MO-IL 35.9% $ 136,093 69.3 2.36 5.09 $ 19.23
Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI 35.4% $ 258,459 75.9 1.00 4.65 $ 20.66
Racine, WI 35.1% $ 161,554 73.0 1.77 5.61 $ 20.19
Madison, WI 34.0% $ 201,667 63.0 2.25 3.41 $ 19.23
Reading, PA 33.9% $ 166,269 70.5 2.03 4.34 $ 20.61
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO 32.7% $ 132,146 82.9 2.06 3.55 $ 16.33
Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX 32.7% $ 157,418 75.6 3.00 4.15 $ 19.79
Lancaster, PA 31.8% $ 180,168 84.7 2.24 3.47 $ 19.23
Binghamton, NY 31.7% $ 107,227 65.2 2.26 4.65 $ 20.43
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 30.9% $ 113,243 85.0 2.23 5.00 $ 15.87
Utica-Rome, NY 30.1% $ 106,208 67.2 2.79 4.57 $ 9.68
Colorado Springs, CO 30.0% $ 198,587 78.2 1.67 4.69 $ 17.09
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 29.5% $ 179,457 76.0 2.55 4.63 $ 18.13
Albuquerque, NM 28.2% $ 183,194 76.2 2.11 3.92 $ 16.33
Mobile, AL 27.9% $ 107,656 74.1 2.04 3.60 $ 22.24
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI 27.8% $ 127,136 73.9 2.06 6.89 $ 23.56
Kansas City, MO-KS 27.6% $ 132,024 77.6 3.19 5.03 $ 20.31
Salt Lake City, UT 27.4% $ 225,663 97.0 0.75 2.96 $ 17.09
Lafayette, LA 27.1% $ 120,141 72.9 4.84 2.89 $ 18.03
Baton Rouge, LA 27.0% $ 122,634 72.3 1.74 3.93 $ 20.03
Ann Arbor, MI 26.6% $ 212,388 55.7 2.29 4.56 $ 35.26
Chattanooga, TN-GA 26.4% $ 119,291 66.3 2.11 4.40 $ 16.35
El Paso, TX 25.9% $ 99,742 95.5 2.35 6.71 $ 13.46
Knoxville, TN 25.8% $ 131,259 64.7 1.42 4.15 $ 19.51
Lexington-Fayette, KY 25.8% $ 140,213 66.8 2.63 4.63 $ 19.90
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 24.7% $ 121,813 72.7 2.14 3.22 $ 19.23
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 24.6% $ 102,182 81.0 2.98 4.61 $ 14.05
Syracuse, NY 24.5% $ 116,321 63.5 2.21 4.69 $ 19.44
Corpus Christi, TX 24.1% $ 94,566 76.4 1.65 4.95 $ 14.79
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 23.6% $ 150,613 68.4 1.63 3.67 $ 18.38
Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 23.2% $ 161,298 72.7 2.24 4.23 $ 18.49
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 22.9% $ 109,720 74.0 3.57 5.85 $ 20.09
Columbia, SC 22.8% $ 119,656 68.6 2.64 5.53 $ 14.42
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 22.4% $ 133,123 58.0 2.58 5.79 $ 19.71
Scranton–Wilkes-Barre, PA 22.2% $ 123,566 63.9 1.62 5.15 $ 15.82
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 21.4% $ 113,685 65.5 1.24 8.39 $ 24.04
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 20.0% $ 129,175 80.5 3.66 3.38 $ 19.23
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 19.4% $ 105,763 73.4 4.11 4.28 $ 16.44
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 19.4% $ 171,002 67.9 2.11 3.91 $ 16.49
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Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 19.1% $ 124,055 80.2 2.18 4.82 $ 18.73
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR 19.0% $ 108,394 74.1 2.79 4.68 $ 14.74
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 18.6% $ 127,502 70.8 2.34 5.67 $ 16.02
Pittsburgh, PA 18.3% $ 110,200 60.9 1.20 4.68 $ 19.15
Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI 18.2% $ 186,579 64.0 1.30 6.42 $ 24.04
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 18.1% $ 76,356 79.5 2.49 5.89 $ 14.62
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 16.5% $ 131,715 77.5 2.39 5.80 $ 18.18
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 16.3% $ 151,494 77.2 3.09 4.76 $ 17.20
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 16.2% $ 124,335 85.0 3.47 3.45 $ 19.23
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 15.7% $ 127,799 67.0 2.48 5.45 $ 23.08
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 15.7% $ 108,505 81.7 2.80 4.72 $ 18.73
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC 15.6% $ 105,663 64.7 2.41 5.85 $ 16.15
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 15.5% $ 138,971 71.8 2.51 5.14 $ 21.18
Lubbock, TX 15.0% $ 83,529 72.7 4.33 3.98 $ 14.66
Peoria, IL 14.4% $ 110,385 76.4 3.23 4.17 $ 16.08
Columbus, OH 13.8% $ 146,041 73.0 2.71 4.65 $ 19.23
Rockford, IL 13.8% $ 123,510 75.5 3.68 5.63 $ 16.83
Toledo, OH 13.8% $ 114,567 65.4 2.21 5.99 $ 24.55
Raleigh-Cary, NC 13.7% $ 178,667 76.2 2.11 3.70 $ 21.45
Flint, MI 13.6% $ 108,328 70.2 2.75 8.04 $ 19.23
Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC 13.5% $ 117,495 72.7 2.71 5.64 $ 16.83
Gary, IN 13.2% $ 131,597 72.5 1.74 5.35 $ 20.66
Springfield, MO 13.1% $ 114,971 71.1 3.60 3.87 $ 16.24
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 12.8% $ 107,023 74.1 4.36 5.14 $ 17.63
Winston-Salem, NC 12.4% $ 128,671 72.5 3.10 4.27 $ 13.22
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 11.8% $ 108,828 75.7 1.76 5.68 $ 19.71
Wichita, KS 11.6% $ 96,868 88.7 5.45 4.57 $ 16.35
Montgomery, AL 11.1% $ 108,348 70.5 3.58 3.45 $ 14.90
Ogden-Clearfield, UT 10.9% $ 179,163 109.0 0.75 3.14 $ 22.84
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 10.9% $ 100,272 66.1 2.23 7.35 $ 14.42
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 9.9% $ 115,101 60.5 1.83 5.11 $ 19.23
Greensboro-High Point, NC 9.8% $ 122,924 66.1 3.10 4.79 $ 16.83
Akron, OH 9.0% $ 132,057 62.6 2.59 5.16 $ 18.03
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 8.7% $ 140,618 66.6 1.02 5.52 $ 19.47
Canton-Massillon, OH 8.6% $ 117,865 68.9 3.03 5.70 $ 15.87
Fayetteville, NC 7.8% $ 107,010 83.9 2.71 5.38 $ 14.42
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 7.5% $ 97,192 64.3 2.59 6.07 $ 18.96
Rochester, NY 7.3% $ 117,940 63.9 1.40 4.56 $ 19.23
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 7.0% $ 130,473 78.3 4.00 4.36 $ 19.23
Spartanburg, SC 6.8% $ 100,563 70.5 2.71 6.59 $ 16.75
Dayton, OH 3.9% $ 119,761 68.0 3.71 5.65 $ 17.07
Fort Wayne, IN 3.3% $ 101,869 81.1 5.36 4.89 $ 19.23
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